

- [Kremlev Sergey \(Brezkun Sergey Tarasovich\)](#)
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# **Kremlev Sergey (Brezkun Sergey Tarasovich) Russia and Germany - play off! (From Wilhelm's Versailles to Wilson's Versailles)**

Kremlev Sergey\*

Russia and Germany: pit!

From Wilhelm's Versailles to Wilson's

Versailles A new look at the

old war \*Actually: Sergey Tarasovich

Brezkun Publisher's abstract: In the 20th century, the whole world was shocked by two major wars between Russia and Germany. The author of the book, S. Kremlev, argues convincingly and convincingly that there might not have been bloodshed, since the entire course of world history clearly confirms that the two great powers are allies, not enemies.

About the author: Ukrainian. Born October 7, 1951 in Dnepropetrovsk in the family of a railway engineer. He graduated from high school in the city of Kerch and the engine building department of the Kharkov Aviation Institute. NOT. Zhukovsky by specialty - engine-rocket engineer. After serving in the coastal units of the Black Sea Fleet, since 1978 - an employee of the largest and oldest center for the development of Soviet nuclear weapons of the All-Union Research Institute of Experimental Physics in Arzamas-16 (later - the city of Kremlev, now - the city of Sarov, Nizhny Novgorod region). Now it is the Russian Federal Nuclear Center - All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics (RFNC-VNIIEF). He took part in the development of thermonuclear charges, in 1981 he participated in field tests at the Semipalatinsk test site. Since 1992 - an employee of the Department of Problematic Analysis of Nuclear Weapons of the RFNC VNIIEF, as well as one of the deputy directors of the Institute

Strategic Author of numerous publications on a wide range of socio-political topics and on the conceptual problems of nuclear weapons. Co-author of the books (with I.I. Nikitchuk) "START-2 at a glance" and "21st century. Will Russia have a nuclear weapons complex?" (the latter was published as an official publication of the State Duma of the Russian Federation) and the book (with VN Mikhailov) "Good or Evil? The Philosophy of a Stable World". Contents From the Author Foreword Part One From the Sedan to the Paris Conference Chapter 1. The Maps of the Century Are Handed Over, the Map of the World is Colored Chapter 2. Bismarck, Disraeli,

Witte, and the

Oshansky

Ovenmaker

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"cutting

up" Chapter 11. New directives - Dawes and Young's plans Chapter 12. If

somewhere something loses... Russia and Germany

- together or apart? From the author The story of this book is as follows... At first, I

was

interested in the circumstances and origins of the formation of

the conflict "Germany - the USSR." But, considering them in

detail, I was forced to descend more and more

along the time scale into the depths of time. From

the beginning

of the thirties - to the post-Versailles Weimar Germany and the semi-Trotskyist USSR

of the early twenties, then to the Treaty of Versailles, the First World War, and then to its prehistory.

Working on my "Versailles", I wanted to give not an adventurous "version" of events, but to restore the historical era as it unfolded in reality. What forces moved the world

on the eve of the 20th century and at its beginning? Why did World War I happen? Who and why is preparing such wars? How did Germany become the "cash cow of Versailles"? I wanted to explore these issues with logical precision and analytical openness, but at the same time original and exciting. Not shunning sometimes almost detective situations and ascertaining ... I hope that this book will be seen by a thoughtful and inquisitive reader.

What was Russia's alliance with France and England? Did the German emperor Wilhelm II want war? What was Germany supposed to be for Russia - an enemy or a partner and ally? What is the role of America and the Golden International of financiers in the preparation of the war? Is there much truth in the story of Lenin's "sealed carriage"? And how did the outcome of World War I set the stage for World War II? A new look at the

initial time of the formation of the world of the 20th century, at the prehistory, history and "posthistory" of the old war - this is the essence of my historical research "From Wilhelm's Versailles to Wilson's Versailles".

Among the historical figures present on the pages of the book, there are both well-known Nicholas II and Wilhelm II, Lloyd George and Clemenceau, Bismarck and US President Wilson, as well as "behind the scenes" figures: the "gray reverend" of German foreign policy, Baron Holstein, an international arms dealer Basil Zakharov, the "gray eminence" from the USA, Colonel Mandel House, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of England, Sir Edward Gray, as well as the financiers Witte and the Rothschilds, the head of the Jewish community of St. many others - famous and unknown heroes of the era - heroes in quotes and without them. In the 1920s, he wrote his book "Europe in the era of imperialism. 1871-1919" on the same topic. Academician E. Tarle.

But I did not follow the established schemes, however, I did not ignore them, but critically rethought them. And at the same time tried to leave what

made it possible to reveal historical truth, and not to correct it in any predetermined spirit.

Not striving for the laurels of Valentin Pikul, who overly fictionalizes the story, or Alexander Bushkov, who interprets it superficially, the author wanted to achieve ease, but not lightness, of the reader's perception of serious facts and assessments.

The author expresses his deep gratitude to his colleagues at the Institute of Strategic Stability of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russia and the Director of the ISS, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Viktor Nikitovich Mikhailov for the constant and diverse support of the author's work in the field of historical and military-political analysis.

Preface Dear Reader! This book turned out to be, although pleasant for me, but a by-product of a large and still unfinished work. Its topic was the question that interested me: how inevitable was the clash between the USSR and Germany? Indeed, in the deadly confrontation between the two great powers and peoples, Germany suffered a major defeat, and Russia, although it won, but in the historical perspective, it turned out to be Pyrrhic. And it became so

because during the war the Soviet Union had to engage in labor not peaceful, but military. By 1941, our economic prospects could, without exaggeration, be called grandiose. If the third five-year plan in 1942 had been completed as planned, and there would have been an opportunity to complete the fourth five-year plan by 1947, then by the beginning of the fifties the astonished world would have seen with its own eyes what even in such a backward country in the past as Russia could achieve people working not for the internal parasitic and semi-parasitic elite, not for the financial and industrial structures of the Golden International, but for themselves.

Economic progress would ensure the well-being of the peoples of Russia, a new generation would be firmly established in life - in comparison with the fathers and grandfathers, qualitatively differently educated, more cultured.

And after prosperity, education and culture, socialist democratization would also come - as an expansion of the opportunity for the broad masses to independently control their own destiny.

On June 22, 1941, such opportunities were put to rest. But after all, Germany, despite the fact that now it has bypassed its former victor far, has also suffered a defeat in the historical perspective. She also missed her historical chance! After all, if not for her last "Drang nach Osten", she could today be (and by right!) The second power in the world after the USSR.

The conflict was mutually meaningless, but was it automatically programmed by the confrontation between the communist USSR and the nationalist Third Reich? Yes, the future Marshal of the Soviet Union Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, when he was the commander of the troops of the Leningrad and then the Moscow districts, published in 1927-1929 the famous three-volume work "The Brain of the Army", which said: "Great wars are like an earthquake. ...> Unfortunately, this "earthquake", which has been experienced, has not yet ...> deprived imperialism of its anaconda embraces that suffocate humanity. ...> A series of wars are ahead, fierce wars, because the contradictions that exist between the capitalist form of the world economy and the emerging new economic structure, are so great that one cannot do without great sacrifices and struggle.

The USSR was preparing for war, like other countries, like Germany. And very many believed that these two countries would have to face again in the future. They say that "ideology" programs everything here ... But

here is the opinion of the Japanese Sovietologist Professor Terataka: "By the conclusion of the Soviet-German treaty, the idea of a world revolution faded into the background. Trotsky brought his theory of the "permanent revolution". It, that is, in the thirties (XX century. - S.K.) there was a certain de-ideologization of Soviet foreign policy.

Professor Terataka rightly believes that Stalin gave priority to ensuring the sovereignty of the USSR. So, the ideological attitudes were aimed at war, and from this point of view it became really inevitable. However, directly state interests were oriented towards peace. And this circumstance alone makes everything not so obvious. True, Terataka himself wrote: "It is often possible to come across the

assertion that Bolshevism and Nazism are one and the same field. I am with this

strongly disagree. Nazism and Bolshevism are genetic enemies. "It seems to be all true? Yes, if we keep in mind the ideological point. But is it true in general? Asking this question, I by no means join those falsifiers of history who are trying to convince us that Stalin and Hitler are related phenomena. Here everything is ambiguous.

Kinship - neither ideological nor spiritual - was not in sight here. But something capable of reconciling and finding common interests - perhaps it was! The same

Terataka - unlike many of today's Russian defrocked with academic degrees in "Marxist history" - admits that by the end of the thirties, the Stalinist USSR put itself at the forefront, and not Trotsky's chimeras. Why, even Lenin, let's say

parenthetically, in his last works worried about how we should "organize emulation", "reorganize the Rabkrin", and not about how to kindle a "global conflagration".

That is, Stalin's Bolshevism had an increasingly pronounced state and even, I would say, national character. Only the national coloring here was not purely Russian, but new - Soviet.

The thesis of the "Soviet people" as a new historical community of people is now being laughed at. But the idea that at the beginning of the 20th century a new nation began to take shape in Russia - the Russian one, was expressed by General A.I. Denikin in Notes of a Russian Officer. In the USSR, this trend, subtly noticed by Anton Ivanovich, only developed and strengthened. And Bolshevism of the Stalinist formation increasingly put the interests of the new Soviet-Russian nation above

Total.

German Nazism put the interests of the German nation above all else. But the highest interests of both nations - both Soviet-Russian and German - were to ensure mutual friendship and cooperation, which had both a natural economic basis and deep historical roots. And on the basis of common national interests, it was the USSR and Germany that would not necessarily have to come together in hand-to-hand combat. Professor Terataka was not mistaken: Nazism and Bolshevism,

as ideologies, were indeed deeply genetically alien to each other, up to direct antagonism.

But this did not mean that the Nazi Third Reich, as the state of the German people, and the socialist Soviet Union, as the state of the Soviet people, were the same genetic enemies. Germany and Russia, historically and geopolitically, were not initially enemies, because they were always called upon not to destroy, but to complement each other. And yet between them in a short historical period

twice there were violent wars. What's the matter? Why?

Examining in detail the circumstances and origins of the formation of the Germany-USSR conflict, I found that the causes of their occurrence lead back into the depths of time: from the beginning of the thirties to post-Versailles Weimar Germany and the semi-Trotskyist USSR of the early twenties, then to the Treaty of Versailles, the First World War, and then - and to its prehistory.

At the same time, such a branch of the topic is somehow natural and logical acquired independent significance and completeness.

After the prehistory, history and posthistory of the old war lay down on paper, I realized that I had already written one book - the one that you, the reader, are now holding in your hands. Its first main idea is clear and needs no special comments. The World Wars were conceived and provided by World Gold. The ruling exploiting elites of the world are the main and only cause of the major wars of the 20th century. Developing and arguing this idea, plunging into passions that had long since died

down, but still not obsolete, over and over again I came to the idea of the artificiality of the participation of pre-revolutionary Russia in the war of the Western world with Germany. We shouldn't have fought with her, we didn't need it, from any point of view. Unless, of course, we keep in mind the point of view of a friend of Russia, and not its ill-wisher. Actually, investigating the problem of "Germans - Russian Slavs", one could get to the times of the late Roman Empire and even more

ancient Vedic, Aryan ones. And on this path - far from being rich in mutual conflicts, we would remember that Ivan the Terrible, for example, waged the Livonian war not with the Germans, but

above all with the Swedes, that the Smolensk regiments were on the Grunwald field only due to the fact that the Smolensk lands



were then under the rule of Lithuania, that Alexander Nevsky received his nickname for the Neva victory in 1240, not over the German "dog knights", but over the Swedish army led by a relative of the Swedish king Birger. Yes, and in the Battle of the Ice, in a clash with the Teutonic Order, which occurred two years later, the order troops were actually international (Germans, Danes, volunteer knights from other European countries, Chud-Ests).

The first edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia in the first volume for 1926 names the Swedes, Livonians, Lithuanians among the enemies of Alexander Nevsky, but does not even mention the Germans. The Teutonic Order itself appeared in the Baltic at the invitation of the Polish prince Konrad Mazowiecki and settled there by the will of the Catholic rulers of the West to fight the Lithuanian pagan Slavs. Oriented the Teutonic knights and Orthodox Rus', but the knights, not the Germans as such.

By the way, in the same first edition of the TSB, but already in volume 45, published in 1940 (!) The Battle on the Ice is described in detail and with an emphasis on the Germans ... I think it was not Stalin and not the friends of Russia who signed the encyclopedic article for publication with such here is the focus ... We

remember the victories of the Russian miracle heroes at Yegersdorf and Kunersdorf over the Prussian army in the Seven Years' War, we know that in 1760 the Russians reached Berlin for the first time (occupying it, however, only for three days). But few people remember that the Seven Years' War began because of the colonial quarrels of England and France, and then Russia was dragged into this absolutely unnecessary war by the Austrian Empress Maria Theresa, deftly using Elizabeth Petrovna's personal resentment against the Prussian King Frederick.

The conflict between Prussia and Russia was beneficial only to Austria, France, England and Sweden. The famous memoirist of those times Andrei Bolotov (a participant in the Seven Years' War) wrote: "Secret alliances were concluded (by Maria Theresa. - S.K.) with the Saxon elector, who was then together with the king of Poland, also with the king of France and with Sweden itself. Used there were all possible ways to conclude the same alliance with Russia and to incline her to the fact that she, too, was woven into this contrived and not in the least concerning matter.

Ever since Russia entered the European and world level, there have been attempts to "weave" and "weave" it into adventures that are alien to it more than once. And it would not be superfluous to talk about it, but such time travel would take us too far away from the problems of recent and current...

I am not a historian, but a nuclear analyst. And embarking on a reassessment of the latest history of the 20th century, as well as the era adjacent to it, he did not proceed from personal likes and dislikes, did not build schemes in advance and did not want to proceed from other people's constructions. I did not follow the established schemes, however, I did not ignore them, but I critically rethought, trying to leave what made it possible to reveal the historical truth, and not correct it in any predetermined key: "communist-official", nationalist, pro-Western or anti-Soviet. Without striving for the laurels of Valentin Pikul, who overly (and sometimes maliciously) fictionalizes the story, or Alexander Bushkov, who interprets it superficially, I wanted to achieve ease, but not lightness, of the reader's perception of serious facts and assessments. The basis of my approach was a critical analysis based on parallel

reading (of course, I began it many years before I started working on this topic) of various pre-revolutionary, Soviet, post-Soviet and Western sources. It was my first fulcrum - my first "whale".

The second "whale" was the belief in the commonality of the basic human manifestations in any era. To understand how true this or that historical evidence is, it is very useful to imagine yourself in this era, in the place of its heroes. And the honesty of the approach

was chosen as the third point of support. I did not seek to give some new version of events. I wanted to carry out a reconstruction that was closest to what actually happened, that is, to restore the true (in other words, secret) background of what was happening in front of hundreds of millions of people. And when the framework of my ideas about those

times was already outlined, I made it a rule not to be afraid to test it for strength over and over again, comparing what I did with what others had done before. And, in my opinion, the building that I invite the reader to enter is not built on sand.

In the 1920s, he wrote his book "Europe in the era of imperialism. 1871-1919" on the same topic. academician E.V. Tarle. To be honest, I found out about this after the first draft of the book was ready.

And I sat down to study the work of Yevgeny Viktorovich, more and more rejoicing that I was reading it after, and not before, writing my "Versailles ...". Tarle's book is superb in fact and, as always with him, brilliant. However, historically it is not well-founded. Why I appreciate it so, the reader will, I hope, understand when reading my books...

Different historians and authors have lied or kept silent in different ways. Their views and readiness for accuracy, bearing in mind their adherence to the "pre-renegade" Central Committee of the CPSU, were influenced by certain factors, and the positions

of Western historians by others. Memoirists were often even more biased than historians, and if they were honest, it was the editors of their memoirs who edited the real story. In post-Soviet times, absolutely inveterate liars, opportunists and "historians"-defiants began to operate in the Russian information spaces.

But even among the lies, a solid, reliable truth can come across. It was not easy to find in these rubble, created jointly by East and West, not fake, but real "bricks" of events, facts and reasons, but I tried, reader.

Without knowing, at least briefly, how and why the First World War was conceived, how it began, continued and ended, it is absolutely impossible to understand either the causes of the Second World War or, in general, what is happening in the world today. But the history of the First World War is interesting and instructive in itself.

It is also instructive in that it reveals well the technology by which in the 20th century Russians and Germans were pushed head-on for the first time, and then for the second time.

Will they push us into the third? The question is not idle. Destroyed from the outside and from the inside, today's Russia can be taken by the outside world, it would seem, with bare hands. That's how they take us.

However, can we be taken with armed hands? No, to this day - it is unlikely, because in this case the peoples of Russia are aware of the disastrous situation and, as of old, bristle with needles

resistance. That is, for Russia, which has realized itself as a sovereign and independent power, confrontation with the outside world is inevitable.

What position will be in the interests of the German people here? Is a new confrontation with Russia profitable for Germany? We need to think about this today, so that our tomorrow will be smarter and more prudent than the posture - and posture-pose-yesterday.

Solzhenitsyn also wrote about the First World War... Historian and publicist Nikolai Nikolayevich Yakovlev rated the novel "August 14" as a book imbued with "Smerdyakov's" longing that, they say, a "smart nation" (the Germans) did not subdue a "quite stupid" nation "(that is, us) ... Not badly assessed, but

Smerdyakov spoke, in fact, about the French:" It would be nice if these same Frenchmen conquered us then: a smart nation would conquer a very stupid one and annex it. other orders... Yakovlev was both right and wrong... While rightly rejecting

Solzhenitsyn's concept, he did not see the beneficence of the idea of the significance of Germany for Russia. Not the subjugation of the Russians - a nation that is socially very inexperienced and inept - by the Germans, that is, a nation really more organized and businesslike, but mutually beneficial peaceful ties - that would be justified politically, economically, and civilizationaly.

I do not think that what I have said can be assessed as cringing before Germany and preaching the inferiority of Russia. No, I think that in such a statement there is only a sober understanding of those historically (since the time of the accursed Tatar-Mongol yoke) existing vices of the Russian national character, which it would be easiest for us to get rid of in alliance with only one "external" people - the German. In the midst of our first tragic conflict with Germany - on October 4, 1917

- the German Thomas Mann wrote to the German professor Witkop: "And how I love everything Russian! How it amuses me with its opposition to everything French and its contempt for it, which you meet in Russian literature at every step! How much closer to each other Russian and German humanity! My long-term sincere desire is consent and alliance with Russia "...

Like this.

It remains to say the last ... I did not want to tie "all the ends" in this book - rather, a series of "knots for memory" is tied here. In the subtitle of the title, I wrote "A new look at an old war", but you could also write "a direct look, not biased." And, of course, I wanted to attach you,

dear reader, to this view, to convince you that I was right. But above all, I wanted to write not just a book that was accurate and strict from a factual point of view, but an interesting one. I tried, reader. And what came of it, now you judge. Sergey Kremlev

(Sergey Brezkun) Part one. From the Sedan to the Paris Conference

Chapter 1. Maps of the century

handed over,

the map of the world painted The era  
between

the two world wars cannot be understood

without knowing the causes of the First World War, and several main questions arise about the reasons ... Was war being prepared? If prepared, then by whom, how and why? How inevitable was it? And how did at least the main events that preceded it proceed? By the way, even in ancient times serious European historians gave in to these questions. The French professor A. Debidour finished his most famous work, The History of European Diplomacy, in 1891 as follows: "We can hope (without falling into utopia) that the most devastating wars of conquest, the causes of which, almost always, are the ambition of a dynasty or thoughtless the impulse of a people, will become more and more rare in Europe."

Everything here was a mistake: both the explanation of the reasons, and the very prediction of the course of events. A quarter of a century after Debidur's forecast, it was precisely a devastating war of conquest with the participation of the professor's compatriots that was going on in the very center of Europe. But where and when did it start?

To the question "When did it end?" easier to answer. Finally: on June 28, 1919 in France, in Versailles, when signatures were put under the main document fixing the results of the First World War. What if we go back in time? Then, going over the past year by year, we can see that

the First World War began - in Versailles in the second half of the 19th century, when the conditions for such a European war began to form, in the slightest comparison with which even the Napoleonic wars did not go. Versailles is a former

village, later a small town eighteen kilometers from Paris. Louis XIV set up a brilliant residence in it. Since then, Versailles entered not only the chronicles of the court, but also the history of diplomacy. In 1763 - six years before the birth of Napoleon, the Republic of Genoa handed over Corsica to France here. In 1783, the Treaty of Versailles established the independence of the United States. In the light of future distant events -

symbolic detail.

Everyone has heard about the beauty of the fountains of Versailles. It is less known that in order for the "sun king" to admire the brilliance of the water jets, both gold and blood flowed like a river here at first. The royal treasury spent nine million livres in three years on the construction of a water pipe for the Versailles cascades. Thirty thousand soldiers and masons employed in construction had only lives. Ten thousand of them had to pay with their lives for royal pleasure. And the entire Versailles complex cost the people of France half a billion livres. The overall result in human casualties has eluded historians. Versailles has been a symbol of eternal festivity for centuries, but its true symbolic essence is different:

behind the external golden brilliance for hundreds of the elect, poverty, suffering and death of millions of those who created this brilliance. By the second half of the nineteenth century, many great events were reflected in the ponds of Versailles. Here

the French monarchy, in the person of Louis XIV, reached its power, from here King Louis XVI and Queen Marie Antoinette set off on a journey that ended for them on the guillotine. Here, with short steps, the Emperor of the French Napoleon measured the long luxurious halls of the palace, and here much later his nephew, also Emperor Napoleon III, flaunted. The second empire of the third Napoleon ended with the surrender of the French army at Sedan during the Franco-Prussian War.

This long-standing war, which was of epoch-making significance not only for both countries participating in it, but also for the rest of the big world, was always written in the Soviet Union indistinctly. True, it did not come to direct falsifications, however, the angles of the

presentation of the era were seriously shifted. What's the matter here? Perhaps in the fact that one of the results of the war was first the formation and then the fall of the Paris Commune. And the indirect involvement of Prussia, Bismarck, Moltke in the defeat of the Commune immediately programmed a negative

attitude towards the victory of the Germans in the writings of Soviet historians. The "historians of the Central Committee of the CPSU" thought that gloomy, militaristic, militaristic, bloodthirsty and aggressive Prussia, wanting to quickly fulfill the program of German unification "with iron and blood", invaded sunny and cheerful France, brutally suppressed it. took Alsace and Lorraine and robbed the defeated French, imposing on

them an indemnity of 5 billion francs. Bismarck was generally accused of forgery. He allegedly provoked the war by crossing out a few phrases from the so-called Ems dispatch before

sending it to print. With such a scheme in front of my eyes, it was not immediately possible to figure out that on July 19, 1870, France declared war on Prussia! Moreover, Ivan Sergeevich Turgenev, who was closely connected with the French social environment, nevertheless assessed this announcement as "disenfranchised (ie, unfounded. S.K.), impudently

frivolous." And arrogantly aggressive, I will add already. The French empire of Napoleon III set out to at least appropriate the Rhine province with the historical cities of Cologne, Aachen, Trier (the birthplace of Karl Marx), that is, as Turgenev commented, "almost the most precious edge of German land for the German heart."

The French were sure of victory in advance. Their Chaspo gun in range (up to 1800 m) and rate of fire (9 rounds per minute) was superior to the Prussian Dreyse needle gun. The Germans had a decisive advantage in artillery: Krupp's steel rifled guns fired at 3.5 kilometers, and the French bronze ones - no further than 2.8 kilometers. Knowing this, we can say that the war turned out to be a kind of

confrontation of the fanfare "bronze of feelings" and modern, newest "steel will and mind".

In his "Letters on the Franco-Prussian War", written in August 1870 in Baden-Baden, Turgenev noted: "The chances are on the side of the Germans. their numerical superiority is so great, the superiority of material resources is so obvious "... Turgenev wrote about the opponents of the Germans: "I have noticed before that the French are least interested in the truth ... They really appreciate wit,

imagination, taste, ingenuity, - especially wit. But is there any truth in all this? This unwillingness to know the truth at home is combined with laziness to find out what is happening with others, with neighbors. And besides, who does not know that the French are "the most learned, most advanced people in the world, representative of civilization and fights for ideas "... Under the current terrible circumstances, this conceit, this ignorance, this fear of the truth, this disgust for it - terrible blows fell upon the French themselves."

Turgenev hoped that the defeats would bring France to reason, make her look at herself with a sober look, as was the case with Russia after the Crimean War. However, looking ahead, we can say that the French did not draw the right conclusions ... Instead of working hard, learn from the Germans how to build the country's economic power on a daily basis (and at the same time learn and respect their neighbor teachers, as Peter I did in relation to the Swedes), the French put all the passions of the Gallic soul into the idea of "revenge on the bosses." And this circumstance alone gave reason to expect a major military conflict in the future on the same battlefields - in the region of Strasbourg, Metz, Chalons-sur-Marne ... And to expect not so much the Germans as the narrow-minded, but vindictive French.

The meaning of the Franco-Prussian war is often seen in the "conquest plans" of the Prussian Junkers. Well, that was one of the reasons. In a completely different way, its meaning was imagined in real time by a truly Russian person who lived for a long time in France, who died in Bougival near Paris, but who also considered Germany to be his second fatherland. Testimonies and estimates of I.S. Turgenev are valuable for several reasons at once, because he is - and well



an informed contemporary, and a subtle, attentive observer, and a great writer, and an objective analyst, committed not to one side of anyone, but only to his own vision of events. I think, reader, that seeing the Franco-Prussian war through his eyes will be both useful and interesting for us. And, perhaps surprisingly...

So, on August 8, 1870, Turgenev wrote to P. Annenkov: "From the very beginning, you know, I was for them (the Germans. - S.K.) with all my heart, because in one irrevocable fall of the Napoleonic system I see the salvation of civilization, the possibility of free the development of free institutions in Europe: it was unthinkable until this outrage received a worthy punishment ... Speaking without jokes: I sincerely love and respect the French people, I recognize their great and glorious role in the past, I have no doubt in their future significance; many of my best friends, the people closest to me are the French; and therefore you will, of course, not suspect me of deliberate and unjust hostility to their homeland.

That is why Turgenev did not just express a personal point of view, but wrote the pure truth, saying: "All this time I diligently read both French and German newspapers - and, honestly, I must say that there is no comparison between them. , such slander, such ignorance of the enemy, such ignorance, finally, as in French newspapers, I could not imagine ... Even in such efficient newspapers as, for example, "Temps" come across news like that Prussian non-commissioned officers they follow the ranks of soldiers with iron rods in their hands to drive them into battle, etc. ... And this is said at a time when all of Germany rose from end to end against the primordial enemy "... And the enemy really was an old one - since the time of the

Thirty Years' War and the subsequent Peace of Westphalia in 1648, according to which France wrested Alsace from Germany and achieved legal consolidation of German fragmentation into a bunch of small "kingdoms" and "principalities". The sovereign trash is the same everywhere, in Russia of the early Middle Ages, in absolutist Europe. Russian appanage princes "secured" the three-hundred-year Tatar yoke of Russia, the French dukes and counts - the Hundred Years' War of France. And the German "great" princelings are more

for two hundred years blocked Germany's path to unification. But "Westphalian" principles and ideas helped

them in this too. Not without reason, even decades after Sedan, Chancellor of the German Empire von Bülow, speaking on November 14, 1906 in the Reichstag, recalled: "The Peace of Westphalia created France and destroyed

Germany." Now, when Germany was reborn and responded to a raised sword with a raised sword, the French showed neither intelligence, nor a sense of proportion, nor nobility in their confrontation with her. The official "Journal Officiel" assured that the goal of the war on the part of France was the return to the Germans of their freedom (!). The magazine "Soir" exclaimed: "Our soldiers are so sure of victory that they are seized, as it were, by some modest fear of their own inevitable (this was written a month before Sedan. What? - S.K.) triumph"! At the same time, a Parisian newspaper with the name "Freedom" praised a certain Marc Fournier for his article in the "Paris-journal", where it was said literally: "At last we will know the voluptuousness of beating. Let the blood of the Prussians flow in streams, waterfalls, with the divine fury of the flood! Let a scoundrel who only dares to say the word "peace" will be immediately shot like a dog

and thrown into the gutter "... The matter was not limited to words ... The Germans were beaten (not on the battlefield, but civilians living in France) and special by decree they were expelled (cleanly) from the French borders. Turgenev noted: "Ruin threatens thousands of honest and hardworking families who settled in France in the belief that they were accepted into their bowels by a

civilized state." At that time, Prussia was considered a friend of Russia. This friendship, which arose after the Battle of the Nations near Leipzig, where Russian and Prussian soldiers stood shoulder to shoulder against Napoleon Bonaparte, was constantly strengthened by growing mutual economic turnover. However, the St. Petersburg press, foaming at the mouth, protested "against the German seizures." And the correspondent of "Birzhevye Vedomosti" reported that, they say, in Baden they are shouting: "Death to the French!", and the Russian ladies resting there, as a result, switched to Russian. Turgenev, who, as we know, was in Baden-Baden itself, remarked: "Mr. Correspondent is worthy of being a French chronicler: there is not a word of truth in his statement."

In fact, our ladies still preferred French with a Nizhny Novgorod accent to Russian. And they even pinched lint not only for the German, but also for the French wounded, with whom (as well as with prisoners in general) the Germans behaved like knights. Unlike the French. The "noble" chevaliers called for the European war "bestial Turks (that is, Algerian Arabs. S.K.)", and they treated the German prisoners, the wounded, doctors and nurses far from noble.

However, even the civilized politician Paul Granier de Cassignac refused to grant subsidies to the Genevan Red Cross on the grounds that he would take care not only of the French, but also of the German victims of the war. One involuntarily recalls the statement of General Count Dumas during the Napoleonic occupation of Dresden. When the city was besieged by the allied Russian-Prussian troops, Dumas announced: "Rather, all the inhabitants of the city will turn into corpses, than one single French soldier will die of hunger." True, it did not come to this - Dresden was quickly occupied by the unforgettable Denis Davydov.

I will cite again the testimony of Turgenev, who was well versed in politics and in the verbal expression of human thoughts and aspirations: "It is impossible not to admit that the proclamation of King Wilhelm upon entering France sharply differs in noble humanity, simplicity and dignity of tone from all documents that reach us from of the opposite camp; the same can be said about the Prussian bulletins, about the messages of German correspondents: here - a sober and honest truth; there - some kind of furious, then whining falsehood. In any case, history will not forget this. Subsequently, alas, everything turned out so that Ivan

Sergeevich's last forecast did not come true. Just because Germany-Prussia, having won the Franco-Prussian war, did not refuse to take advantage of the fruits of victory, the Soviet History of Diplomacy, for example, assessed Prussia's line as "aggressive" and "unjust." But V.I. Lenin, by the way, was calm in his historical assessment: "In the Franco-Prussian war,

Germany robbed France, but this does not change the main historical significance of this war, which liberated tens of millions of the German people from feudal

fragmentation and oppression by two despots, the Russian Tsar and Napoleon III.

Lenin should not be suspected of some kind of Germanophilism. In August 1915, already in the midst of the First World War, he wrote: "It is not the business of the socialists to help the younger and stronger robber (Germany) rob the older and overeating robbers (that is, England and France. - S.K.)".

Lenin was right both in his second assessment and in the first. On the eve of the Franco-Prussian war, the question of German unification arose especially acutely. In 1867, the North German Confederation was created, under whose constitution the Prussian King (Wilhelm I) led all German states north of the Main River as president of the confederation, its supreme military head, and head of its diplomacy. The southern German states - Bavaria, Hesse, Württemberg - concluded agreements with the North German Confederation. Both for Bismarck and for the mass of Germans, this situation was only a prologue to a united German Empire. "Is it really possible for one second to doubt

that some people in the place of the Germans, in their present position, would have acted differently"? - quite rightly concluded Turgenev.

Germany included Alsace and Lorraine in its borders not only by the right of the winner, but also because the French, for example, the city of Strasbourg was founded as German Strasbourg and annexed to France only in 1681, a thousand years after its foundation! The names of the founders of the famous Strasbourg Cathedral - Erwin from Steinbach, Ulrich from Ensingen, Johann Gültz from Cologne - speak for themselves. And the so-called Strasbourg oath, given on February 14, 842 near Strasbourg, turned out to be both a monument of both Old French and Old German, because then the two younger grandsons of Charlemagne swore to work together against their older brother Lothair. Louis the German (future King of Germany) swore in German, and Charles the Bald (future King of France) swore in French. So, in general, both the Germans and the French had rights to these lands, controversial and equal. The collapse of the Second French Empire gave primacy to the

Germans.

After the Sedan catastrophe, Versailles became the headquarters of the Prussian King Wilhelm. In the Hall of Mirrors of the Palace of Versailles on January 18, 1871, the German Empire was proclaimed. Wilhelm was the first German emperor - Kaiser. Almost half a century has passed, and the position of the two countries has changed in the opposite direction: Germany was defeated in the First World War. Generosity does not belong to the virtues of the rulers of European peoples. From generation to generation they are greedy, cruel and vindictive. Once again, this was confirmed by the Prime Minister of the French Republic, Georges Benjamin Clemenceau. It was the walls of the Hall of Mirrors that he chose to witness the humiliation of now Germany - in retaliation for the Sedan. Thus, the last important international act in its "diplomatic" history, the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, was signed in Versailles. This happened after the conclusion of preliminary peace conditions in the French staff car in the Compiègne Forest on November 11, 1918. Another twenty years will pass, and France will capitulate again. Hitler will order to drag the Compiègne wagon to sign the surrender without fail in it. But let's not forget - here he just followed the example of Clemenceau.

States won and lost, peoples regularly paid tribute in gold and lives. This distribution of duties was not something new, but after the Franco-Prussian war the scope and nature of the policy of "iron and blood" became quite different. It was from that time that a new history of the world began, because a new powerful factor in its transformation, the united imperial Germany, came into the world. Approximately in the same years, another most serious factor finally took shape - financial, banking

capital, which is actively merged with the commercial and industrial life of the capitalist world and controls it.

Academician E.V. Tarle in the late 1920s in the book "Europe in the era of imperialism. 1871-1919." wrote: "A grandiose external struggle was planned, a clash of the most gigantic forces that mankind had ever seen. Mightily organized finance capital in England, and in France, and in Germany, moving like diplomacy, everywhere sang puppets, a provocative policy. Powerful economic forces

systematically

more backward countries, like Russia and Italy, acted in the same spirit  
" ...

But ... But Evgeny Viktorovich never came to the general, fundamental idea that the "clash of the most gigantic forces" was planned primarily by the state, which was across the ocean that Uncle Sam played the actual director in the theater of political puppets of the Golden Capital.

Alas, not understanding this, Tarle was mistaken in many other ways, seeing Russia's mortal enemy in Germany, although it was she who could become Russia's most suitable partner in the outside world.

After all, the unification of Germany was not due to "iron and blood", according to Bismarck. Germany was united by the desire of tens of millions of Germans who realized that their true homeland is not Baden, Württemberg, Hesse or Darmstadt, but Germany, divided over the centuries and therefore weakened over the centuries. Now it was uniting, and in the new Europe a lot depended on how the fate of German-Russian relations would turn out. Exactly them.

New times were advancing, and the period from Wilhelm's triumph at Versailles to Clemenceau's triumph at Versailles (but is it Clemenceau?) set the tone for events for the entire twentieth peck. Therefore, it is simply necessary for us, reader, to at least "gallop through Europe" of those years in order to understand our own time.

There is no better "novel" about young imperialism than Lenin's Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism. It is full of facts and figures that cannot be called dry - there are so many tears, sweat, blood, oil and kerosene, financial storms, ocean waters, golden rains and waterfalls of political eloquence. In terms of the intensity of the depicted passions, the pages of Lenin's "novel" can immediately compete with Shakespeare and Molière at the same time. Perhaps readers will think that I am exaggerating? Far from it. That's because often quoted by Lenin, far from being a literary Berlin magazine, the Bank, believed that "a comedy worthy of the pen of Aristophanes is being played out on the international capital market."

And the same magazine did not hide what the fees of the "actors" were: "a concession in a trade agreement, a coal station (that is, an extra port in distant waters for refueling cargo ships, and, if necessary,

dreadnoughts. - S.K.), the construction of a harbor, a fat concession, an order for

cannons "... And the latter became more and more necessary. Almost simultaneously with Wilhelm's Versailles speeches in 1872, the English Jew Disraeli, leader of aristocratic conservatives, former and future prime minister minister of Her Royal Majesty Victoria and the future Lord Beaconsfield, spoke at the Crystal Palace in Sydenham near London. The former main exhibition building of the World Exhibition of London in 1851 was pierced through by the sun, and this is not a metaphor. The iron frame of the palace was filled with glass slabs - it was conceived as a symbol of light. This London sun was no longer enough for Britain. For Disraeli, there was only a luminary, obliged not to set over the British Empire, which he called for the expansion. A friend of the Rothschilds knew what he was talking about, as did his successor Lord Salisbury, explaining the new colonial policy as follows: "Earlier, we were in fact the masters of Africa, without having to establish protectorates or anything like that there - simply by virtue of the fact that we dominated the sea." Now they had to expand and formally consolidate their presence, because not only the British lion wanted to dominate. In addition, by

the end of the 19th century, the position of the lords, although outwardly strong, was only outwardly. Cecil Rhodes (after whom a part of Africa was called "Rhodesia" for a long time) said in 1895 to his friend, the journalist Stand: "I visited a meeting of the unemployed yesterday. When I heard wild speeches there, which were a continuous cry: 'Bread, bread!' - I, going home and thinking about what I saw, became more convinced than before of the importance of imperialism. We must take possession of new lands to accommodate the surplus of the population, to acquire new areas for the sale of goods produced in factories and mines. Empire is a matter of the stomach. If you if you don't want a civil war, you must become imperialists"... Rhodes, of course, did not finish saying that if you want to be imperialists, then you must also want war - imperialist, external. First, she is fast and forever

places part of the excess population in the "new lands" and ensures a rapid turnover of steel, copper, cotton and soldiers' rations ... Secondly, such a war cannot be dispensed with simply because the English lords were not alone in thinking about what they saw in the workers' quarters. The pressure of the masses began to feel the ruling elite of all developed

countries. In France, the collapse of the Second Empire led at first not to the Third Republic, but to the Paris Commune. And after 1871, the concept of "Versailles" in France acquired a very definite meaning - these were those bourgeois troops that came from Versailles to Paris and shot the hopes of the workers at the wall of the Pere Lachaise cemetery. Graves remained, but hope and memory did not disappear. And so the French brothers of Rhodes in the class also had a headache about new lands and markets, especially since they knew what it was - a civil war. America

began to boil gradually. On May 1, 1886, workers in Chicago went on strike and demonstrated to demand an eight-hour day. In return, many of them received nine grams of lead. True, the first "May Day" did not make the weather yet. Future U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt wrote to Sister Anne that May: "My ranch workers here are men of backbreaking work, longer working hours and no better wages than many strikers; but they are Americans to the core. I would like them to be with me against the rebels; my people shoot well and know no fear."

The approach, however, was not particularly new even for America. Thomas Scott, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, said six years earlier: "Feed strike workers machine-gun rounds for a few days and you'll see them take that kind of food." Bullets, however, were only a temporary solution to the problem. At the beginning of

the 20th century, 1% of the "American nation" owned 47% of the national wealth. For the "freest country" the ratio is somewhat unexpected. And such times could come when even "Americans to the marrow of their bones" would not want to do exhausting work from dawn to dusk in order to Colonel Roosevelt and him



such amused themselves on the hunt by destroying the last American buffalo. The gallant

colonel himself understood this quickly enough. Already in 1897 he wrote articles, one of which is directly called "How not to help our poor brother." No, Roosevelt - now Governor of New York State - has not changed. While extracting concessions from the industrialists to the workers, he kept the National Guard at the ready. After he was elected president, he kept federal troops in reserve. Still, it was progress: bullets no longer came to his mind as the first and most reliable argument. In 1899 he wrote to a friend, Lord Spring Rice: "We have to solve the enormous problems arising from the relationship between labor and capital. In the next fifty years we will have to pay much more attention to this issue than to expansion" ... Roosevelt lied even to the old friend - US capital paid attention to the labor issue only

after the US in 1929 found itself on the verge of a social revolution. The capital entrusted then to take America away from it to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the cousin of Theodore Roosevelt. But he himself began the expansion ...

It was the United States that initiated the first imperialist war for new colonies: in 1898 Cuba, Puerto Rico, the island of Guam and the Philippines were conquered. However, earlier, in 1893, the Yankees occupied the Hawaiian Islands. Roosevelt was not yet president, but his younger friend, the writer and journalist William White, wrote: US imperialism was sown in the globe. We were condemned to a new way of life."

Hypocrisy has always been as much a family trait of the American elite as assertive arrogance. According to White, it turned out that if it were not for the "weak Spaniards", then the good Uncle Sam would sit quietly between two oceans and would not rush anywhere from there. Here everything was put, of course, upside down. It was not the weakness of Spain that "turned" America towards expansion, but America's capital, having gained strength, moved along the path to world domination, kicking aside decrepit Spain.

The Spanish-American War began when the USS Mail was allegedly blown up by a Spanish mine. When, many years later, the sunken ship was raised from the bottom of the sea, it turned out that there was an explosion, but from the inside!

The American elite began to consider themselves the elite of the world, but in the Old World there were people who thought differently than the same Roosevelt and White. Lord Curzon wrote in 1892: "Afghanistan, beyond the Caspian region, Persia - these are for me the cells of the chessboard on which the game is played; the stake in it is world domination."

Curzon was referring, of course, to British dominance. And then it was real. By 1900, Great Britain owned 33 million square kilometers (109 times the size of the British Isle itself!) on which 368 million people lived. A quarter of the globe and a quarter of the world's population! India was here only the main pearl in the British crown, and the Suez Canal was the English noose on the throat of world trade.

The United States, meanwhile, was preparing to tighten the freedom of Central and South America with the Panama Canal belt. However, the Yankees have not yet become full masters there. Having piles of gold, they did not yet have a powerful fleet, and therefore Brazilian, for example, railways were built mainly with French, Belgian, British and German capital. Due to the shortage of battleships, the States then operated more with the principles of the policy of "open doors" and "equal opportunities". However, the United

States was increasingly imbued with the consciousness of the future role of the ruler of the world of the 20th century. The superpower mood was present not only in secret plans, it manifested itself even at the level of mass consciousness. The great O'Henry wrote his "Kings and Cabbage" in 1904 - ten years before the First World War. And even then, his "star-striped" consul in banana Anchuria spoke of the United States as "the greatest, hard-currency and gold-reserving power in the world" ... Although this actually did not happen yet! Moreover, the United States at that time was the world's greatest debtor! France, although it suffered the Sedan fiasco (if

necessary, pay solid reparations to the Prussians), managed to grab the second "colonial" prize - 11 million square kilometers of colonies

with 50 million semi-slaves. A third of Africa received orders in French! But France in this race remained far behind England. But she recouped in Europe, which will be discussed later.

The word "race" expresses the essence. In the second half of the nineteenth century, sails gave way to steam. The fleets of the powers rushed around the globe, as in a regatta. And the world was finally divided between the capital of different countries very soon. We are somehow inclined to believe that it was divided among the European powers already in the time of Sir

Francis Drake, Queen Elizabeth and La Perouse. However, what did Europe need in the 17th-18th centuries from the vast outside world? Tobacco, tea, coffee, spices, exotic colors, precious woods, fruits and more

some little things.

Therefore, until the 19th century, the planet was, in fact, "ownerless". Only the progress of technology and knowledge brought to life many new needs, including colonial conquests. The recently discovered periodic table was turning from a purely scientific achievement into a trading price list. Waste lands, soiled with spots of oil seeps, began to be valued more expensively.

gold veins...

In 1876 - 5 years after Sedan - the colonies occupied only the 10th part of the Black Continent, and by 1900 - already nine-tenths! At that time, Polynesia was completely captured, and in Asia they completed what was previously uncollected. Formally, only Turkey, Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan, China and Siam remained independent there. However, even there "white" capitals frolicked with might and main, with the possible exception of Afghanistan. Russia did without colonies - it even refused to accept into Russian citizenship the lands discovered in the Southern Hemisphere by Miklukho Maclay. But the Russian Empire of Tsar Nicholas II did

not refuse to be a semi-colony itself. The English researchers Tugenhat and Hamilton wrote that the oil fields of Baku already in 1888 produced 2.5 million tons of oil on an area of only a few tens of square kilometers. Some wells spontaneously gushed to a height of more than 90 meters. For the Nobel family, only one of them provided more than a million gallons of oil a day. That is, each

day condition.

Tugenhat and Hamilton compared the extravagance and wealth of some oilmen with the atmosphere in the palaces of the Golden Horde Kubilai Khan. One had a palace made of gold plates, the other kept oil in platinum tanks, all imported many beautiful women from Russia and had hired "kochi" troops from ruined Georgian nobles to protect themselves from each other.

This is the kind of life, reader, that the "golden" evil spirits led at the expense of the Russian subsoil. And what did Russia have? The British did not hide the true situation: the overcrowding of workers' barracks and for hard labor - bread and

water in half. True, by 1913 Russia also received ... an acute fuel "hunger": oil production in it decreased by 2 million tons compared to 1901. The oil producers referred to "natural depletion of the bowels." In fact, for the sake of inflating prices, new oil fields were mothballed, drilling was reduced in old ones. Oil refineries closed.

The world was divided into territorial pieces, but capital penetrated through any borders without hindrance and took into debt bondage no less tightly than a white planter of black slaves into the wells.

This is how they took our richest, but hobbled by the idiocy of the authorities, Russia. France did not have much luck with colonies outside Europe, and she took her toll in Europe itself. England placed abroad twice as much capital as France, but for every "European" English billion there were almost six billion French! And almost warm foreign French capital invested in Russia. And this almost automatically provided French rentiers with millions of Russian peasants with bayonets on their side in any major conflict.

The conflict is mature. Moreover, there were not even three contenders for one world domination, but as many as four. Germany energetically broke into the Big Three, turning it into the Big Four of capital. In itself, German capital was both more national than Anglo-French (and even more so American), and a little "out of the way" because of its originality and novelty. After the complete defeat of the French army at Sedan, Kaiser Wilhelm the First, raising a glass to his associates, said: "You, General Roon, have perfected

our sword, you, General Moltke, controlled it, and you, Count Bismarck, with your policy raised Prussia to its present height for several years. a languid monarch

surrounded by relaxed courtiers would not be able to say anything of the sort. In imperial Britain at the end of the 19th century, such energetic toasts were impossible, despite all the imperialist ardor of Rudyard Kipling. only on the periphery of the world, but not in Europe. And the Germans managed to turn around - and how! - in Europe. And even by force of arms! And the Kaiser's toast, with colorful expressiveness uncharacteristic of Wilhelm, reflected the obvious fact: the Reich grew on cleverly built militarism, which was a feature only of the German imperialism (Even more energetic, even richer US capital developed without even the slightest military threat, and therefore could afford the luxury of ostentatious peacefulness and pacifism). Paris, of course, is more charming than Berlin. Succumbing to his charm, some people are inclined to admire France and slander Germany. And so the novelist Valentin Pikul, in the manner of a frivolous Parisian, reports that the poor provincial German Werther grew by leaps and bounds

on an indemnity from France of five billion francs, "on robbery." And somehow it remains beyond the romantic lines that these contributions were provided by the latest Krupp steel guns, created by the labor and talent of German scientists, engineers and workers. It was also forgotten that France, England, Holland, Belgium received much larger "contributions" from the robbery of the colonial peoples.

The Russian military attache in France, Count Ignatiev, later rightly admitted that "the Franco-Prussian war was won not only by Moltke, but also by a German non-commissioned officer, a village teacher" ... However, Wilhelm I himself probably played a positive role here. Here is his completely reliable (from the "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" of 1928) characteristic: "In his personal life he was very modest, thrifty, untalkative, extremely

punctual and conscientious in his work. "Qualities that adorn the common man, and even the monarch - even more so.

Sometimes German national consciousness and pride were awakened by means that were generally extraordinary for the 19th century. In Paris - four years before the first Versailles triumph of the Germans - the so-called "European concert" was arranged at the Second World Exhibition of 1867. For superiority in the European arena (so far - only musical) military ... orchestras fought.

And this is how the famous Russian critic Vladimir Vasilyevich Stasov described the results of the "battle of the bandmasters": "The Austrian and Prussian orchestras were recognized as the first - there was nothing to do with this, their superiority was already too palpable for the French themselves ... Having heard the Austrians and Prussians, he himself the emperor (Napoleon III. - S.K.) exclaimed: "Here are real examples of military music! That's what we need to achieve "... The Prussians, however, did not

give the French time either to hone their musical skills or to hone their swords. And here is another symbolic detail - on the very first day of the Franco-

Prussian war Prussian Andersen won a match in Baden-Baden against the most powerful chess players in Europe. All this together - the hard daily work of the "top", the German people, the military victory

over France and five billion reparations ensured the rapid growth of the economy of the Second Reich. In 1873, a crisis came, consumption However, German production, and, consequently, German power, grew. And from 1884 German colonial conquests began: Cameroon, Togo, the Marshall Islands. German South-West and East Africa appeared, in Oceania - the Bismarck Archipelago, Earth Emperor Wilhelm In the penultimate year of the 19th century, Germany, taking advantage of the Spanish-American war, included in the empire the Caroline, Mariana Islands and the western group of the islands of Samoa. In the midst of the colonial boom in 1891, the ultra-nationalist Pan-German League took shape, whose goals were fully determined by the name itself. One of its ideologues, General Friedrich von Bernhardi, declared: "We must give the German nation and the German spirit throughout the globe the high respect they deserve."

There is nothing wrong with wanting to be deservedly respected. The bad thing was that Bernhardt himself explained: "Our political tasks are impossible and insoluble without a blow of the sword" ...

Until recently, there was no German Reich on the world map at all, and by the beginning of the 20th century it had become the third colonial power, although it was four times inferior to France in terms of the area of the colonies and their population. Germany also came out on the third position in terms of the export of capital, almost catching up with France in the overall result. Moreover, Germany placed half of its capital in Europe and here it was only slightly behind France. There was also a peculiarity: almost a third of the foreign

capital the Reich sent to America - 10 billion marks. And the global financial capital was distributed in the following way... There were about 600 billion francs worth of securities in the world. Of these, England accounted for 142 billion, the United States - 132, France - 110 and Germany - 95. If someone is interested in Russia, I can tell you: 31 billion against 24 billion for Austria-Hungary and 12 for Japan. Italy, 14 billion, and the Netherlands, 12.5 billion,

were also over a dozen billion. The owners of capital united in international cartels and divided spheres of influence. Without much fuss and founding congresses, the "Golden International" took shape. By its very nature, there could be no talk of good agreement. Consent was, but fragile, evil. All this was distributed very unevenly - colonies, capital, dividends and economic opportunities. The States - as an industrial and financial power - could quickly reach the first position, Germany - to the second. And the international rail cartel gave two-thirds of foreign markets to England. The kerosene market was divided between the American "Kerosene Trust" of Rockefeller and the owners of Russian oil, Rothschild and Nobel. To squeeze between them for Germany meant to fall between two millstones. But the emerging electric market was divided by the American "General Electric" and the German "AEG". The first received the States and Canada, the second - Germany, Austria, Russia, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey and the Balkans. The mistress of the seas - Britain - clearly remained "aground" ... But it easily bypassed the two electric superpowers on colonial courses ...

But even on the seas, Germany in some places already bypassed England. The two largest German shipping companies - North German Lloyd and Hamburg-America Line, on the portal of the Hamburg office of which there was an inscription: "The field of my activity is the whole world", - had together 148 ships with a total capacity of 770 thousand tons. Three British - "British-Indiasteam Navigation", "White Star Line" and "Kunard" - 155 vessels with a capacity of 700 thousand tons. However, John Pierpont Morgan soon took over both German firms. Teutonic patriotism is patriotism, and dollars are dollars in Germany. The

overall picture was motley, and the division of the world that had taken place did not cancel the future redistribution. On the contrary, he made it inevitable. The interests seemed to be heterogeneous, but the desire for maximum profit and the provision of calm conditions for it remained

the same. Therefore, at the turn of two centuries, all the main participants in the future world conflict once united into an ideally close-knit, friendly coalition. And it is unlikely that ever before and later history knew a union more durable, coordinated and sincere, driven by common ideas. Where did such a miracle happen? I will answer right away - in China. Since

the second half of the nineteenth century, only the lazy did not go to China for profit. The Yankees were especially distinguished, but the Germans, the British and others cleaned up coastal China with such greed that even the Chinese, patient in their Confucianism, could not stand it. A secret society with a very convincing name "I-he quan" ("Fist in the name of justice and harmony") began to prepare an uprising. It started in 1899. This is where the "great unity" happened. The "I-he-quan" society was later transformed into the "I-he tuan" ("Squads of justice and consent"). In the "civilized" countries, the Yihetuan uprising was called the "Boxer" uprising, but the Chinese peasants, artisans, coolies and small merchants fought mostly with their bare fists. But the fist of the interventionists in the name of injustice was reliably protected. And not the skin and wool of a boxing glove, but steel and lead. Germany, Japan, Italy, England, USA, France, Russia and Austria-Hungary took part in the intervention.



The English Admiral Seymour commanded the combined Anglo-American squadron, the German Field Marshal Waldersee commanded the combined ground forces. The struggle

against the Yihetuan became the first joint action of the Golden International. She showed for the first time that there is no limit to the unity of the priests of capital of different tribes in the matter of planetary confrontation with peoples defending their rights on their land.

The uprising in China dragged on for two years, and at the dawn of the 20th century it was crushed - brutally. Why, the animals gathered there in a row: lions, fighting cocks, normal one-headed eagles, two-headed bird freaks, elephants, donkeys and

jackals ... Chapter 2. Bismarck, Disraeli, Witte and the stove-maker of Oshansky ... The world was entering the twentieth century, on which many hopes were pinned, since the progress of science and technology really promised a lot. Already in 1834, Nikolai Vasilievich Gogol wrote: "On countless thousands of graves, the great 19th century rises like a phoenix. What an abyss of experience the nineteenth century must acquire! Our rich and extensively developed intelligent nineteenth century, which endowed mankind with such happiness as a reward for its difficult and disastrous wanderings.

Gogol's age did not fully justify his attestation, but he really changed the world beyond recognition and for the first time made the whole planet a property of man.

What would Gogol say, looking at the fruits of the nineteenth century on the eve of the twentieth century? Obviously, this would be an inspired hymn to the forthcoming final liberation of mankind from ignorance and disasters... However, crystal dreams of an abundant, new golden age were dispelled in the last century of the second thousand years from the birth of Christ, like smoke from the fire of the Crystal Palace, which burned down in 1936 - three years before the outbreak of World War II. Before the century had time to get stronger, the First World War began in it. Why did it

happen? We can say that there were four reasons: the sun did not set over the British Empire, Kaiser Wilhelm did not

allowed into Paris, Bismarck quarreled with Russia, and President Roosevelt gave newspapers reason to portray himself as a gardener in a cartoon titled "Roosevelt Plants the Tree of Imperialism."

Of course, the main reason was that world capitalism could not help but try to solve its problems with the sword. However, the greed of the English elite, the arrogance of the French, the mediocrity of the Russian and the special position of American capital were of no small importance. You may have noticed that there is no German component in the enum. And not by accident. The German Reich and German capital were also involved in the "creation" of this monstrous war, but they were the most convincing in their actions in relation to the outside world. Therefore, and

least guilty.

Kaiser Wilhelm II twice notified the French of his desire to pay an official visit to Paris. The French refused. Of course, Marx also said that since Germany had conquered Alsace-Lorraine, France would go to war with her. Together with Russia. Although in fact Marx got what is called the point, the course of his reasoning was not so correct. However, he noted for sure that France without Russia could not resist Germany. No matter how the Gallic rooster swaggered, he could not compete with the German eagle. France had a good two centuries of history of only a fully centralized state (not counting three more centuries of a unified state), and Germany, having emerged as an integral state almost at the end of the 19th century, bypassed France in economic development in two decades! Such people should not be treated arrogantly or lightly. And the French did just that. And the pan-Germanists had some right to say

in 1912: "We cannot believe that we alone should be content with the modest share that fate allotted us forty years ago." Kaiser Wilhelm II also reasonably complained to the King of Italy: "For all the long years of my reign, my colleagues, the monarchs of Europe, did not pay attention to what I said. But soon, when my fleet backs up my words, they will become

show us more respect."

Wilhelm had in mind, of course, King Edward VII of England and Nicholas II of Russia. Well, here, too, there were grounds for German grievances: neither British nor Russian European policy corresponded to national interests. Edward traveled around Europe at the beginning of the 20th century, preparing a policy that would isolate Germany and which he called "the policy of encirclement."

England became more and more the victim of her vast colonies and the wealth associated with them. She seemed like an eternal colossus, able to point even to the United States. Securities invested in the colonies by 1913 brought their owners 200 million pounds sterling in annual income. And it was already possible to exist on just a hundred pounds a year. The dreams of Cecil Rhodes acquired a solid material foundation: the empire, at the very least, provided the stomachs of the common people on the English Isle. However, wealth also eroded the foundations of power. English gold spread over the globe, and the result was a lack of it to build up internal power. In 1913, the United States smelted 31.3 million tons of steel, Germany 17.3 million, and England only 7.7 million. Lacking such colonies as the British, the Germans worked to create a powerful country within their own borders. And the British "carried the burden of the white man" all over the world. The occupation is profitable, but England itself was ailing, new branches of industry developed slowly in it. France, the world usurer, found itself in approximately the same position. In France, a layer of rentiers was growing, cutting off coupons from Russian loans, which stimulated Parisian restaurateurs, rather than industry and military power.

Gogol, in the excellent passage "Rome", vividly and accurately described the expanding emptiness of French society: "For all its brilliant features, with noble impulses, with chivalrous outbursts, the whole nation was something pale, imperfect, a light vaudeville, generated by it. The whole nation - a brilliant vignette, not a picture of a great master." Germany became the first European (and almost the second world) power. By right? Perhaps yes. The capital of the rest of Europe had two options: either cooperate with the Reich, or fight with

him.

For France, cooperation meant submission. France could not lay claim to anything else, also by right. And already from

the eighties of the XIX century, as Germany strengthened, France more and more covered itself with a "Russian shield". Was it beneficial for Russia? Alexander II, Alexander III, the parasitic nobility and the absurd, provincially educated Russian bourgeoisie believed that yes, since the excessive weakening of the Gauls would deem the Teutons too strong. Russian liberal professors have already seen Russian battleships in the "open spaces" of the Baltic, the banners of the "Christ-loving host" over the Black Sea straits. And, accordingly, the Russian Tsar - the monarch of all Slavs.

However, not everything was so perfect in Russia. Huge wealth lay untouched inside it, the Russian land was so wide, and the peoples inhabiting it were so dark that all Russia needed was to ensure reliable defense of the borders and take care of internal affairs. Foreign participation in such grandiose affairs was inevitable, but one principle could be nationally sound here: "The lion's share - Russia, and you will snatch a lot anyway." Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin did worse than he said, but he said wisely: "You need great upheavals, but we need great Russia." Great upheavals ruled out great Russia. But even peaceful Russia could be great only by developing its richest suburbs. After all, the North, Siberia, and the Far East were still completely undeveloped in our country ... Kaiser Wilhelm II was already three times right when he raised the signal "Admiral of the Atlantic Ocean welcomes the Admiral of the Pacific Ocean" on his flagship, hinting to cousin Nicholas II that there was nothing to Russia meddle in Europe. Another thing is its eastern outskirts. Of course, the hint here was made not without cunning, but it contained a healthy

grain. The Kaiser had in mind, of course, the war. However, in the Far East, Russia needed not to fight, but to work. And work within your own boundaries. Well, was it worth it for a power with untouched richest internal resources to get into Korea, meddle in China, conflict with Japan? Nicholas II contemptuously called the Japanese "monkeys", and in Japan by the beginning of the 19th century there were practically no illiterates. Detail? Yes! However, one such detail could keep the smart Russian leadership from

reckless actions. But what kind of mind and leadership could there be if, during the Russo-Japanese War, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Birilev, in response to the demand of the commander of the Vladivostok detachment of submarines to provide 24 French spark plugs to the engine, with an unwavering hand, wrote: "Two pounds of state-owned stearin are enough"? This is not a joke, but the latest history of tsarist Russia, reader! England, France,

Germany were bright patches on the world map, and Russia stretched for half the world and was itself a world - original and self-sufficient. The European powers had already exhausted their internal possibilities and rushed to the colonies. But Russia did not reveal, did not develop even a hundredth of its own national wealth ... Having a mind and a heart, Lomonosov already understood this, however, the Russian autocrats of the late XIX - early XX centuries had neither a Russian heart, nor a mind - at least some ... That is why they pursued such a stupid Far Eastern policy, which, with Russian blood, paved the way to the Far East not so much for Russian as for European capital.

In the Far East, criminal stupidities were committed on behalf of Russia. And how were Russian affairs in Europe?

Clever Russian European policy fit into three words: "Peace with Germany." Such a peace made it possible to solve the Caucasian problems along the way, to develop Central Asia. It would not be easy to pursue a worthy, self-respecting "German" policy of Russia, but it is possible! No wonder

Bismarck saw the future of Russian-German relations only as peaceful. Yes, the contradictions between the two countries were considerable, although most of them were not objective, but bourgeois-capitalist in nature. In the most unpleasant way, this manifested itself in the competition of Russian and Prussian landlord breads on the German and European markets. There were other sharp moments, but they just arose because of the vastness of mutual ties. One thing would be reasonable: to smooth the corners and build friendships. And the

"mayors" of the all-Russian Glupov acted exactly the opposite. Already after Sedan, Alexander II demanded that Prussia limit itself to smaller reparations than it expected to receive.

from France. And so it went ... In 1875, Bismarck starts a preventive war against France, and Alexander II disrupts it with his policy. As a result, after the Russo-Turkish war in the Balkans, Russia at the Berlin Congress faced opposition from Austria-Hungary and England, while Germany did not support it. By the way, in Berlin, Lord Salisbury and our acquaintance Disraeli, who had already become Lord Beaconsfield, shredded the fate of the southern Slavs with an unwavering hand. The same duo subtly quarreled with the Russians and the Germans.

The desire for a permanent weakening of Russia in general was the constant line of Disraeli year after year. The calculation was distant, for decades. And it did come out! In 1879, Wilhelm I and Alexander II quarreled completely. The dim-witted but proud Russian "tsar-liberator" took offense at Germany for her behavior at the Berlin Congress - as if Germany had no serious counter claims against Russia. The Congress of Berlin, summing up the results of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, is described differently in different countries, and in Russia Germany has long been blamed for it. Thus, the well-known Soviet historian academician V. Khvostov believed that "Bismarck behaved duplicitously, playing an "honest broker." The 2nd edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia is even more sharply expressed: "Chairman of the Berlin Congress Bismarck took a position that was clearly hostile to Russia and the Slavic peoples The Balkan Peninsula. In fact, Bismarck, both before the Congress and after it, was loyal to the only state, Germany, and to the only German people. Can we claim him for this, reader? the outcome of the Berlin Congress was influenced not by Bismarck, but by the

secret Reichstadt agreement, signed by Alexander II and the Austrian emperor Franz Joseph in the Bohemian Reichstadt castle a year before the Russian-Turkish war - July 8, 1876. Then the fact of its conclusion was hidden from Russian Slavophiles, which is not surprising. Indeed,

according to this agreement, the parties (in fact, only Russia) pledged not to assist in the formation of a "big Slavic state" in the Balkans. Thus, Russia ensured the neutrality of Austria during the war with the Turks.

The outcome of the Turkish war and the Treaty of San Stefano, which ended it, stimulated a different turn of events than was due to the two emperors before the start of the war. It was the

Berlin Congress and the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano that brought Austria's discontent to life, which was poorly understood by both then and present Slavophiles. Four

months before the Berlin Congress, Turgenev wrote in a letter from Paris: "Our country dance with England has just begun; the most intricate figures are ahead. Bismarck, apparently, wants to limit himself to the role of a "tapper": dance, they say, darlings, and we'll see."

Turgenev

has no condemnation of Bismarck. Our great writer thought soberly: his own shirt is closer to the body, especially when it is not a "shirt", but HOMELAND! FATHERLAND!! Which you need to love not only with your heart, but also smartly love ...

By the way, here is the final (after the congress) opinion of General Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin, one of the authors of the San Stefano Russian-Turkish Treaty, significantly curtailed by the Berlin Treaty: a step will be taken in the historical course of the Eastern Question. The result will be enormous, and in Russia one can be proud of the successes achieved." Milyutin was a practical politician, in contrast to the professorial and literary chatterers-Slavophiles. Therefore, both he and

Chancellor Gorchakov understood that Russia had won such a victory in the East, which far exceeded our ability to use it. We have already received a lot: Kare, Batum, strengthening our positions in the Caucasus.

The Congress was held from June 13 to July 13 (a rare case of frankly provocative symbolism) 1878 at the request of England and Austria-Hungary. The Russian-Turkish war had just ended (the same one when "everything was calm on Shipka"). Russia almost took Constantinople - Istanbul, that is, almost gained control over the Black Sea straits. If such a situation were to take hold (which, in general, was absolutely too tough for us), then the "British

the lion "would only have to drown with grief in the Sea of Marmara just between the Bosphorus and the

Dardanelles. To prevent this, Britain sent a squadron of 6 ships to the Dardanelles in February 1878 (by the way, also on the 13th) and thereby sharply pressed Russia's strong positions

in the Slavic world were of no use to the Austrians either. We were not able to ensure such positions seriously, that is, economically, but even the growth of our moral authority among the "Slavic brothers" caused panic in Vienna. Within a week before the congress, the British and the Austrians concluded an agreement on a joint (and undoubtedly anti-Russian) course of action in Berlin. The agreement was faithfully observed, but Bismarck did not help the Austrian Foreign Minister Count Andrassy and the eternal Lord Beaconsfield, that is, Disraeli, in this. 20 years ago, and upon arrival in Berlin, he immediately ordered a return special train to Calais, hinting that he recognizes only one direction of the work of the delegations of the great powers - according to the London scenario ...

The formal head of the Russian delegation - the Chancellor and Prince Gorchakov shone with manners. But the "first violin" in the negotiations was played by the "second delegate" Count Shuvalov, with whom Bismarck established respectful and trusting relations. After the congress, Shuvalov was said to have allegedly sold out the interests of Russia. Stupid certification ...

Yes, and incorrect. As for the political position of the German chancellor, it was perhaps most correctly assessed by an outside observer in this case ... Professor Debidur wrote in his "Diplomatic History of Europe": "Bismarck wanted Russia to remain strong enough, at least so that could serve as a counterbalance to Austria-Hungary, since he did not want to allow Germany to become dependent on the Habsburg monarchy. Bismarck, of course, also feared a serious strengthening of Russia.

States are not people. And behind the competent actions of the heads of state are not personal predilections, but the logic of the life of peoples. Alas, in Russia they did not want to understand this. Even such a subtle diplomat (and not just a poet) as Fyodor Tyutchev, like many, counted on Germany's gratitude for Russia's past support for her in conflicts with France and Austria. But to this day in our



Historical literature, especially in the works of neo-Slavophiles and neo-Pan-Slavists, asserts that in the era of the first Balkan crises, Bismarck wanted to play off Russia and Austria-Hungary. In fact, this could not have happened because such a turn of European political life led Russia to an alliance with France. Indeed, in those days, the conflict between Vienna and Paris was not just traditional - then it was constantly fueled by the "Italian question". And with what and with whom would Germany then remain? Good relations with Austria-Hungary were desirable for its confident future, and vital with Russia. No, Prince Otto von Bismarck-Schönhausen was not so stupid as to play with fire.

Another thing is that, striving for strong ties with Russia, Bismarck thought about the Germans, and not about the Russians, and did not crumble like a petty demon in front of us. His scale was not the same - both physical and historical ... Bismarck did not provoke conflicts at all, since they could

lead to certain coalitions that pursued him like a "nightmare". On the other hand, in Russia they did not see anything wrong with coalitions, although they were no less harmful to us than to Germany. The already mentioned Minister of War of Alexander II, D. Milyutin,

is certainly an outstanding figure. The reformer of the Russian army after the Crimean War, that alone says it all. However, in foreign policy, he, alas, did not show outstanding abilities. Perhaps the lack of proper temperament had an effect here - the general was a balanced person and lived for almost a hundred years (born in 1816, died in 1912). He could, for example, at first fearlessly prepare the Treaty of San Stefano, according to which Russia received more than it could keep, and then, after the Berlin Congress, melancholy admit the excess of the ideas of his own offspring.

Being an honest but inflexible man, Milyutin saw in Bismarck's behavior not a natural line for a German, but "intrigues that entangled the aged emperor (Wilhelm I. - S.K.)". Approximately the same "thought" and Alexander II himself. In 1879, the Russian emperor wrote to his uncle, the German emperor, a letter that Bismarck assessed as nothing more than a provocation, and the letter smacked of it. The position of Germany was regarded there as hostile to Russia on the grounds that Bismarck did not lay down his bones for Russian interests. But

Not everyone can be simpletons, like the Russians, who willingly turn their heads for other people's and even alien national ideas! Bismarck once said: "England's policy has always been to find such a fool in Europe who would defend British interests with his sides" ... Academician Tarle, in 1951, after Churchill's Fulton speech, without a

shadow of irony, stated in the Izvestia newspaper: "One of the most remarkable political leaders of Great Britain, William Pitt the Elder (Lord Chatham) made friendship with Russia one of the foundations of his policy. "I am a Russian" ("I am Russian"), half-jokingly, half-seriously, he spoke about himself "...

Tarle obviously forgot about Krylov's Raven and Fox, thus certifying the English Prime Minister of the late 18th century, before, during and after the Seven Years' War of 1756-1763, who actively intrigued against Russia! It was for nothing that the Russian sides had to take on a lot of kicks for the sake of British interests. Alas, Milyutin turned

out to have no more political instinct than Tarle. "Offended" by Germany and "fearing" her, he undertook the redeployment (!) of a number of military formations from the south and from the central regions of Russia to the western provinces bordering Germany ... There is no doubt that William Pitt the Elder

applauded him from the grave for a couple with William Pitt the Younger (who also spoiled Russia wherever possible and impossible).

It is not surprising, therefore, that Bismarck and Wilhelm I considered Milyutin to be a "Germanophobe". In fact, the general was not. He was simply full of suspicions about the growing German Empire, although, like his colleague, Foreign Minister Giers considered it necessary to maintain peace with it in every possible way.

The plans of the Russian General Staff under Milyutin were designed for defense. However, the defense was supposed to be from Germany, during the Russian-German war! And with such "super-caution" Dmitry Alekseevich rendered the Fatherland a service, alas, a bearish one ...

The concentration of Russian troops on the German border worried Berlin very much. In August 1879, Wilhelm I initiates his meeting with Alexander II in Alexandrov, where Milyutin was also. Wilhelm gave the Russian minister the highest order of the Black Eagle and

I talked to him one-on-one for almost an hour... Subsequently, the interlocutor of the German emperor himself reported the content of the conversation,

and obviously without distortion. Why are you, General, so suspicious of the German

Reich? asked Wilhelm. Allow me, Your Imperial Majesty, to answer a direct question directly. German policy is hostile to Russia. She supports the enemies of Russia in everything - England and Austria. And they are inciting

Turkey against us. Wilhelm was not particularly emotional, but here in his tone suddenly slipped apologetic notes in half with annoyance:

- But, General, you are well aware that we are constantly threatened by France. Paris cannot help but think about revenge... Milyutin barely perceptibly shrugged

his shoulders, and Wilhelm patiently explained: - France is a traditional rival for England.

Just like for Austria... And so we have to be extremely careful to keep this situation going. We cannot openly break either with Austria or with England and are forced to occupy a neutral position.

position.

Milyutin again shrugged his shoulders in bewilderment and said:

- I will allow myself to object, Your Majesty, that such a passive policy is unworthy of Germany, which is now quite powerful and quite high in the opinion of the whole of Europe. With your one voice, without drawing your sword, you can prevent a pan-European coalition against Russia - your age-old friend and

ally.

Let's think, reader, what, in fact, did Milyutin offer the Germans? And here's what ... Ten years before this conversation, Germany did not exist as a single state, and the same France, England and Austria were united in their desire to forever preserve the European alignment of the time of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. In other words, to have Germany dismembered in the future.

Through intense internal German work and a successful external war, the Germans secured for themselves a powerful historical prospect of rebirth, which automatically irritated both London and Vienna,

not to mention Paris. After the Crimean disaster, Russia was not considered capable of waging a successful offensive war against the European powers. Even in the Russian-Turkish war for Bulgarian freedom, victory was given to us with a creak. Therefore, Europe was confident only in the defensive strength

of the Russians. And in this state of affairs, Milyutin, at the same time pushing troops to the border with Germany, was inclined to expect from Germany the same behavior when she, headlong, "without drawing her sword", but threatening them, would eliminate the possibility of a pan-European coalition against Russia?

Didn't we demand too much from "our age-old friend and ally"? In addition, the coalition was formed against Russia not military, but political. And not with the aim of invading Russia, but with the aim of stopping Russia's advance into the Slavic Balkans, that is, where, frankly, we should not have to meddle. It was this last

moment that Milyutin understood, because he sighed - God, let me master what the Berlin Treaty allows. However, for some reason, I wanted the Germans to pull back the British, who were dirtying us in Turkey. And why did Berlin have to do this? Yes, and with a similar attitude, not only the Minister of War Milyutin, but also his royal boss, in a situation where good relations with Germany had to be maintained at any cost! Indeed, in 1879 in London, for example, our Fatherland evoked a feeling about which V. Stasov wrote as follows: "This is an extraordinary hatred for Russia and for everything Russian, reigning in entire strata of English society and in their expressive language - the English press." To assume in the late 1870s - early

1880s (and later) that Germany of its own free will would start the first war with Russia could only be a worthless Russian politician. Alas, it was they who prevailed in Russia, starting with the chief of them "according to rank" - the autocrat. And here, too, the intellectual "love of Slavs" and pan-Slavist ambitions that flourished in the Russian capitals played a cruel joke on us. Mikhailo Vasilievich Lomonosov already

understood that Russian power should grow with Siberia, the Far East, the Russian North - including the Northern Sea Route, Russian America ... Lomonosov saw our abundant future as the result of Russian

activities within Russian borders. And the unlucky Slavophiles were always pulling somewhere to "St. Sophia", to the "gates of Constantinople" ... And if Germany did not agree with our whim, then for many

it turned into an enemy. No, there were, Bismarck had reasons exactly one month after the Alexander meeting of the two monarchs to reproach our ambassador in Berlin Saburov that "the Russian government itself gave rise to a cooling between Germany and Russia" ... And the fires of the Cossack patrols in view of East Prussia Russian-

German relations were not warmed. In 1887, Bismarck again tries to achieve European hegemony, plotting to defeat France. Now the Russia of Alexander

III stood in the way. Already at the beginning of his reign, the administration of Alexander (for although he fancied himself an autocrat, he ruled by no means alone) stepped up the construction of strategic railways in Poland. Objectively, it was, of course, an anti-German act, especially if we remember that Russia desperately needed the development of railways inside - in the center, and not on the periphery of the state. About some "railroad" piquancy of the era at the turn of the reign of Alexander III and Nicholas II, we still have a reason to say a few words. But already in the early 1880s, certain forces in Russia began to inflate anti-Germanism. And the famous "white general", the hero of the Russian-Turkish war, the thirty-nine-year-old infantry general Skobelev Jr., turned out to be a very striking

figure in this. Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev was, of course, an outstanding commander and an outstanding Russian man. But his political role did not embellish the fleeting biography of the general and did not serve Russia well. Here is a typical example of his way of thinking: "We need a slogan that is understandable not only in the army, but also to the broad masses. Such a slogan can only be a declaration of war against the Germans and the unification of the Slavs. This slogan will make

the war popular in society." Whether such a war would strengthen Russia economically, whether it would contribute to the strengthening of Russia, and not to its fruitless exhaustion, Skobelev did not think.

But in his fatal, so-called "Paris speech" on February 17, 1882, in front of Serb students (4 months before his death), the general attacked Germany as an enemy of Russia. On the other hand,

he saw France as a friend, although the good old Gauls did not need to be fed with bread if they managed to add coals to the fire in order to burn normal Russian-German relations.

The history of the "Paris speech" is obscure. To his friend, Vasily Ivanovich Nemirovich-Danchenko, Skobelev said: "I know you were against my Parisian speech. But I said it out of my own conviction and I do not repent." And in a letter to Ivan Sergeevich Aksakov, the general wrote something else: "What can I tell you about the speech attributed to me to Serbian students. I, in fact, did not deliver it. But it turned out, however, that for the press - a conversation "to your liking" was suddenly published by the newspaper "France". That is, there was and was not a speech, although the general did not refuse the "France" option and informed the same Aksakov: "In the end, everything said there is the absolute truth."

Apologetic authors writing about Skobelev never quote Turgenev's assessment of him. And they are interesting ... On July 9, 1882, Turgenev wrote from Bougival in a letter to actress Maria Gavrilovna Savina: "My soul is especially saddened today: yesterday the news of Skobelev's death arrived. For a long time I didn't want to believe that our Achilles died so early - and that they were deceived those who predicted a great future for him... Russia is unhappy in its great people... Our people, in whose eyes he was the most popular modern person, will hardly believe in the naturalness of his death... I would not be surprised if I knew that the Germans, his fiercest enemies, were subjected to a beating worse than a Jewish one."

Savina treated Skobelev enthusiastically, and this affected Turgenev's tone. In a letter to Annenkov, he is already much more restrained: "And then there is the death of Skobelev. Of course, I did not sympathize with him, but I felt bitter and sad, like, probably, all Russian people."

Yes, Turgenev did not sympathize with the living Skobelev! On February 25, immediately after Skobelev's speech, he wrote from Paris to his constant addressee Annenkov: "Skobelev turned out to be as brainless as Charles XII, whom he is physically very similar to."

as if they are supporting us in our higher spheres - and thereby further aggravating the confusion reigning there. Amen, amen, I tell you...

We often imagine Turgenev as a kind of admirer of France. Well, of course - Flaubert, Maupassant, Hugo, Pauline Viardot! .. And he had one passion, which, however, he did not really advertise - Russia. And his sharp assessment of Skobelev's Parisian behavior once again confirmed this.

Skobelev provoked a war antagonistic to the interests of Russia, and for Turgenev such an attitude depreciated all the previous merits of Mikhail Dmitrievich.

Skobelev died under really strange circumstances: in the room of the luxurious Moscow cocotte Wanda after a revelry, during which an unknown person brought him a glass of champagne. Although the autopsy stated paralysis, rumors about "German intrigues" immediately spread. However, this was hardly the case. The extremist anti-Russian circles in Berlin (and they, of course, existed there and were quite strong) only benefited from the noise around Skobelev's antics.

Rather, here you can see the hand of the secret organization of the court aristocracy "Sacred Squad", created after the execution of Alexander II in 1881 by the Narodnaya Volya. The guards hussar, Colonel and Count Pavel Shuvalov, the son and nephew of the famous Shuvalov diplomat brothers, with whom Bismarck was so close, led the "team" designed to protect the emperor and fight the revolutionaries. Skobelev was least of all a fighter for the freedom

of the people, but interfered with the aristocrats by the fact that he could become a pillar and support of any anti-palace opposition. Academician Tarle wrote about him: "an ambitious man of the highest order, dreaming not so much of Suvorov as of Napoleon." His anti-German speeches were also, of course, the "bast" that is put on the line.

One way or another, Skobelev died. But he left the German circles hostile to Russia an eternally convenient excuse to make a loyal attitude towards Russia

unpopular. Bismarck, on the other hand (Skobelev could not stand him after the Berlin Congress), was very alarmed by the general's speeches. And he, along with the Shuvalovs, had to work hard to somehow fix

position for the better. However, pro-French (in fact, anti-Russian) political and economic cheaters were increasingly active in Russia. And so Russian-German relations were constantly in a fever, and Alexander III himself often set the tone. After Skobelev's February "speech", he recalled the latter to St. Petersburg, but the general left the tsar's office after a two-hour (!) audience cheerful and satisfied, although two hours earlier he had approached the "royal gates" extremely embarrassed. And for Berlin, this fact, of course, did not remain a secret. After the death of Skobelev, the

Russian emperor sent a very sympathetic telegram to his sister, in which there was not even a shadow of "officialism", but there were the words: "It is sad, very sad to lose such useful and dedicated figures." Even the academician Tarle, who was always cool

towards Germany, later admitted: "In Germany, neither the speech of the general, nor the telegram of the emperor" was ever forgotten ... At one time, however, the gap seemed

to be outlined ... On June 18, 1887, through the efforts of the Shuvalov brothers and Bismarck, the so-called "reinsurance agreement" was concluded. Russia and Germany pledged not to attack each other and remain neutral, except in the case of an attack by Russia on Austria-Hungary, and Germany - on France.

Well, what did we care about France! Alas, more Alexander III did not go with Germany, but it was a narrow-minded policy. An initiative Russian attack on the Austrian Empire would look like a stupid and aimless move. And therefore almost unbelievable even for tsarism. But the military actions of Germany against France were real. Therefore, with its treaty, Russia insured France rather than Germany. Bismarck understood this by pressing on us. And Russian-German customs friction began. The stupid tsarist policy harmed both the economy and the future of Russia. The French historian Antonin

Debidour fought the Prussians in his youth, and in relation to Germany he cannot be accused of objectivity. But he portrayed Franco-Russian relations no more faithfully. According to Debidur - and he was a contemporary of all the events described - the initiative of rapprochement belonged to Russia, although in fact it was precisely Gallia, dear to Debidur's heart, who was interested in this. France provided itself, firstly,



safety. Secondly, it ousted Germany from the East. And for Russia, an alliance with France did not give anything but loans that could become cheese in a mousetrap - and even not free. In addition, we received an absolutely unprofitable enmity with the Germans.

Our ties with the Germans were not established yesterday. One can recall many German by birth, but Russian by fate and services to the Motherland of German surnames, at least the same Emil Khristianovich Lenz or Academician Karl Maksimovich von Baer, who wrote his works in German, but with one introduction to the popular consumption of the Caspian herring (instead of "Dutch"), which increased the national wealth of Russia by millions of the then very significant and very necessary rubles for us. Perhaps the reader will be surprised - what does the herring have to do

with it? The fact is that at that time, in the devastation of the Crimean War, we still did not know how to cook herring on an industrial scale on our own. And for the first time it was Baer, not only the great Russian biologist, but also, as we see, the practical organizer of specific economic affairs, who strengthened our economic

independence.

Baer was the initiator of the famous (alas, now half-forgotten!) Trans-Siberian expedition of Alexander Fedorovich Middendorf in 1842-1845. One of the results of the expedition of another Russian German was the annexation of the Amur Territory to Russia. However, this was the nineteenth century. However, even in the times of Peter the

Great, Daniil Gottlieb Messerschmidt, who was born in Danzig and died in 1735 in St. "Undergoing great labors and trips, he lost his health from intolerable repeated swamp and running waters, collected ancient mammoth bones, all kinds of stones and the like in Siberia."

A native of Leipzig, Gottlieb Schober, also at the behest of Peter, explored the Volga region, the Terek, the Caspian. Died in Moscow.

Here is how academician Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky assessed their services to Russia: "The natural science study of Russia begins with them, they are the founders of that great collective scientific work, which is continuously and successively

continues from 1717 to the present day ... Schober and Messerschmidt were Germans, but they gave Russia their whole lives ... Their names must be remembered by us - the successors of the work they started."

The German Catherine II kept Russia from German domination, from dominating the Russians by Emperor Peter III, who wanted to be a "Prussian lieutenant." With manifestos of December 4, 1762 and July 22, 1763, Catherine invited foreigners to settle in free places in Russia. Settlers from Westphalia, the Palatinate, Bavaria, Saxony, Swabia, Alsace-Lorraine were drawn to Russian lands. By the end of the 19th century, almost one and a half million Germans lived with us, in the Volga region alone there were 190 of their colonies. The German question in Russia had both pluses and minuses, but it was a fact. Moreover, the fact is potentially positive, because the colonies were not cancerous tumors, but examples of rational management and intelligent life. They did not suppress the Russians, but introduced something of their own into the general Russian process, something that was necessary and useful for Russia. As for the states, allied Germany and Russia would complement each other in every respect. And although the pan-Germanists looked at Ukraine, there were enough sober heads in Germany to understand: "Everyone has his own." At least in the Russian East. In his practical foreign policy, Bismarck was by no means

always a consistent conductor of his own principles. As a rule, his principles should not prevent a statesman from acting realistically, taking into account the specific situation. And therefore, sometimes violently conflicting with Russia, he was always loyal to her. Russian thinker Nikolai Yakovlevich Danilevsky in his work "Russia and Europe" wrote about England's eternal

enmity towards us, about France's eternal readiness to stand next to Albion against Russian interests. As for Prussia, Danilevsky spoke unambiguously: "The task of this state, so brilliantly begun by him back in the time of the Great Frederick, so brilliantly continued by him under the leadership of Bismarck, but far from completed, is, undoubtedly, in the unification of Germany, in delivering to the German people of political integrity and unity. This goal is unattainable without the help and assistance of Russia."

So did Bismarck. When he was informed that Prince Wilhelm (the future emperor) wanted to learn Russian, the chancellor grunted: "This is the best thing he can do." However, Bismarck also owns the following words: "There is one good for Germany, which even the mediocrity of German diplomats cannot destroy: this is the Anglo-Russian rivalry."

But the top of Russian society thought differently ...

People of practical business looked at many things more calmly ... So, in the 70s of the XIX century, the Krupp company, having received an order from the Prussian government for large-caliber guns, faced great difficulties. Russian artillery scientists, specialists in ballistics and gunpowder, helped to cope with them, and Krupp conducted experimental firing at the Okhta training ground ... After all, such an experience was useful for Russia itself.

And we gradually moved away from such trusting relations with the Germans into a cloudy, foggy future ... This is one of the reasons why Germany increasingly departed from the Bismarck line at the end of the 19th century. The new young Kaiser Wilhelm II, despite the lessons of the Russian language and the warnings of Bismarck, appointed General Georg-Leo von Caprivi de Caprera di Montecuculi

as Chancellor. The general tried to negotiate with England against the emerging Franco-Russian bloc. The Soviet "History of Diplomacy" believes that Caprivi broke the "reinsurance" agreement with Russia, which pushed her into an alliance with France. But Caprivi was chancellor for three years - from 1891 to 1894, and the rapprochement of the Alexander emperors with France began much earlier.

Already in 1888, Russia "swallowed" the first French loan. So here, too, events turned out to be rearranged - Caprivi could drive a wedge between the Reich and Russia because tsarism itself short-sightedly helped this. However, not only tsarism ... Nikolai

Karlovich Girs was of Swedish origin, but had a Russian soul. By the beginning of the nineties, he was already seventy years old, and for almost ten he was sitting in the chair of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia. He was smart, experienced and therefore advocated a cautious rapprochement with Germany. "Even the appearance that Russia

looking for the friendship of France, rather weaken than strengthen our positions, "Girs

reasonably considered. He was, however, also obedient. And therefore he had to soon conclude a Franco-Russian pact, as demanded by Alexander III and the Russian (although far from Russian) stock exchange. Conclude in this situation ...

Practically all world capital was afraid of a lasting Russian-German alliance, perhaps more than anything else. Such an alliance made a major continental war in Europe impossible and could frustrate many plans. It would be very difficult to resist such an alliance by military force. England and the United States did not have land armies, and France ... Here France, as the most concerned side, rushed to work on Russia in favor of concluding a direct military alliance with it. Naturally, against Germany. Even the slow-witted Alexander III hesitated. Gears's position was categorically negative. The fate of many

future profits hung in the gray air of St. Petersburg in May 1891 ... And France increasingly insistently wanted to be not only a usurer for Russia, but also its senior military commander. As a creditor, the French Rothschilds promised to arrange another loan for Russia. Through Russian Jews, they financed almost all railway construction in the country and

controlled most of the banking system. And suddenly ... Alphonse Rothschild said that he would gladly place a loan from the Russian government in Europe, but "he will not be able to do this until the persecution of unfortunate Jews stops in Russia." If we take into

account that in St. Petersburg there were four bankers of Alphonse's tribesman for one Russian banker, then the claims were "justified." However, the Russian friends of the Parisian blackmailer hinted to the tsar that if Alexander signed an agreement, then there could be an indulgence for the ally. Alexander hesitated... Gears was firm. Then Rothschild terminated the contract with the

tsar, and... And already in July 1891, the bearded autocrat, taking off his cap (so as not to salute), listened to the Marseillaise. And the French fleet, invited on a "friendship visit", moored to the sounds of

revolutionary anthem at the forts of Kronstadt. Loans were received, in the summer of 1892 the first meeting of the chiefs of the Russian and French General Staffs was held in St. Petersburg. By early 1894, the Franco-Russian military convention had been signed and mutually ratified. Now, having started a war with France, Germany automatically received a war with Russia. Breaking Russo-

German relations was not easy. Suffice it to say that the first trade agreement between the two monarchies was concluded only at the end of the 19th century. Not because there was no trade, but because it used to be "kindred". Already very strong were dynastic and economic ties. However, Alexander III allowed himself

to intimidate the young Wilhelm II in a conversation with the fact that he, they say, would flood Germany with Cossacks. In the mouth of the Russian emperor, who was not much inclined to jokes, such threats made a frightening impression on the Germans. In addition, the Germans did not forget about the "night cuckoo" factor. After all, the wife of Alexander III - the Russian Empress - was a Dane, who was traditionally hostile to Germany. In

general, Russia has always been lucky not only for "gray cardinals", but also for similar "gray cuckoos". Alexander III made a sharp turn away from Berlin, and the Minister of Finance Sergei Yulievich Witte helped him in this - the happy husband of a divorced Jewess Matilda Ivanovna Nurok, by his first marriage - Lisanevich, as well as a friend of the Parisian Rothschilds and St. Petersburg banker Adolf Yulievich Rothstein.

And the Rothsteins and the Rothschilds increasingly twirled the policy of Russia as they wished. On June 18, 1895, Count Lamzdorf, a longtime employee of Giers, entered the following in his diary: "Our ambassador is worried about the fate of our loan and assures that the French capitalists will not give a penny if the British or Germans participate in the loan. He attributes all the evil before the temporary disclosure information by agent Rothstein; he talked with Rothschild even before applying to credit institutions ... ". And a month earlier, Lamsdorf had written: "The Parisian Rothschild refuses to negotiate a partial loan because he cannot do it without the London Rothschild."

Russia was left wondering: with what - London or Paris - legs standing up, European capital would talk down to us.

However, Witte did not see anything threatening in that ... Vladimir Karlovich Lamzdorf believed that for Russia friendship with France "is like arsenic - in a moderate dose it is useful, and at the slightest exaggeration it becomes poison." Witte and his trusted bankers thought otherwise, and Russia accepted French loans with suicidal desperation. But the same Witte was very firm with the Germans, and this provided us with customs wars with Germany and mutual losses. Witte fought the Germans, demanding a reduction in duties on Russian bread, while the Russian peasant was chronically malnourished. But Witte raised duties on the import of German cars, which contributed to the preservation of our technical backwardness.

As for relations with the French, Russia suffered losses here too. On June 1, 1895, Lamzdorf melancholy noted in his diary: "We have spoiled our relations with neighboring Germany and for a more or less end, chain only to union with oneself and keep depending on one's will.

The situation was not determined by the interests of Russia. As one commentator on Lamzdorf's activities put it, "others broke the dishes." However, in spite of everything, by the beginning of the 20th century, a third of Russian exports went to Germany: grain, sugar, meat, butter, timber. And a quarter of German exports - machinery, equipment, chemical products - went to Russia. Industrial equipment is not Chanel No. 5, not Coca-Cola. Industrial machines are the basis of sovereignty, and they were supplied to us by Germany.

Russian sales of goods to Germany strengthened the Russian ruble, German sales to Russia developed the Russian economy and ensured the stable growth of the German economy. Nevertheless, Witte slowed down the renegotiation of the Russian-German trade agreement, to the point that the Kaiser himself was forced to write a personal letter to Nicholas II, where he proposed to put

an end to the red tape. The contract has been extended. The Germans gave us a large loan, but in general policy this did not change almost anything. Fans of helping the Russians to beat the German "pots" were added

all sides. Russia was deployed to France by very powerful forces inside and outside the

country. Lamsdorf was one of them. In 1905, he wrote to the ambassador in Paris, Nelidov: "In order to be on really good terms with Germany, an alliance with France is needed. Otherwise, we will lose our independence, and I know nothing harder than the German yoke."

Lamsdorf did not know that the most terrible collar is the one that is harnessed for a trip to the war. And France harnessed us to such a "yoke", behaving extremely arrogantly after Russia's failures in the Russo-Japanese War. The same Nelidov warned the officers of the General Staff Captains Polovtsev and Ignatiev, who arrived in Paris on a business trip: "Please note that the mot d'ordre (slogan) "La Russie ne compte plus!" ("Russia is no longer considered") is in vogue here.

This was the case on the Continent. But England also remained ... Since the time of the friend of the Rothschilds - Disraeli-Beaconsfield - Jewish visible, that is, personal, participation in the political life of the British has become more and more tangible, although its history goes back at least to the time of Oliver Cromwell.

This new political feature of English society manifested itself not only in the lifetime role of Disraeli, but even more visibly in his posthumous veneration. The day of his death - April 19, 1880 - became for decades for the royal court and the Conservative Tory in "Snowdrop Day". The deceased lord had a special respect for this flower.

The life publicist of Cecil Rhodes - the editor of the Johannesburg "Star" Monipenny - grieved for Disraeli only a little less than the life publicist of Disraeli himself - the longtime editor of the "Times" Buckley. What did all this mean for England on the eve of the

new century? Well, firstly, the strengthening of transnational, that is, for England, anti-national tendencies in foreign policy. What was beneficial to the London Rothschilds was beneficial to the Rothschilds in Paris, and the Warburgs in Berlin, and the Warburgs overseas. But it was far from always profitable even for all English lords. It was impossible to talk about the people.

By the way, Gilbert Keith Chesterton - not only the creator of the images of Father Brown and Horne Fisher, but also an original philosopher, wrote: "Benjamin Disraeli rightly said that he was on the side of the angels. He was on the side of the angels - the fallen angels (that is,

Remember, Satan. - S.K.). He did not stand for animal cruelty, but he stood for the imperialism of the princes of darkness, for their arrogance, mystery, and contempt for the obvious good.

disputes caused by the publication of "The Origin of Species" by Charles Darwin. It was then that the Lord declared that, according to Darwin, man is either an ape or an angel, and Disraeli himself is "on the side of the angels." If we recall that the devil is sometimes called "a monkey God", then with Chesterton's correction, the whole story takes on an additional,

albeit somewhat amusing, depth.

The policy of the princes of darkness, the "monkeys of God", became the policy of Disraeli, and that became the policy of England, that is, the policy of the Jewish

cosmopolitan bankers. Here, reader, is a curious story... The Suez Canal, which cost 400 million francs and 20,000 lives of Egyptian fellahs, was officially opened for navigation on November 17, 1869. The canal project belonged to the Frenchman Lesseps, the French built the canal and mostly the French owned it - to the extreme displeasure of England. 44% of the shares (176,600 out of 400,000) were owned by the Egyptian king - Khedive Ishmael Pasha.

Suez shares were "gold", but "suddenly" in 1875, Disraeli "unexpectedly learns" that the Khedive is ready to sell his share of the shares. Credits for the purchase could be passed through Parliament, but how could Disraeli forget about the Rothschilds! Instead of state interest-free financing, they took money at interest from them - allegedly in order to speed up the transaction. For 100 million francs, the British government first became a co-owner of the canal in part, and after the occupation of Egypt by the British in 1882, in fact, completely. The Soviet "History of Diplomacy" summed up: "Now ... control over the canal was secured to the British government."

So it is so, but is it the government? Count Archibald Philip Primrose Rosebery was an influential Liberal leader. From 1892 to 1895, he was first Minister of Foreign Affairs, and then Prime Minister of England. The count belonged to the group of "liberals-



imperialists, "was a supporter of repressive measures in South Africa that ensured the interests of ... Who? Yes, all the same Rothschilds. And Rosebery would not want a war with the Boers! After all, at the age of thirty, in 1878, he became the husband of the only daughter of the omnipotent Rothschild That is why, a decade and a half later, Count Lamsdorf complained on May 22, 1895: "The Parisian Rothschild refuses to negotiate a partial loan, because he cannot do it without the London Rothschild, and he, being a relative of Rosebery, has his own plans." , reader, in addition to London and Paris, there were also the Rothschilds of Vienna, where they controlled the economy of Austria-Hungary through the largest bank Credit Anstalt. In 1895, the Rosebery cabinet fell, but the new Salisbury cabinet was also associated with the Rothschilds, if not related, then friendly and business ties. Such a Rothschild factor almost automatically fastened English politics to American. Of course, deploying the heavy dreadnought of Albion to its former colony was not an easy and quick matter, but for the Rothschilds and Warburgs it was absolutely necessary, because the North American continent, reliably sheltered from military upheavals , has long been considered by them as the future main residence of the world

capital.

For British England, long-term normal (at least neutral) relations with Germany would be reasonable. For Rothschild England absolutely unacceptable. The struggle between these two powerful tendencies determined the inconsistency and bifurcation of British policy... The American Barbara Tuckman, who wrote an interesting book about the beginning of the First World War

"Guns of August" ("Guns of August") in 1962, believes that Germany could have an alliance with England, if it had not rejected "the advances of the Minister of the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain." The Soviet author of a book about Joseph and his sons, Lev Kertman, is convinced of the opposite: there could be no question of any agreement, because, they say, Germany was "Great Britain's main imperialist competitor." Wrong here, it must be said, both. Incidentally, Kertman's thesis was expressed even earlier by Academician Tarle. He also believed that an alliance between Germany and England would inevitably

Germany "a soldier of England on the continent" with the prospect of a war against Russia insofar as Russia was supposedly bound by an alliance with France. If

Yevgeny Viktorovich proved anything, it was only how harmful and unnatural for Russia was her orientation towards France. Indeed, without an alliance with France, there could not have been a sharp deterioration in relations with the Germans.

A possible union of the Germans and the British, although it would not be the best option for Russia, but not fatal, Of course, in this case, Russia, for example, would be closed to the way to Persia and somewhere else ... So what? We needed a different path - into the depths of Russia, into the depths of ourselves ...

There were objective conditions for a rapprochement between England and Germany, but not on the base that Tuckman had in mind, and indeed Chamberlain himself. Chamberlain believed time after time that "a general agreement between Germany, England and America" was possible. However, only an alliance of England and Germany against America would make sense.

Be that as it may, England developed naturally. And although she grew stronger at the expense of the colonies, she left her home to the outside world herself. Germany also developed and grew stronger, using the internal forces, first of all, of its own people. The same could be said about the other peoples of the Earth, except for ... two - the Jewish, self-scattered around the planet, and the American. America was created as a kind of "black hole", into which parts of different peoples, world resources and gold fell ... America owed its success to foreign peoples at least as much as to its own.

England and Germany turned out to be the most developed countries in the world due to the qualities of the English and German peoples themselves. Both nations had the right to say: "We developed our Motherland ourselves, even if we took the funds for this from others!" The American human "cocktail" could only pugnaciously declare: "Go to hell, all of you!", because America developed in artificial, greenhouse and therefore unnatural conditions. The union of Anglo-German European naturalness against Jewish-American artificiality would give a powerful potential for the development of a new world. Also, naturally (albeit slowly, with delays and miscalculations), developing Russia could soon become in such

the world as that third pillar that would finally give stability to the true progress of mankind. Another sequence was also

possible: at first the Germanic Russian union, and then - the accession of England to it.

And if there was a "fourth extra" in such a possible scenario, it is France. When

Chamberlain was groping for the possibility of an alliance with the Reich, Wilhelm II reported the English proposal to Nicholas II and asked what he could get in return from Russia if he refused the "English version"? It was clear: Wilhelm wanted to know if Russia would move away from the orientation towards France? Alas, the Tsar's advisers had a strong opinion about France. The pro-French-anti-German line of Russian

policy gradually became stronger. And all the same Tarle was later sure that the tsar did the right thing, not falling for the bait of the German cousin, because the Germans did not seriously think about the German-English conspiracy against Europe, because, they say, in this case Germany became the continental mercenary of the Britons. How to know! If the tsar had agreed with the

Kaiser, then even an Anglo-German alliance could only mean the isolation of France. Russia would have benefited from the strengthening of relations with the Germans and from the role of "arbitrator", because, "detaching" from France, Russia would find itself in the position of a natural arbitrator - the regulator of the European situation. Russia could become that "axis" on which the yoke of the European equilibrium would hang, where the German and English "scales" would fluctuate. In other words, any alliance sealed with a

Russian-German handshake would mean European peace, the belittling of France, the limitation of England's initiative, and Germany's hegemony in Europe. Why not? Germany deserved it, but it would not harm Russia. On the contrary, it would only be beneficial for her!

The unnatural but powerful forces of seeming progress resisted such a possible future both consciously and instinctively. And their resistance was the more successful, the more disagreements arose between the great European peoples.

Anglo-German contradictions were, of course, evident. If earlier England was considered the "workshop of the world", now this definition was more suitable for Germany. German exports grew so rapidly that by the end of the 19th century, British surprise, mixed with annoyance, was replaced by, by their own admission, panic. The British interfered with the Germans in Turkey, and the Germans with them in South Africa.

And such conflict points multiplied: the Far East, China, Istanbul and Baghdad. Distances on the globe remained the same, but the speed of movement of people, goods, weapons and information increased dramatically. A conflict between two neighbors could arise thousands of miles away and become known in the capitals of the warring parties no later than a day. And since the British Empire was global, and the German Reich aspired to the same, then they constantly collided foreheads. The Pan-German alliance was decidedly anti-English (it was generally "anti-..." in relation to any country except its

own), and the London "Saturday Review" was no less categorically asserted: "Germany must be destroyed" .. .

All this is so. However, objectively, the United States remained the main imperialist competitor of both Britain and Germany. Of course, England could have tried to decisively weaken Germany by pushing her against France, but then she would have found herself face to face with America, reliably protected by the ocean from the military attacks.

Of course, Germany could assert itself in Europe and beyond by the power of the sword. But in the end, she would lose to the same distant America, not wasting her strength in the exhausting fever of war.

America was overseas. Germany and England were at arm's length from each other. Their conflict could easily escalate into mutual destruction. The option is not the most reasonable from any point of view. Alas, just the mind (not even humanistic, but practical, far-sighted)

the British and Germans did not have enough, although they entered into negotiations more than once and even concluded temporary agreements. On March 29, 1898, Joseph Chamberlain's negotiations with the German ambassador, Count Paul von Gatzfeld, took place in ... the London house of the banker Rothschild. But this did not change anything in the main.

And Rothschild as a peacemaker? There was nothing surprising or contradictory here either, if we understand that it was only a matter of tactics, and not of a profit-making strategy.

The Rothschilds are the South African gold and diamond industry. The big Birmingham industrialist Joseph Chamberlain, second in office after Salisbury's premier, was also associated with her. So willy-nilly, and with the same Rothschilds.

Lord (Lord, reader!) Rothschild became the patron of the ruthless stomach empire enthusiast Cecil Rhodes and one of the founders of the British South Africa Company. It was almost a state with its banner, coat of arms, postage stamps. But Rothschild's commercial "empire" was hindered by the independence of the Boer republics. The Transvaal and its Boer President Kruger were pressed politically and with arms.

Germany, on the other hand, had its own calculation for Africa, and Kaiser Wilhelm II supported the Boers. His telegram of welcome to Kruger after the unsuccessful British raid on the Transvaal made a lot of noise in Europe. "The nation will never forget this telegram," exclaimed the English Morning Post, as if Wilhelm was congratulating not the people who had defended their freedom, but the

enslavers. But at that moment, Rothschild urgently needed to negotiate with the Germans, and his companion minister Chamberlain turned out to be an excellent option, especially since it was not just about Africa. The interests of the shareholder of the "Royal Company of Niger" Chamberlain also conflicted with the French colonialists, who also interfered with the Germans. And besides, the closest ally in Chamberlain's office, the Duke of Devonshire, was worried about the state of affairs in China, because Lancashire textile workers operated on the Chinese market, and the Duke invested his capital in this textile. Germany's position in China

was very strong. With such an intertwining of selfish interests, temporary alliances became inevitable, and such "high state considerations" could not but be taken into account by the ministers of either His Majesty the King, or His might of capital. Such vicissitudes gave "high politics" and "higher state interests" additional ambiguity and inconsistency.

So, at the beginning of the 20th century, Rhodes and the Rothschilds decided to conduct and waged a victorious war against the Boers. Germany took it easy. Why? Yes, because "in exchange" the British financial tycoons did not object to the plans of Deutsche Bank and the German government to build the Baghdad railway and increase German influence in Turkey.

The German Siemens goes to Constantinople with his daughter, and for company with them, the daughter of Joseph Chamberlain. On March 10, 1899, the bitter enemy of the Boers Cecil Rhodes arrives in Berlin, and Kaiser Wilhelm

favorably receives him ... Nothing particularly new happened here. The selfishness of the leaders was inseparable from them from time immemorial. But the scale of opportunity was now so great in a new way that it changed society beyond recognition. The strategic goal has not changed: constant and maximum benefit. Tactical means also remained the same - temporary alliances. But a strategic means loomed before unprecedented: a world war. And soon enough. On December

15, 1887, Engels wrote in London the words that Lenin called prophetic thirty years later: "For Prussia Germany, no other war is now possible, except for a world war. And it would be a war of unprecedented size, unprecedented strength. From eight to ten million soldiers will choke each other and devour the whole of Europe in the process. The devastation caused by the Thirty Years' War - compressed over the course of three to four years and spread over the whole continent, famine, the confusion of our artificial mechanism in trade, industry and credit, the collapse of the old states and their routine statesmanship - such a collapse that dozens of crowns are lying on the pavement. Such is the prospect if the system of competition in military weapons taken to extremes finally bears its inevitable fruits. This is where, gentlemen kings and statesmen, your wisdom has led old Europe. These are not the naive reasons of Debidur for you - "the ambition of some dynasty or the thoughtless impulse of the people",

but insight into the essence. And the penetration is all the more outstanding because the serious Englishman Henry Noel Brailsford, even in March 1914, in his book "The War of Steel and Gold" was mistaken when he wrote: "The era of conquest in Europe is over; and

except for the Balkans and perhaps the outskirts of the Austrian and Russian empires, it can be said with the greatest possible certainty in politics that the boundaries of our modern nation-states have been finally established. Personally, I believe that there will be no more wars between the six great powers. "Well, cheers for Engels? Of course, but ... But Engels

was unfair to Germany - no war, except for a world war, was already impossible for England, France ", and especially for America. Moreover, it was not Germany that sought war in the first place. Czarist Russia also stupidly climbed into the world squabble, but it only complemented the overall picture. Although Russia had only its inherent feature, it was obviously considered as a "gray cattle" for "slaughter". And many tried for this. For example, in the Russian historical tradition, Witte is considered a large and patriotic figure.

They also refer to Lenin's opinion, although Lenin's assessment of the activities of Sergei Yulievich is as follows: "Russia has already seen a brilliant budget (under Witte). There was also "free cash", there was also boasting before Europe, there was also increased borrowing from the European bourgeoisie. And as a result? Collapse. Collapse is the exact word. Before the war in 1914, Russia only needed half a billion francs a year to pay the

French shareholders of regular loan coupons! In order to pay off, new loans were organized. francs, but there was not enough money for the national economy.

Yes, and the economy was not impressive, no matter what anyone said about the powerful de "progress" of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. In 1988, Boris Brazol's pamphlet "The Reign of Emperor Nicholas II in Figures and Facts" was published in New York. The author tried to prove that after the revolution, Russia was supposedly in decline - even the railways were built only a thousand kilometers a year, and under the tsar - 1,575 kilometers each! That's

right... But by 1940, freight turnover had already grown by almost 7 times, passenger traffic - by 5 times... And what about the new station economy? A

bridges? And thousands of kilometers through the tundra, desert, taiga? And the newly built roads after the war?

Brazol reported that the "royal" kilometer of the railway was cheaper than the "Soviet" one - only 74 thousand rubles. But the "Statistical Collection of the Ministry of Railways for 1913" gave the price of a kilometer at 117.3 thousand rubles for 1910 and 123.4 thousand rubles for 1913. However, the royal roads were really relatively inexpensive, because they were bad: light rails, weak ballast, bad sleepers ...

The main thing is that Russia generally did not build so much - cities, domains, hospitals, residential buildings. Russia fought, but became more and more entangled in the web of both external and internal bloodsuckers. And although the offices and offices of these financial "spiders" were located on different sides of the state border, both of their varieties were equally alien to Russia and its interests. Witte is sometimes credited with the introduction of gold circulation in

Russia. One of the implementers of the idea was A. Rothstein, invited by Witte from Austria-Hungary, who practically did this. But here are the words of the State Comptroller Peter Khristoforovich Schwanebach: "The transition to gold circulation took place in our country mainly through the accumulation of gold by external loans." And to maintain such a "success" could also only be new loans. What worked? The gold reserves seemed to be solid. The gold backing of paper money was about 120%! As a result, the West ... sucked out Russian gold, and there were not enough funds for lending to the national industry. All this was so obvious that the opinions of Lenin and

Schwanebach, as we see, almost coincided.

At the same time, Lenin wrote about the official publicist Guryev from the government officialdom Rossiya. The Zemshchina newspaper defined him as a "publicist with a Jewish-liberal tinge," and Lenin scoffed: "Is the official Rossiya really a Jewish-liberal body?" Lenin, on the other hand, explained: the actual State Councilor Guryev was Witte's personal secretary. And the editor of Rossiya, by the way, was a former professor of law at the Demidov Lyceum... Ilya Yakovlevich Gurlyand. So the shade was still determined correctly.

The name of Witte is often associated with the growth of railways and less often with the growth of drunkenness in Rus'. But it was he (is it true, is he alone?) who spent



a very interesting financial and social innovation with a state monopoly on vodka. Here is how the hereditary monarchist V. Shulgin described its consequences: "The pictures played out in front of the Monopoly stores were disgusting. Previously, people drank in taverns and taverns. There they sat at tables and ate something. drunken songs, but sometimes they talked. The tavern was in some way a club, although of low quality. After the reform, taverns were closed. Consumers of vodka drank it straight from the bottle in the street, and those who were drunk lay there right there "...

So, before Witte, the common man had a place to drink and eat. After Witte, one could only "get drunk". I will note in brackets that approximately according to the same scheme, already in Soviet times, at some point, the use of alcohol in canteens was banned. The social result of this measure was very reminiscent

of "Witte's". Through the efforts of Witte, the budget became more and more parasitic and was filled not so much with the increase in production as with "drunk" incomes. The net income of the wine monopoly increased from 188 million rubles in 1900 to 675 million in 1913 and amounted to about 30% of the revenue of the truly "drunk" budget.

The former Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Finance of the Russian Empire, Vladimir Nikolaevich Kokovtsov, writes in his memoirs that in the spring of 1913, Witte at one time fooled him with a certain project of sobering up Russia, but never presented any project. But at the end of the year, he broke out in the State Council on this occasion with a purely hysterical, according to Kokovtsov, speech, ending it with a heart-rending "Sentry!" ... The speech, of course, was pure camouflage and was clearly intended "for history" - they say, Witte did not spoil Russia, he wanted to "sober up" her. "This word" guard, "Kokovtsov recalled, " was uttered in such a frantic, shrill voice that the entire State Council literally came into undisguised bewilderment not from the impression made, but from the unexpectedness of the trick, from the shamelessness of speech "... Perhaps, in the presented In a brief

sketch from life, Witte's personality is outlined amusingly accurately. Sergey Yulievich was a chameleon - in life, in politics, in views. Perhaps it was his absolute lack of conscience, combined with a quick mind and

noble origin attracted the attention of the Jewish bourgeois elite in Russia already in the early stages of the career of the future count ... After all, Witte came to the state policy of Russia from a private service in the joint-stock company of the South-Western Railways. And the Russian railways are the Jewish magnates Bliokh, Gunzburgs, Varshavsky, Polyakovs. During his long career, Witte more than once entered into visible conflicts with Jewish business circles (with the same Polyakov), but without the closest and warmest cooperation with them, his career simply would not have taken place.

Moreover, if one takes the path of adventurous assumptions, then Witte's breakthrough to the highest rungs of the official bureaucratic ladder can be presented as a very cunning combination of the railway elite. A combination where Sergei Yulievich played the role of a pawn, confidently advanced by an experienced queen player. Witte made a lightning career.

After graduating from the Faculty of Mathematics of the Novorossiysk University in Odessa (!), he almost immediately began to serve on private railways. In 1888, the thirty-nine-year-old Witte was the manager of the Southwestern Railways, where Blioch was chairman of the board. Emperor Alexander III himself often traveled along these roads - from St. Petersburg to the Crimea and back. The lettered royal train ran at courier speeds. He went from year to year, and no incidents happened to him.

The story of what happened next is absolutely reliable - it taken from the memoirs of Witte himself.

In his service, Witte had to accompany such trains, but he was not allowed to see the person of the emperor. All that Sergei Yulievich could see was Alexander's worn-out pants, which the tsar's valet Kotov patched at night (the tsar did not like renovations and wore out his clothes to

dilapidation). Everything went according to routine and no one paid special attention to the employee Blioch. And even with Witte "on board" the train did not slow

down. And suddenly ... Suddenly, in August 1888, the road manager Witte begins to categorically demand a decrease in the speed of the imperial train, because otherwise he does not guarantee safety.

It would seem that there are doubts, carry out the necessary road works. But no - Witte demands a reduction in speed, and the Minister of Railways, Admiral Posyet, has to redo the traffic schedule, increasing it by three hours. As a result, the highest displeasure directly addresses Witte in Fastov. At first, however, it is transmitted by the head of the tsarist guard, General Cherevin, but Witte begins to object to Cherevin in excessively loud tones. And then ... And then Alexander III himself comes out of the salon and interrupts the "zealous campaigner": - What are you

talking about. I drive on other roads, and no one slows me down, and you can't drive on your road simply because your road is Jewish. Witte fell silent, but Posyet

spoke: - Your road, my dear, is not in order. On other roads we we drive fast and no one dares to carry the sovereign slowly.

And then Witte

soared: - You know, Your Excellency, let others do what they want, but I don't want to break the Emperor's head, because it will end with you breaking the Emperor's head in this way!

And it came true according to his word! Two months have passed. The term is sufficient for not arousing unnecessary suspicion, but not enough for Witte's "zeal" to be forgotten. And on October 17, 1888, near the Borki station near Kharkov (of course, not on the South-Western, but on the Kharkov-Nikolaev road), the train with Alexander III and his family flew down a slope ... Witte, appointed one

of the experts, describing the incident, composed a whole epic about how the hero-emperor on his back held the roof of the dining car, saving his family and servants. This picturesque picture wanders from book to book, but in reality the royal family, together with the emperor, was saved by the walls of the car, which moved like a "house" and delayed the fall of the roof.

Witte's expert opinion as a whole turned out to be just as picturesque. And neither A. Koni, who came from St. Petersburg, nor the director of the Kharkov Institute of Technology, process engineer and professor of mechanics V. Kirpichev, agreed with

him. Witte disputed Kirpichev's opinion in print, declaring that Kirpichev "does not know railway practice." But engineering flair

Witte's opponent was, as they say, in the genes. The Kirpichevs are a whole dynasty of scientists and engineers. Brother Mikhail is a chemist, an employee of Mendeleev. Brother Nil is a general, professor at the Nikolaev Military Engineering Academy, and in Soviet times - a teacher at the V. Kuibyshev Military Engineering Academy. Son Mikhail - Soviet scientist, heating engineer, academician. So what about the "incompetence" of Kirpichev, Sergei Yulievich cast a

shadow on the wattle fence. However, the deed was done - Alexander remembered the "shrew" - "seer", chopping the truth in the eyes of the kings. And ... Witte was offered the post of director of the department of railway

affairs of the Ministry of Finance. Maybe, however, the tsar was reminded of Witte, but they suggested about fasting. After all, for some reason, the engineering prophet was not identified in the Ministry of

Railways (Ministry of Railways), but in finance. This is where it started ... Witte, who was connected with Jewish financial and industrial capital with his whole fate, turned out to be so in his place (for this capital) that you involuntarily think about it: was it not too opportunely played out first in Fastov, and then near Borki, this "story"? After all, the "pocket" Witte was desperately needed by the blichos: a grandiose railway construction was unfolding in Russia, and unclean raking hands could be heated on it better than on anything else.

"Focused" Witte at the posts of Minister of Finance and Prime Minister a lot. He deprived the State Bank of loans to the most healthy financial and industrial groups of von Derviz, Alchevsky, Mamontov. In 1899, at his suggestion,

the "case" of Savva Ivanovich Mamontov, a Russian philanthropist and chairman of the board of the Moscow-Yaroslavl-Arkhangelsk Road Society, arose. Mamontov started a new major railway project in the North - extremely useful for Russia. Witte at first pretended to support him, and then he himself "sank", depriving him of support. Moreover, he opened a criminal case against the Mamontovs. They were acquitted by a jury, but they could not avoid ruin. A promising economic project for the development of the Russian North was also buried. IN

Russia was openly told that the machinations of Jewish bankers were behind the collapse

of Mamontov. Witte's defenders tried to prove that, they say, "the investment promotion of the economy through state subsidies has logical limits" self-regulation mechanisms should operate. But even these "logical limits" were far from being reached in Russia. Witte portrayed himself as

a champion of "honest business", but the Perm-Kotlas railway (part of the St. Petersburg-Vologda Vyatka line, which he did not allow Mamontov to build) was later built by a relative of Witte's wife, engineer Bykhovets. And Mamontov was replaced on the board of the Arkhangelsk-Yaroslavl road by another of her relatives - the doctor Levi. For a long time, Witte also managed

the Ministry of Railways. Witte's political biography, published in 1989, written by the historian A. Ignatiev, shows how Witte pursued "the policy of concentrating railways in the hands of the state by buying out private roads and state-owned railway construction."

And here is the result of this "noble" work for the benefit of the state. In Germany, by 1913, the state-owned railway network accounted for 94% of the total, and in Russia - only 67%. German roads were unprofitable, and Russian ones were unprofitable. But only for the treasury. As for private shareholders, in 29 years - from 1885 to 1913 - they received almost 4 billion rubles of net income. Gold.

Such was Witte's "statesman" and "Slavophile" (as some biographers certify him on the grounds that in his youth he embossed a couple of articles in Aksakov's newspaper "Rus" and enrolled in Count Shuvalov's "Holy Squad", from which, having sworn allegiance to fidelity, quickly left). Much later, in the

preface to the memoirs of her late husband, Matilda Ivanovna-Isaakovna Witte complained: "At court, among conservatives, among liberals, in democratic circles, everywhere they looked at Count Witte as a "foreign" person. ways, and therefore had few permanent companions.

So, he was looking for good, he had huge opportunities for doing good, but he had few fellow travelers on the path of serving the Motherland. According to the countess, only Count Witte cared about Russia, and next to her was another guardian who understood him - she herself. About Rothstein and the Rothschilds, for whom Witte was not a stranger, the Countess did not mention, presumably, solely out of jealousy. In fact,

Witte turned out to be a genius of opportunism, helpfulness and guessing "where the wind blows from." And the fact how firmly this ideal chameleon tied himself from an early age precisely with international Jewish financial circles showed better than many who in Russia "orders the music" more and more powerfully and selfishly. And this is not an unfounded assertion, reader. Here is how, on the

eve of the First World War, the Jewish *Starina* magazine described the change in the internal Russian situation since the early 1980s: employees - in the capital's dandies. A phalanx of stockbrokers was formed, making colossal air turnover. One St. Petersburg Jewish old-timer admired: "What was Petersburg? Desert; now it's Berdichev!"...

And here is another piece of evidence, so interesting that I will simply cite an excerpt from the memoirs of Count Ignatiev "Fifty years in the ranks", referring to 1896: "On one of the regiment's duties (the count had just joined the guards cavalry guard regiment. - S.K.) the non-commissioned officer on duty on a non-combat team ran up to me and with excitement in his voice reported that "Alexander Ivanovich died." Alexander Ivanovich, everyone, from the private to the regiment commander, called the old bearded sergeant major who stood for hours next to the orderly at the gate, regularly saluting all those passing by.

Where did Alexander Ivanovich come to us from? It turned out that back in the early 70s, the stoves in the shelf smoked incredibly and no one could cope with them; once the military district sent a stove-maker from the Jewish cantonists to the regiment (there were such military pupils who were obliged to serve later. - S.K.), Oshansky. With him, the stoves burned regularly, but without him they smoked. Everyone knew this for sure and, bypassing all the rules and laws, detained Oshansky in the regiment, giving him a uniform, ranks,

medals and distinctions for extra-long "immaculate service". And here it is gone...

I had no idea what happened in the next few hours. Luxurious sledges and carriages drove up to the regimental gates, from which elegant ladies in furs and respectable gentlemen in top hats got out; they all made their way to the basement, where the body of Alexander Ivanovich lay. It turned out - and it could not have occurred to any of us - that Sergeant Major Oshansky had been at the head of the St. Petersburg Jewish community for many years. By noon the next morning, the regimental arena took on an unusual appearance. In addition to all of Jewish Petersburg, not only all the available officers of the regiment gathered here, but also many old cavalry guards, led by all the former commanders of the regiment. At the coffin of Alexander Ivanovich, the aristocratic military world was mixed with the Jewish commercial and financial world. After the rabbi's speech, the coffin of the old cantonist was raised by six former regimental commanders.. Such was the solemn finale of the old story about smoking stoves.

Ignatiev himself saw in the story he told only a funny curiosity, but, as you know, there is no smoke without fire. Guards furnaces "smoked", and then a quarter of a century they could not live without Oshansky, presumably, not in vain. It seems that someone really needed to hide an inconspicuous, but, as we see, by no means insignificant figure behind the "smoke screen" of the guards' furnaces for decades. And the picture Ignatiev involuntarily painted is rather

sinister than curious. Imperial St. Petersburg was truly becoming "New Berdichev". The head of the Lena gold mining partnership is the son of Baron Evzel Gintsburg

Horace and the son of Horace - Gabriel. In 1908, such a peculiar "Englishman" as Baron James de Hirsch and his banking house joined the Russian gold mining. Hirsch is also operating in South Africa, which means - along with the Rothschilds. Not without the powerful Muscovite Samuel Polyakov (whose daughter was married to de Hirsch), as well as the Parisian (former St. Petersburg) banker baron Jacques Ginzburg. Dmitry Rubinshtein becomes the banker of the last "New Berdichev" Empress Alyx. And since 1891 unofficial, and since

1894 - already the official agent of the Russian Ministry of Finance in France for many years (until the war itself and later) becomes a real Privy Councillor (rank II class!), Commander of the Order of the White Eagle, French financier Arthur Rafalovich. However, the reader, the Rafalovich did not leave the Russian land directly without good deeds either. In Odessa, there was a banking house "Rafalovich and Sons". The best friend of the Rafalovichs was the landowner Abaza, whose nephew "organized" Russia's war with Japan.

Returning to Witte, we can summarize: without respecting and not recognizing the new "Berdichev" hypostasis of the "city of Petrov", not a single financier - either private or government - would have sat in his place for a long time. On the other hand, it was impossible for the alliance that had arisen between Petersburg, Paris and London not to involve the Russian peasant in the planned European war as a bargaining chip to pay for

large combinations. Chapter

3. Russia and Germany: play off! Combinations were thought seriously. The fact that war only continues politics by other means has been known to the world since the time of Clausewitz. The future world war was also, of course, a means. And as such, it had to ensure the fulfillment of three tasks at

once. It was necessary, say, to bring down social tension. In the third, however,

turn. Secondly, the war was supposed to give unprecedented dividends. The American publicist Hershl Meyer well explained the profitability of state military orders, which is special for capital: "Even when 75-90% of the company's production capacity is used for civilian production, and only 10-25% for military orders, it is the latter that play a decisive role for entrepreneurs "Civilian products cover the costs of materials, depreciation, wages, salaries of employees, rent, etc. And military products provide a net excess profit." That's right: after all, a special consumer pays here - a non-market consumer. Prices for military products are determined

not by the cost, but by the possibilities of the treasury. The treasury of the developed countries became



bottomless due to the buildup of public debt. Ordinary taxpayers acted as creditors, only they did not pay interest on the debt, but they themselves. By blood. But even

superprofits played a secondary role. First of all, the war was supposed as a means of rapid redivision of the world. Yes, the German example was the most striking, but not decisive. The young Reich found itself stuffed, like a good German black pudding with cumin, not only with the ideas of aggressive Pan-Germanism, but also with mighty Krupp twelve-inch barrels. It is enough to look at the old photo panorama of the gun shop of the tenth years at the Krupp plant, where there are fifty steel "trunks" only within sight, to understand how much the war for the capital of Germany was a settled matter. But resolved in the event that the colonial powers do not cede to them part of the planetary production amicably. Russian diplomat Nikolai Nikolayevich Shebeko reported in 1911 to the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs about the plans for the development of the Baghdad railway: "In its present phase, the track being built is already an excellent market for the products of German factories and factories, since all iron building material is delivered from Germany. In the future In its final form, the road will enable German industry to flood Asia Minor, Syria and Mesopotamia with its products, and at the end of the Baghdad-Khanekin-Tehran line, also Persia. The Germans paved these paths to the East not with the fire of torches and the steel of swords, but with the fire of a domain

and rail steel! And the pan-German ideology had convincing material justifications.

Academician Tarle spoke of the power of the Entente in only superlative degrees: "The combined forces of the Entente were so colossal, its material possibilities were so limitless ...", etc. However, statistics spoke of the opposite.

In 1913, the share of the Reich (excluding Austria-Hungary) in world engineering was 21.3%. And the entire Entente - Great Britain, France and Russia, combined - 17.7%, The result is impressive, but ... pales before the power of the United States,

which had 51.8%! There were other statistics as well. In 1900 almost 75% of American exports went to Europe, and in 1913 only 59%! And the ma

the reason was the strengthening of Germany. It turned out that US capital was losing its influence in Europe at a rate of more than 1% per

year! But Uncle Sam had a serious "handicap": he did not have to spend much on the maintenance of the armed forces, on the construction of "defensive ramparts", "lines", fortresses. Finally, to waging devastating wars over the centuries ... Actually, reader, these figures and

considerations pre-programmed everything: geography, the course and outcome of the first great division of the world and superprofits through war.

The line of reasoning here was simple and vile. Let's start with geography... A serious war could only start in Europe between Europeans. And with the obligatory participation of Germany, which has already crossed the mark of one-fifth of the world's modern production. The States had to win, as a country that provides half of the world's production. But what to do with free-spirited cowboys and farmers? With America's unwilling industrial workers, not to mention the "lower" middle class? They didn't give a damn about all the problems outside the star-striped homeland. To show off with carbines here, at hand: in Mexico, in Cuba - still all right. And it was not easy to pull them out to distant Europe for a great war - such that the profit turned out with a capital letter, on a global scale. Almost impossible. This means that it is necessary to wage war by proxy, but under American control. There was no choice - the war would begin by the hands of the Anglo-French, with the involvement of the

peasants of the unprepossessing "Admiral of the Marquis Puddle and the Tsushima Strait" Nikolai Aleksandrovich Romanov.

Both the course of the war and its outcome were clear. And it is strange that this has been denied and denied by many. I have referred more than once and will continue to refer to Academician E. Tarle just because I am writing about the same period about which he wrote his book. Parallel comparisons beg themselves.

Let us turn to Tarle's opinion: "Of course, for the capitalist classes of all countries, especially all the great powers, there was an element of risk; no one had a mathematically indisputable hope for victory" ... Tarle is fundamentally wrong.

As for the United States (and only them!), they had something more than hopes. risk for them

was reduced to zero, but the victory was calculated with mathematically indisputable accuracy.

There was no doubt in advance that in the event of war, Germany would beat the Entente. And that the United States will begin to support the Entente at first "after the fact." But when Germany almost beats the Entente, the United States will intervene openly and bring the final balance. To your

advantage, of course. Tarle did not understand the essence even after the end of the war, but the cunning but shrewd fox Talleyrand, having once observed America closely, gave an accurate forecast of the future one hundred and twenty years before the actual events. He warned: "Europe must always look at America with open eyes and not give any pretext for accusations or repression. America is growing stronger every day. It will turn into a huge force, and the moment will come when, in the face of Europe, communication with which will become easier in as a result of new discoveries, she will wish to have a say in our affairs and lay her hand on them ... The day America comes to Europe, peace and security will be banished from her for a long time. This is

exactly what happened, but all this had to be well prepared. After all, one had to deal not with tin soldiers, but with the fate of a good half a billion living people. And it was imperative to isolate Germany from Russia

and at the same time prevent Germany from reconciling with England. In this dual task, the enemies of the European world have succeeded completely. There were many of them, but among them there is one particularly mysterious figure. The secrets of the long preparation for the war manifested themselves in it so clearly that, in fact, they ceased to be secrets. This case is so unique that it needs to be dealt with separately.

I mean, the reader, most, by the definition of the first edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia of 1930, a major representative of behind-the-scenes diplomacy in the era of Wilhelm II, Baron Friedrich August von Holstein. This name is almost unfamiliar to contemporary Soviet historiography and has "dropped out" of subsequent editions of the TSB (which is surprising and mysterious in itself). Academician Khvostov mentions Golypteyn in what he wrote at the beginning

sixties, the second volume of the "History of Diplomacy", but he did not indicate the true meaning of the mysterious baron. However, modern Western historians, for some reason, also overlook the history of the baron.

Holstein was born in the year of Pushkin's death - in 1837. He began as the closest collaborator of Bismarck, and much later actively contributed to his resignation. At the age of twenty-three, Golshtein arrived in St. Petersburg as a junior attaché under Bismarck. At thirty-seven, he was the second secretary of the embassy in Paris and became famous thanks to his testimony at the 1874 trial in the case of his former boss, the German ambassador to France, Count G. Arnim, a rival and opponent of Bismarck. It was said that Holstein, while carrying out Bismarck's assignments, even had to collect dust under the sofa in the embassy's reception room in order to eavesdrop on von Arnim's

conversations. Since 1880, the baron, who remained a bachelor all his life, settled in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an adviser to the political department. Ironically, the author of Bismarck's biography, Alan Palmer, claimed that Bismarck promoted the "honest and ambitious" baron through the ranks until he became the most famous "gray eminence" since the days of Father Joseph, who was under Richelieu. Palmer himself did not notice how he got into a mess! After all, the "gray cardinals" are different in that they do not have any official weight with absolute actual influence. They never rise up the corporate ladder precisely because of their special position.

So was Holstein. He flatly refused all promotions and, until his retirement in 1906, formally remained the same modest adviser, but in fact he was in charge of all foreign policy.

Bismarck received his resignation from the new Kaiser, the young Wilhelm II, in the spring of 1890, and even then Holstein's role in this was one of the main ones. Why did Holstein want so insistently to remove Bismarck if he did not aim high himself? And why did Holstein then act in the shadows, behind the scenes, for almost thirty years - just the most important decades for the diplomatic preparation of the world war?

The answer is to be found in the main results of Holstein's policy. Already at the resignation of Bismarck, he came out as an ardent opponent of renegotiating the "reinsurance" treaty with Russia. He even hid the text of the treaty from Bismarck's son, Herbert, at the decisive moment. Actually, the "new course" of Chancellor von Caprivi de Caprera di Montecuculi was the course of Holstein. And this anti-Russian line, which runs counter to the principles of Bismarck, he withstood to the end of his activities.

But he also disrupted the planned Anglo-German rapprochement. He assured William II that England would never come to an agreement with France and Russia. A couple of decades later, the English Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey, provoked the Germans in the same (for some reason!) way, assuring that England would remain neutral while she was preparing to declare war on Germany. The Secretary of State and then Chancellor Bernhard von Bulow had nominal

political weight, but in reality everything was decided by the baron's notes on the margins of diplomatic dispatches. If he wrote: "Cheap!", then the project was set aside. It was in the hands of Holstein that the most important diplomatic appointments were, he conducted his own correspondence with German representatives abroad. Sometimes he even talked over the head of the ambassadors with their secretaries and clearly earned his nickname "the great stranger" along with the already beaten "grey reverend" ("graue Eminenz")...

E. Tarle, describing in detail the Germany of Wilhelm II, did not pay much attention to Holstein's personality, but he understood the level of his influence, because he wrote: "All four chancellors who held this post between the resignation of Bismarck and the beginning of the world war, i.e. (1890-1894), and Prince Hohenlohe (1894-1900), and Bülow (1900-1909), and Bethmann-Hellweg (1909-1917), were in essence tools and executors of the will of the emperor, more precisely, the thoughts of those behind him, such as Baron Fritz von Holstein "... But who was behind Holstein? Tarle - usually very sensitive to the psychological

and personal aspects of historical events - for some reason did not ask this question. Moreover, he did not even notice that he contradicted himself when he stated: "Already the presence of such outstanding people as Prince Lichnovsky, Brockdorf-Rantzau, Bernstorff, Kiderlen-Wächter, Marshal von Bieberstein does not give any

the slightest right ... to talk about the general unsatisfactoriness of German diplomacy. "Holstein is not on the list, although the named diplomats were junior contemporaries and colleagues of the "gray baron", and in the art of diplomacy they were most likely inferior to him.

True, in one place in his "Europe in the Age of Imperialism" Tarle gave an important characterization of the baron, albeit concise, defective in its brevity. "We note, by the way, that in 1890-1907, behind the back of the emperor, there was one person whose enormous role was revealed only relatively recently (Tarle wrote this in 1927 - S.K.) - Baron Fritz von Holstein, hiding in the shadows. .. This man, very hard-working and efficient, in essence compiled reports presented by the chancellors to the emperor, and, having perfectly studied the nature of Wilhelm, skillfully prompted the emperor of his resolutions, prompted the very construction of the report. game and was in constant contact with the stock exchange; he reflected the interests of the most aggressive spheres of big capital. He was a very important, albeit hidden spring, through which capitalism created imperialist foreign policy. But Tarle immediately added: "This is only a detail, of course. An imperialist, aggressive tendency in German foreign policy was inevitable."

I note that the artistic nature of the liberal Tarle did not tolerate German practicality, but was well-disposed towards the Anglo-French way of thinking. An unbiased view is limited. And so Tarle could not understand that the aggressive trend in German foreign policy was really inevitable, but the anti-Russian trend was not at all necessary.

Line Holstein was emphatically anti-Bismarckian, that is, ultimately anti-Russian. But what was the role of the Kaiser personally here? After all, Wilhelm more than once or twice tried to negotiate with Nicholas II (and even earlier - with Alexander III). Yes, that was the tragedy, that both in St. Petersburg and in Berlin, forces were actively operating, preparing an open military antagonism between two previously friendly countries. The Holstein factor here, if it was a detail, is fundamental. Tarle involuntarily gave a very accurate image - Holstein was a spring.

The spring sets the movement, without it the whole mechanism does not work, but it, in turn, is wound up! And it was no longer a detail, but the essence of the era, that in Germany, even contrary to the intentions of the monarch, someone wound up a

spring for a movement against Russia. The "crown" (not in terms of value, but in terms of time) of the baron's official efforts was the undermining of Germany's positions in Morocco and the conflict over this with France. This fact exhausted the credits of confidence in Holstein from Wilhelm, and the baron was forced to retire - three years before his death. The almost seventy-year-old "good-natured man" (according to Palmer) turned out to be very vengeful, and through the journalist Garden he rang about homosexual amusements in an intimate circle of the Kaiser's closest friend and the second "hidden spring" of international anti-Russian circles - Count Philip Eulenburg. An interesting circumstance. It is unlikely that the elderly baron was collecting his "compromising evidence" again under the sofas. Rather, he looked for him on the sofas in Count Philip's circle. Given the close connection between influential Freemasonry and aristocratic homosexuality,

Holstein's political physiognomy acquires a very definite cosmopolitan tone. By the way, even at the beginning of his "anti-career" career, von Holstein, conducting negotiations on April 26, 1871 with the military delegate of the Paris Commune of Klusere about the possible recognition of the Communards by the German government, frustrated them in favor of the Versailles counter-

revolution. In the general picture of the life of the baron, a trifle, but meaningful and also revealing. Rare and stingy Soviet assessments of Holstein explain his "miscalculations" by adherence to ossified doctrines and schemes, but it is unlikely that a successful stock speculator, deftly turning diplomatic secrets into gold, turned out to be so incapable of breaking his views. No, it's just that the scheme in which Holstein's policy was inscribed had nothing to do with the interests of Germany from the very beginning, because it isolated

Germany, led her to war and created for her the image of a future "warmonger". On closer examination, the "great stranger" turns out to be a particularly confidant of transnational forces. So "graue Eminenz" did not direct the foreign policy of the Reich. No, it's for them, like a steering wheel, p

direction needed by the Golden International. There were two course goals: a break with Russia and the prevention of an alliance with England.

Bismarck, although late, figured out the "under-the-sofa" baron. And he warned the Kaiser against "a man with the eyes of a hyena." Alas, Holstein intrigued and ruled freely. Moreover, he ruled until his death, because until the last days he was a private adviser to von Bülow and contributed to the last Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909, which became the threshold of an imminent war. It consisted of the following.

Austria-Hungary annexed the Slavic provinces of Turkey - Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia began to protest, because it was counting on these lands as part of the future South Slavic state. Russia supported Serbia, and Germany supported the Austrians. The Anglo-French remained on the sidelines, not wanting to play along with Russia and thereby increase our influence in the Balkans. As a result, the authority of the Russians fell, and the differences between the Russians and the Germans received additional fuel. Holstein played a significant role in this. Undoubtedly an outstanding personality, he acted

with impeccable knowledge of his craft, diplomatic history, court life and secrets. His situation was such that, as a rule, it was not him, but he who threatened to resign, and the threat worked every time.

He lived mysteriously, openly meeting almost no one, avoiding journalists and any publicity. There is not even a real photograph of him. But history itself showed its true role. "Holsteins" were in France, and in Russia, and in

England. And everywhere their hands ensured one thing - war. But only German Holstein turned out to be so enigmatic that its defiant enigmaticity turned into its opposite. Strange as it may seem, it is precisely Fritz Holstein who is associated with an almost fleeting, but

very interesting and still misunderstood episode of Russian-German relations. In the summer of 1905, when there were still almost 10 years before the start of the First World War, two emperors, Wilhelm II and Nicholas II, met near the island of Björk in the Finnish skerries.



The rendezvous of the emperors has been written about more than once, but its authentic details clearly remained only between the two main figures of the Björk rendezvous. On the other hand, although Björk was mentioned repeatedly, but without understanding what happened then and why. So what was the point of the Björk meeting, reader?

It is hardly possible to understand all this if one does not look at the world foreign policy of the beginning of the 20th century as a process, although not yet completely settled, still contradictory in particular, but already a single process in the main, which secretly, but energetically organized in all countries at the same time a supranational world capital. In

the first years of the beginning of the century, the arrangement of the pieces of the future great game by living soldiers began to be finally determined. World capital had a strong position in all major "political" powers, that is, in the USA, England and France. At the beginning of the 20th

century, it was true that industrial capital was more national than banking capital. In Germany, first of all, the domestic producing economy was rapidly developing, and for this reason alone, the growing Germany was controlled by the Golden International to the least extent. Control over Russia seemed to have already been established, but it was still too early to talk about its strength. It turned out that there was a need to

finally tear Russia away from Germany and make their political union completely impossible.

Easy to say, but how to do? After all, something happened outside of Russia that, on the contrary, could turn Nicholas II and the Russians away from "democratic" Europe and bring them closer to "monarchist" Germany.

Usually, the main political confrontation of those years is considered the Anglo-German, but big capital has a finer sense of smell than sworn historians - for nothing that the same capital does not have a penny of historical foresight. We already know, reader, that capital conceived the coming world upheavals, and Europe was bound to become their arena simply because in the course of such events it was necessary to weaken Germany within it.

itself with the help of a continental war. And it was impossible without the fact that not only Germany and France were at enmity, but also Germany and Russia were divided. They also chose the new

headquarters of the capital - the territorially and geopolitically invulnerable United States. Yes, so far there has been a debtor-creditor relationship between them and England, and the United States, until the First World War, was the world's largest debtor, and England the world's largest creditor. More precisely, according to the correct remark of Academician V. Khvostov, the creditor was the English financial oligarchy, it could be called English with a big stretch both in terms of formal nationality and from the standpoint of its worldview -

cosmopolitan and egotistical.

The world of the beginning of the century seemed to be ruled by England, but the world of the 20th century was supposed to be ruled by the States. And the prospective main world contradiction would then no longer be the Anglo-German, but the American-

German. Here is what the German ambassador in Washington, Holleben, wrote on January 1, 1898: "The contradictions between Germany and the United States in economic matters, which have become more and more acute since the great rise experienced by Germany as an economic force, as far as the mood in the United States is concerned, have entered Germany is by far the most hated country in the local press and in philistine conversations. This hatred refers primarily to the embarrassing competitor, but it also transfers to purely political grounds. We are called bandits and highway robbers (these are Americans - the fact that the discontent against us goes so far and manifests itself more strongly than against other competitors is explained here by the fear of our increasing competitiveness in economic field and before our energy and growing power in the political field.

Holleben's assessment, reader, is not only bright and accurate. It is also valuable because it proves that the "debtor" was not very afraid of his

"lender", and England in the United States - as a serious competitor in the future - was not considered. But there they were very afraid of Germany.

But Germany, even at the end of the 19th century, was only a faint shadow Germany in the 1910s!

Holleben's general statements were well illustrated and practically. In the spring and summer of the same 1898, the Spanish American War broke out. In fact, the expression "flared up" is not very true: the fire of American gunboats burned out the remnants of Spain's former influence in the region, like a steppe fire burns out dry grass - uncontrollably and to the ground. States quickly occupied the Caribbean, landed in the Philippines. However, a German squadron was also sent to Manila Bay

from China. On June 12, 1898, she anchored in the sight of the American squadron, which was inferior in power to the Germans. The Yankees are complacent only when they see obedient lackeys in front of them. But then a wave of "noble indignation" rose in the US press. And there was a reason - the Germans chopped off some of the tidbits of the "Spanish pie" from the USA. The government of Spain got away with it, and so slipping away from them, and in Berlin sold the Caroline and Marianne Islands to Germany.

At the same time, Lenin, with his usual merciless accuracy, noted: "The United States has 'views' on South America and is struggling with the growing influence of Germany in it."

However, England also actively fought against German influence. The British elite became increasingly concerned about the growth of both overall and (especially) German naval power. England entered into another conflict with Germany on the issue of the Baghdad railway, but it was precisely the next and far from the only conflict, far from a single point on the globe. But relations between England and Russia, which had

never been cordial, were also deteriorating. England openly supported Japan, and in general traditionally "dirtyed", sometimes covertly, and more often openly. On January 30, 1902, an anti-Russian Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded and, relying on it, Japan unleashed the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905.

Let us also say, by the way, that in April 1904, a syndicate of English banks, together with the American-Jewish banking house "Kuhn, Loeb and company" and the banker Jacob Schiff

provided Japan with a \$50 million loan. According to the credible (in this case) testimony of Witte, "then the sovereign considered the British our sworn enemies."

True, even in "allied" France, the banker Baron Jacques Ginzburg, in the midst of the Manchurian war, according to the memoirs of Count Ignatiev, managed to arrange a loan for Japan. And against the background of all this, a mutual counter movement of England towards France and

vice versa began. Just seven years ago, between these two colonial superpowers, not only an alliance, but there was simply no trace of normal relations. The language of the whole world had the word "Fashoda", and the British and French were on the brink of war. Classical colonial wars, which would not have been fought under the walls of London and Paris, but thousands of kilometers away, could still arise. Or still couldn't? Here is how it

was. In September 1898, near the village of Fashoda on the White Nile, in the upper reaches of the great river, two military formations collided.

The French colonial detachment of Captain Marchand came here from the French Congo back in July, hoisted a tricolor flag over the ruins of the old fortress and now stood in the way of the English expedition of General Kitchener, who was going up the Nile.

The general and the captain met not at a secular reception, so that the chain of command went to hell - the captain resolutely refused to give in to the senior in rank, and the muddy Nile waters began to boil from the heat of passions. The general

commanded a corps of 20 thousand people, the captain - a detachment of a hundred fighters, but the point was not in the local balance of power in a particular African outback. The Fashoda crisis was growing not under the walls of an abandoned fortress wall in Eastern Sudan, but in European capitals. It

was a serious test of the emerging global colonial "disposition", but a political one, when the ink of newspaper scribblers, and not the blood of soldiers, poured in a stream, and not advanced units, but editorials were introduced into the battle. In the course of the Fashoda conflict, ties were groped, the chances of future coalitions were assessed. And since the serfs had not yet fought, the forelocks were still crackling at the pans.

France suddenly found itself in such discord with England that, as academician Tarle wrote, even in an ultra-nationalist

For the first time in many, many years, the French press began to ask themselves the question: who should rather be considered the eternal, investigative enemy of France - Germany or

England? It got to the point that plans were being drawn up to bring Germany into the war with England on the side of France and ... Russia. But Germany at that moment could get more from an amicable agreement with England on a colonial field, and France had to give in. The general crushed

the captain's corns - for nothing that Marchand went to Fashoda through the jungles and swamps of Central Africa for two whole years.

Actually, a military skirmish between France and England could only strengthen Germany, which was by no means included in the calculations of the strategists of a future world war. Therefore, instead of mutual massacre, England and France had to move on to mutual, albeit dubious consent.

It's funny, but even Marxist historians seriously called the personal diplomacy of the English King Edward VII one of the factors of the emerging "friendship" of the former Fashodian enemies. He, they say, was a supporter of the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian (!) rapprochement, but he was hostile to both Wilhelm and Germany. Historians have not

forgotten about Edward, but the fact that on both sides of the English Channel the policy was determined by the London and Parisian Rothschilds, for some reason, was overlooked. However, the main thing was just the fact that the union of bankers was in dire need of an Anglo-French alliance.

France, although bragging, was decrepit. The French economy was losing dynamism, France - a worthy prospect. But, let me remind you, without France as the only really anti-German continental great power, a future big war could not begin.

France had to be securely taken over by a controlled alliance. The English king was here only a crowned zits-chairman - nothing more. Yes, he didn't have to work especially hard - France willingly backpedaled in past disputes, and on April 8, 1904, an Anglo-French agreement was signed, formally concerning the division of spheres of influence in Africa (and somewhere else on trifles), but in fact it was a mortgage blackboard in the future building of the anti-German global alliance.

The agreement was called in the press "cordial consent", in French "Entente cordiale". This is where the Entente came from.

But for Russia, such "consent" came out sideways. Increasingly tied to France by loans and the policies of financial Petersburg, Russia scowled at the prospect of being tied to England as well. Russia was defeated in the war with Japan, France did not help it, but was inactive, and even helped Japan through the hands of Jacques Ginzburg. England was openly hostile.

Friends are tested in trouble, and even in such a local trouble as the Far Eastern embarrassment, the behavior of Europe willy-nilly made even the lazy-minded monarch Nike (Nicholas II. - S.K.) think, especially since Kaiser Wilhelm insisted on this

pushed.

So, the world supranational capital, on the one hand, had to nip in the bud the possibility of the now German-Russian consent, and on the other hand, finally fasten Russia to its own "consent".

And the method chosen for this was as skillful as it was risky. Although, however, with an accurate account of the psychology of the emperors Wilhelm and Nicholas, and also in the light of the fact that the external unkind influence on Russian politics was powerful and deep, the risk was not very great and even completely excluded. Perhaps the chosen method can be described as "counter-mine". What does a smart and skillful soldier do if the enemy leads an underground mine under him? Well, of course, he begins to conduct his own countermine in order to pre-emptively detonate someone else's mine and completely upset enemy calculations.

For the hopes of Wilhelm II, the German (though only superficially German) plan for a new European political alignment became such a countermine to the financial West.

Here we, the reader, need to think without haste, because no one left documents about this fact of history, and could not. Such plans are not trusted on paper. But here's what logic tells us...

Germany needed an alliance with Russia, which would inevitably become an alliance against France as a continental enemy of the Reich, and against England, as its own global enemy.

In such an alliance, Russia, acquiring stability on the western border, could make the best use of all the benefits of mutual trade with the Germans. And this is already quite a lot, considering that for Russia the only reasonable foreign policy would be one that would ensure peace and the accelerated development of domestic wealth.

However, Russia was bound by agreements with France and could not break them so easily - loans received and still unpaid held tsarism firmly. Wilhelm understood this, but he relied too much not only on himself and on the common sense of Nicholas II, but also on their advisers.

At the end of October 1904, he wrote to Nicholas II about "a combination of the three most powerful continental powers." Naturally, Germany, Russia and France were implied, but the Kaiser mentioned France, as they say, for the sake of formality. He hardly doubted that if Nicholas could be moved to a common alliance, this would lead to a break in Russia with the "cordial agreement" that had just been built.

The approach here was simple: if France does not join, the trouble is small. And even if she joins, the grief is also small: she will still have to play second fiddle in Europe. Actually, to be honest, the French could not count on anything else, the only question was who in one of the two possible triplet ensembles with the participation of the French and Russians would be the prima - England or Germany?

An alliance with Albion meant for France a war with the Germans, an alliance with Germany and Russia - also a war, but obviously more acceptable - outside Europe, on the colonial fronts. So there was a sense in Wilhelm's undertaking. And she looked especially reasonable in her striving for a lasting peace

with Russia. The Kaiser did not take into account one thing - the international branching, in modern terms - the network of "agents of influence" and the consistency of their actions, including in his Fatherland. That is why in Russian affairs he willingly began to act according to the plan ... Holstein and with the participation of Holstein. Yes, yes, the reader, a staunch Russophobe, Baron Fritz von Holstein suddenly became imbued with the idea of the common destinies of the two monarchies.

It is this detail that allows us to assume in the idea of the future Björk meeting a double bottom, arranged by Holstein, and

More precisely, through him. Miracles do not happen in the world of politics controlled by financiers, so Baron Fritz was clearly inflamed with love for the Russians for a reason. "Timeo danaos et dona ferentes," Virgil used to say in the Aeneid, and the advice of the great ancient Roman poet to be afraid of the Danaans, even those who bring gifts, was quite appropriate for the case of Holstein.

Events unfolded like this. On October 27, 1904, the Russian ambassador in Berlin, Osten-Sacken, reported to Foreign Minister Lamzdorf: "I was very surprised when two days ago I was informed by the party that Baron Holstein, the first adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wanted to see me. You, of course, remember, dear count, that this important person, perhaps the true inspirer of the policy of the Berlin cabinet, remained invisible to official ambassadors.

Having met with the Russian-Ostsee baron, the Berlin baron made the same speeches as the Kaiser in his letter to the tsar: they say, it is worth thinking about how to create an alliance between Germany and Russia, drawing the French into it, who will be afraid of the prospects of staying on the continent in loneliness.

Describing the Björk episode, academician Tarle later stated: "That France would get scared and join - Holstein, and after him the chancellor Prince Bülow and especially Wilhelm did not doubt." Well, the Chancellor and the Kaiser might have thought so, although it is unlikely, because it was too obvious that even if France would be "scared", then her new "cordial friends" from across the Strait would "join" her (and also from overseas) will not be allowed in any way. However, the monarch and the prince could have had certain hopes, since, as already mentioned, there was a certain reason for France in the ideas of the Kaiser. But what you

should not build illusions about is the naivety (according to Tarle) of Baron Holstein. Tarle describes Wilhelm as a limited, narrow-minded, imperceptible nature. Well, even so (although hardly so). But Holstein absolutely does not fall under such a characteristic. He was cold-bloodedly prudent and knew the European situation thoroughly.

Why, then, did Holstein act exactly as he did? A reasonable explanation suggests one thing: the calculation was on



the fact that Wilhelm will be carried away by an idea thrown up (allegedly by Holstein) that has already been wandering in his

head for years. Then it is necessary to organize a meeting between the Kaiser and the Tsar in the most informal setting and to slip "Niki" through "Willy" such an agreement that at first glance would firmly unite Germany and Russia, but in reality would contradict Russia's obligations towards France. The

political and diplomatic mediocrity of the Russian tsar and his indifference to serious everyday state work were no secret to the behind-the-scenes directors of capital. Therefore, one could firmly count on the fact that Nicholas would thoughtlessly sign the Russian-German treaty, and thoughtlessly refuse it after he was dissuaded by the stunned Russian ministers or the Russian "agents of influence" who were informed in advance, or both at the same time. Indeed, in St. Petersburg it was often difficult to figure out who was a dignitary and who was an agent. One personality Witte reasons for reflection gave enough. It

was not difficult to predict the Kaiser's reaction to the tsar's "perfidious" refusal. The counter mine exploded and tore to shreds not only the sham "agreement", but also the possibility of a real, not false, but genuine, without the mediation of the Holsteins and Witte, the union of Russia

and Germany. Everything turned out, reader, as if by notes. In the spring of 1905, Chancellor Bülow (obviously after talking with Holstein) advised Wilhelm to invite Nikolai to meet during the next Kaiser's walk in the Baltic. The place and time of the meeting were skillfully chosen: the atmosphere was unbusinesslike; Russian ministers, who are obliged by the laws of the Russian Empire to countersign the tsar's signature, will be far away, with the exception of the incompetent naval minister Birlev (the same one who replaced French spark plugs with state-owned stearin ones in the Pacific Ocean).

There was no question of any preliminary opposition from the political advisers of the king, because even Wilhelm acted in secret from his own retinue. On July 10 (according to the

new style - 23) July 1905, Nikolai went to meet Wilhelm. Here is how these two days are described in his diary: "July 10th. Sunday.

We got up at 9 o'clock with hot weather with dark clouds. ...> Exactly at one o'clock I left on the "Polar Star" in Bjork, where I arrived at 4 o'clock. Anchored at the stop. Ravitsa. There were two thunderstorms with heavy rain, but the temperature is pleasant. From 7 o'clock. expected the arrival of the "Hohenzollern" (Kaiser's yacht. - S.K.), cat. late by two and a half hours. He came over during our late lunch. Wilhelm arrived on the yacht in excellent spirits and stayed for some time. Then he took Misha and me to his place and fed me a late dinner. We returned to the "Polyarnaya" only at 2 o'clock.

July 11th. Monday.

Overslept flag hoisting and got up at 9 1/4. The weather was sunny, hot, with fresh SO. At 10 o'clock Wilhelm arrived for coffee. We talked until 12 o'clock and the three of us with Misha went to the german cruise. "Berlin". Looked it over. Showed art. teaching.

I brought Wilhelm to him and returned to the "Polyarnaya". It was half an hour of rest. At 2 o'clock we had a big breakfast. Listened to the music of Gvar. Ek. (Guards Crew. - S.K.) and talked all the time standing up to 4 1/2. I said goodbye to Wilhelm with great cordiality. Picked up at 5 o'clock. at the same time and to the lighthouse, the Vercomotals walked together; then parted ways. ...> He returned to me under the best impression of the hours spent with Wilhelm. "Let's

calculate ... On July 10, the monarchs met at about ten in the evening and were together for less than four hours, and spent time in such a way that Nicky woke up the next morning not without difficulty. Then - again, joint time for everything about everything about six hours, including coffee, travel, teaching, singing and farewell. The contract was signed, as they say, between two cups of coffee. On the Russian side, it was countersigned by sixty-year-old Admiral Birilev. But how! Tsar invited him to the cabin and offered to put his signature under the text, which he had previously covered with his hand. However, maybe he did not cover up anything, but Birilev simply added later in his defense, and then it went for a walk from monograph to monograph. But either way otherwise, it was impossible to hide behind

the Minister of Foreign Affairs Lamzdorf and Witte, and they reared up: the treaty is unacceptable and destroys the entire system of external relations of the empire.

The extent to which this system meets Russian interests was not discussed. True, Witte, returning from America after peace talks with Japan, was received by the Kaiser and, as we shall see, reacted "with sympathy" to the ideas of the crowned interlocutor about the desirability of an alliance of continental powers.

Why, if you carefully read the Treaty of Björk, then he did not program the war at all. Rather, on the contrary - he insured against a European war. Article one read: "In the event that one of the two empires is attacked by one of the European powers, its ally will come to its aid in Europe with all its land and sea forces." In other words, if Germany attacked France, Russia could be on

the sidelines, but if France attacked Germany, Russia was obliged to come to the rescue. Yes, Russia was bound by an agreement with France, but it did not declare (although it was implied) an obligation to support France's aggression against Germany. That is, the spirit and letter of Björke really programmed the European world. The circumstance is commendable.

Further, Article Three determined that the treaty would enter into force "immediately after the conclusion of peace between Russia and Japan," and Article Four provided that "the Emperor of All Russia, after the entry into force of this treaty, will take the necessary steps to familiarize France with this treaty and encourage her to join him as an ally." As you can see, the treaty was not concluded behind France's back.

"It's boring in this world, gentlemen!" - complained Gogol. It would seem that a lot of water has flowed under the Finnish skerries past the island of Björk, all those involved in the Björk venture have rested. On May 12, 1951, the 6th volume of the second edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia was signed for publication. And there, on page 441, they printed in black and white: "Article 4 obliged Russia not to inform France about the treaty before it came into force, and only after the treaty came into force did Russia have the right (?! - S.K.) to provide France with relevant information with in order to induce her to join as an ally." I don't know why,

but the encyclopedic publication maliciously misrepresented this long-standing and seemingly handed over (?) Long ago to the archive

history. After all, Article 4 did not "oblige Russia not to inform" anything to the French before the entry into force of the treaty, but only determined the period after which Russia not only "had the right" to inform France, but was obliged to notify her. The difference is still significant.

Nevertheless, Lamzdorf, and later Witte, were, according to Tarle, horrified by the treaty. I do not think, reader, that we need to suspect Lamzdorf in a double game. In a letter to Ambassador Nelidov in Paris, Lamzdorf complained bitterly both about Björk's "trouble" and about "the strange adventures of the last two years." The old diplomat thought that it would be better for Russia not to mess with anyone at all. It would be true, but in fact it was necessary to choose from two options. It was impossible

to do without close ties with some major European power of Russia in any way - we are very old in economic and technological development. And it was necessary to get out with the help of a more developed and at least minimally loyal partner to Russia. England fell away immediately. And compared

to France, Germany was by far the better choice. Lamzdorf poorly (more precisely - in no way) was not oriented in the problems of technical progress, therefore he was poorly aware of the inevitability of choosing an ally. However, one cannot suspect Lamzdorf of behind-the-scenes anti-Russian machinations. But what about

Witte? Until September 5, he was in America, then returned to Europe, where he met several times in Paris with the financier E. Neitslin and another interesting financier, sixty-three-year-old M. Rouvier. Rouvier, who died in 1911, was not just a banker, but also a politician: he first served as Minister of Finance in 1889-1892 and in 1902-1905 and Prime Minister in 1887 and 1905-1906. The break in his political activity at the end of the 19th century was due to a forced reason: Rouvier was involved in the fraud of the Panama Company (the famous "Panama"). And, probably, in the era of preparing much larger frauds, someone needed it again.

Witte's Parisian "cupids" with Ruvier do not add confidence to Sergei Yulievich, especially if we take into account that in America Witte talked not only with the Japanese in the American Portsmouth and not only with activists of the women's protection society

ancient monuments. Well, something, but there were, perhaps, even more influential international swindlers in the New World than in the Old! And everything that we know (or everything that we do not know) about Witte's stay in America gives reason to think that the future count did not avoid suspicious contacts

overseas. It can be assumed that the dates of the Bjork meeting were behind the scenes coordinated with the dates of Witte's return and only slightly spaced apart in time - for

disguise. Judge for yourself! Here is the sequence of events, the Treaty of Bjork was signed, the third article directly links the beginning of its entry into force with the conclusion of peace with Japan, that is, in fact, with the return

of Witte. Before returning, a decent pause was maintained, during which both Nicholas II and Wilhelm were confident that everything would be more or less in order. Lamsdorf is not an influential figure, and Witte at one time spoke in favor of a continental union (although by deeds, not words, he undermined its basis in German-Russian relations).

Finally, Witte comes ashore from an ocean-going steamer. Both the English King Edward VII and the Kaiser want to see him. However, Nikolai sends Witte a dispatch to Paris with a direct order to call on Emperor Wilhelm on his way home. On September 10, Witte is already in Berlin and meets Chancellor Bülow there. The tone of the conversation is such that Bülow is confident in the success of the Björk treaty.

Then Witte is a guest in the hunting castle of the Kaiser "Gross Rominten". Here is Wilhelm's impression in a telegram to Bülow: "The meeting exceeded all expectations. Witte was extremely frank and sincere."

In Rominten, Witte got acquainted with the text of the Treaty of Björk, immediately shed a tear and "because of excitement and admiration he could not utter a word." Then, nevertheless, he exclaimed: "Praise the Lord! Thanks be to the Lord! Finally, we got rid of the disgusting nightmare that surrounded us." These words have come down to us, however, in the version of the Kaiser, so this regal "reporter" could add a little emotion and add. However, the fact that Witte met the Björk document with a bang is better than the Kaiser's notes are proved by the facts: Witte left Rominten treated kindly and satisfied.

He took away the highest German Order of the Red Eagle (the Kaiser granted him the Order of the Black Eagle back in 1897) and a portrait of the owner of the castle with his own autograph: "Portsmouth-Björke Rominten". No joke: Wilhelm personally escorted his cousin's subject to the station!

The Kaiser is sure that Witte is his like-minded person and discusses with him the international tasks of Russia and Germany. Witte agrees. And why not roll a vanka in Germany? The main thing was waiting for Sergei Yulievich in St. Petersburg.

He appears there, having spoken with Ruvier (and not with him alone) seriously, but with the Kaiser - acting. And here everything turns differently: from an enthusiast of the Björk agreements, Witte becomes their destroyer. But again, how! In a later exposition of Witte himself, Lamzdorf "convinced" him. Well, perhaps he convinced him sincerely. But here Witte "resisted" him, clearly hypocritical in order to create the impression of "changing his position" under the "weight" of objective reality and de "obligations assumed by Russia" earlier.

Witte played an uncomplicated (for Lamzdorf, nothing else was required) farce and, at a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he pretended to be unfamiliar with the terms of the agreement in Björk. Here we do not need to think anything - the

scene was described by Witte

himself. Lamzdorf handed Witte

the text: - - Read what a "charm"! Witte took a piece of paper that he knew very well, paused, and "exploded"

in "noble indignation": How! Yes, this is a direct catch, not to mention the non-equivalence of the contract. After all, he is dishonest in relation to France, because for this alone he is impossible! Does the sovereign

not know our treaty with France? How unknown! Well known. The sovereign, perhaps, forgot him, and most likely, did not understand the essence of the matter in the fog cast by Wilhelm, answered Lamzdorf.

Witte again began to talk about the dishonesty of the Björk alliance. Apparently, communication with Maurice Rouvier had a profoundly ennobling effect on Witte, and after meeting such a "crystal" personality, he could not think otherwise than a man of honor.

Leaving irony aside, I will tell you, reader, that the "reconvinced" Witte, who "suddenly" saw the whole "ugliness" of those ideas over which he shed tears of happiness a few days ago in Romintain, began to argue with ardor the need for the immediate annihilation of the treaty with Germany.

And then he also attracted to his side the uncle of the tsar - Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, who had influence on Nicholas II, but did not have the slightest bit of a serious political outlook. Since Romintain was behind, now it was necessary to convince the emperor, together with Lamzdorf (who was afraid of both an alliance with France and an alliance with Germany, and was afraid to disobey) and with Nikolai Nikolaevich (who was not afraid of anything, but did not understand anything, but was easily controlled outside) that the Treaty of Björk should be abolished. Yes, it was not for nothing that Nicholas II, the day after parting with

Wilhelm, made the following entry in his diary on July 12 (25): "In the morning, life went back to its usual track. It was joyful to see the children, but not the ministers." Heart felt. Why did the sober, extremely cynical and prudent Witte say one thing

in Rominten,

and another, exactly the opposite, in St. Petersburg? Why did he portray "ignorance" in front of Lamzdorf? Well, what if he told the head of Russian diplomacy the truth? After all, then Lamzdorf would immediately ask the inevitable and most natural question: "Well, how do you, Sergey Yulievich, find this agreement? What did you say about it to Emperor Wilhelm?" And here Witte would have to lie more big and risky. But why did he lie at all? Suppose, in Rominten, he simply did not have the courage to disappoint the hospitable and generous host. But what was the point of clowning around in front of Lamzdorf? Yes, and before Nikolai ...

Some biographers of Witte explain everything by his desire to be pleasing to the crowned, but the highest dignitary, who cares about his personal position more than about the benefit of the state, can hardly be called a scoundrel. And everything will become with the scoundrel.

And the strange double metamorphosis of Holstein and Witte (one of the Russophobe suddenly became a "Russophile", and the other from a propagandist of the idea of an alliance of three continental powers turned into a destroyer

practical steps towards such an alliance) loses all mystery, if we proceed from the fact that here and there there was a performance painted in two roles, and both are anti-Russian. Yes, and anti-

German. Witte was especially disgusting and provocative in this performance. Shredding the Treaty of Björk, he simultaneously wrote to Berlin that the tsar not only remained faithful to the decision made, but was now even more convinced of the need to achieve the goal set in Björk. He also wrote that Lamzdorf supposedly also supported the alliance. Like, it only takes time to pave the way for changes in the French position. Illusions were maintained so that their collapse would be as painful and irreparable as possible.

Then Nikolai was forced to write to his Berlin cousin that the treaty must be supplemented with a declaration of its inapplicability in the event of a war between Germany and France, since Russia has obligations to France. In a telegram dated September 29, 1905, the German emperor reasonably replied to the tsar that "Russia's obligations towards France can only matter insofar as she (France) by her behavior deserves to fulfill them." That didn't help either.

Wilhelm, when he was informed of Russia's apparent refusal to sign the "autocrat of all Russia", was shocked. The Kaiser, however, still tried to dissuade Nicholas from retreating from the Björk course, wrote to him: "What is signed is signed," but the tsar was organically not capable of decisive and independent action. He lost to

Witte. Although

only in 1907 - in response to the attempts of the Germans to recognize the treaty as "tacitly existing" - Petersburg replied that the treaty was not only regarded as non-existent, but could in no way be renewed. In the same 1907, Russia was annexed to the Entente.

Academician Tarle wrote a whole book about Witte, in which he presented the fact of the Björk Treaty only as an awkward, fantasy intrigue-adventure of Wilhelm. Finishing the story about the end of the Björk episode, Evgeny Viktorovich stated with amusing pathos: "Wilhelm was again convinced, as in 1892-1894, that HE CAN'T COME WITH WITTE. Not Emperor Wilhelm with Eulenburg and



Bülow had to take on this intricate task - to deceive Count Witte, when the friendly and collective mental work of the most experienced banking syndicates and concerns, the most battle-hardened, the most powerful world exchanges, never succeeded. the ironic Tarla was completely denied a sense

of proportion, and he portrayed the dubious, much more than outstanding, personality of the "Portsmouth" earl in the form of a sort of super-financier, super-stoic and super-titan, single-handedly beating the entire world stock exchange.

It is even more amusing that Tarle was not mistaken - although in a different way than he thought. The World Exchange has indeed never been able to "deceive Count Witte" for the simple reason that it has always

controlled it! One of those who was involved in this - Neitzlin, director of the Paris-Netherlands Bank - had little concern for Witte's reputation. And as we will see now, he did not need to smooth the face of the Russian prime

minister. Witte returned to Russia, already engulfed in revolution. The Manchu suffering and the Tsushima tragedy of the Russian peasants in the name of the dividends of the Parisian rentiers are over. Now, for the first time, Russia demanded that tsarism pay interest on the blood and sweat spilled near Mukden, in the Tsushima Strait and near Port Arthur.

The bourgeois-landlord empire could no longer delay legal payment without the "Danaan gifts" of European bankers.

Representatives of banking groups from France, Germany, England, America and Holland came to St. Petersburg to determine the terms of the new loan. As we see, this "International" was able to unite, regardless of official interstate relations and without the calls of Marx and Engels.

On October 16, that is, a little over a month after their last meeting, Witte saw the head of the French delegation, Neitslin. Neitzlin later recalled how Witte, THREE TIMES, UNDERSTANDING EVERY WORD, repeated: "Tell Rouvier firmly and strongly that nothing will happen in relations between France, Russia and Germany without the knowledge or behind the back of the French government." And then he added: "There are still things that I can't tell you about

SPEAK, but firmly tell Rouvier that he can rely on the words that I instruct you to convey. "Usually, this is

not the behavior of prime ministers of a great power, but people who are dependent, dependent. In other words, people who are very reminiscent of agents of one or another. Indeed, why should Witte convey his words addressed to Rouvier not by the "broken telephone" through Neitslin, but through him in a sealed letter? France!) such that paper is not trusted. Witte was deceitful, hypocritical and prone to acting already by virtue of the circumstances of his career from

its very early stages. And he was connected with the banking capital of Russia, which automatically meant - with foreign banking capital, as the patron of "Russian" capital (more precisely, Petersburg). As Witte's influence grew, the influence of this external capital on Russia grew. The opposite was perhaps also

true: foreign capital strengthened in Russia, and so did Witte.

For what purpose was this done? The answer can be found, perhaps, in a letter from Count V. Kokovtsov to Nicholas II dated January 19, 1914: "Count Witte makes more and more proposals that have not arisen in the State Duma, clearly designed for one thing - to destroy what is still standing firmly - our

finances. The political biography of Count Witte can be matched with one key word: LOANS. And the true synonym for the concept of foreign loans for Russia was also the only one: PAU-TINA. So Sergei Yulievich did not deserve the praises of Tarle in the least. His role was always sharply negative and anti-national. Of course, he was no exception - almost all the dignitaries of tsarism, connected with the finances of the Russian Empire and appearing in the political arena from the second half of the 19th century until the collapse of old Russia in 1917, played a similar role. But Witte was exceptional in the sense

that he had an outstanding influence on the process of such a financial enslavement of Rus', in which the initial loans first gave an impetus to the Russian economy, and then devastated it according to the classic blood-sucking scheme. In addition, loans went largely to cover military preparations, that is, here they ensured the interests of not Russia, but

France, and then the Entente and the USA. Finally, the loans helped fight the revolution - the legitimate demands of the peoples of Russia.

The topic of loans was not considered in depth in Soviet (and even more so in Western) historiography, and it is not convenient for us to delve into it now. But immediately adjacent to the Bjork episode both in time and in meaning are Witte's troubles regarding the international loan of 1906, which had the main underlying reason. The one that Witte spoke to Neitzlin bluntly: "The French and the government must first of all understand that they will lose everything here if we have a real revolution." This is a valuable recognition. And it completely refutes the myth that the first Russian revolution was led by anti-Russian "Jewish" circles. Witte himself writes in his memoirs about his stay in Paris after returning

from Portsmouth to Europe in early September 1905 the following: "I was accompanied by Mr. Neytslin, director of the bank Paris et Pays Bas, who was the representative of the syndicate of the French group for making a Russian loan without being included in this syndicate of Jewish banking houses that have avoided participating in Russian loans since the Kishinev pogrom of the Jews by Plehve, despite my personal relationship with the head of the Rothschild house, who was always the head of the Russian loan syndicate when Jewish firms took part in it " .

Considering that, for example, Jacques Gunzburg actively participated in the implementation of the Russian loan of 1906, Witte's statements seem frivolous. But after all, Neitzlin himself headed by no means an anti-Semitic banking group. It included: Lyon Credit (!), Paris-Netherlands Bank. National Office, General Society, Gottinger Banking House, other smaller banks. In most of the banks of the so-called "Russian group" the influence of Jewish capital was either predominant or at least significant. So the stories of both Witte himself and his biographers that he several times, including through Arthur Rafalovich, "unsuccessfully" probed the moods of the London and Paris Rothschilds, give us reason only to smile once again.

The Rothschilds were leaving the Russian loan business only to stay. To stay somewhere directly, and somewhere indirectly, through subsidiary or related banks, through participation in the profits of the Nobels and their other international partners in the robbery of Russia.

Witte's duplicity did not leave him even at the end of his life. In March 1914, Novoye Vremya published a series of conversations with an "anonymous" Russian statesman, in whom any St. Petersburg clerk who was not alien to "political reasoning" easily recognized our count.

So, Witte declared that he had always believed that the main lever of Russian foreign policy was the closest possible connection with Germany. The cause of

war had already been firmly established, the wedge between Russia and Germany had been thoroughly driven in, and now Witte could once again worm his way into "Germanophiles" without the risk of interfering with the black cause of a future war. Perhaps Witte (and his patrons) pursued another goal. In the spring of 1914, negotiations with Germany on a new trade treaty were planned, and Witte firmly believed that this mission would be entrusted to him. And one can guess how the best friend of the French bankers Sergei Yulievich would have tried to "strengthen" Russian-German trade ties. Thank God it didn't work...

It is significant that when the war began, Witte in the autumn of 1914 was very busy about publishing his report of 1894 on the construction of a military port on Murman in the Historical Bulletin.

In the Baltic to London - 1,300 kilometers, and from Murman, around Scandinavia - 3,000 kilometers. It is clear that with the paucity of the then economic development of the Russian North, Russia needed the port of Murmansk only in case of a war with Germany. And the king then chose the option of a naval base in Libau. Now, when there was no point in pretending, the spring "Germanophile" was in a hurry to prove that he supposedly foresaw the Teutonic machinations twenty years before they flourished ...

And his shameless chameleonism Witte remained unchanged faithful to the end that followed in 1915.

Björke remained an episode because he was conceived as an episode by his true creators. Wilhelm wanted to see in him a turn to a new order of things, when leadership in Europe would pass from England to Germany, Nicholas, although not a strong political mind and

action, but sometimes able to understand the situation, he saw here stability for Russia.

But the forces that gave birth to figures like Holstein and Witte from the very beginning ensured a quick "explosion" of the Björke agreements after the fuse, which had been drawn in advance, was set on fire and burned to the

end. The end of Björke's ideas became at the same time a logical point in attempts to change the movement from a future European war to a possible European peace.

Of course, Wilhelm should by no means be regarded only as a victim of the intrigues of Holstein and the latter's genuine patrons. The Kaiser's impulsiveness, his superficiality and self-confidence played a role. If he had not seized on the sly idea of an almost impromptu treaty to the fanfare of the guards crew and the champagne of "late dinners", but worked out the vein of the German-Russian alliance thoughtfully, as a series of convincing conversations not behind the backs of Lamsdorf, Russia and Germany, but against the background of a general sharp and a well-prepared turning point in German public sentiment in favor of only and exclusively Russia, if all this were supported by a more active credit policy, then ... Everything could go against the plans of the Holsteins.

But we will not remove the blame from honest German diplomats, politicians and German society in relation to their homeland. After all, they also did not show far-sightedness and turned out to be incapable of broad opposition to the behind-the-scenes intrigues of behind-the-scenes supranational forces.

The combination of the Rothschild factor with the Holstein method gave excellent results, for capital, of course, even before the war. Academician Tarle believed without a shadow of a doubt that the British Cabinet "for the sake of economy" sincerely proposed to Germany to limit naval armaments. However, what "savings" and "limitations" are there! In 1907, during the 2nd Hague Conference on War and Peace, the British Admiralty wrote: "The production of warships is closely connected in all branches of production and trade and therefore attracts legitimate attention and interests, And any major blow to these interests is any proposal to limit growth

naval weapons. Such a restriction will seriously affect one of the main branches of the national industry."

The Germans said the same thing: "Suspension for a year of the construction of the fleet will throw a lot of people into the street." Admiral A. Tirpitz warned the Reichstag that the delay in funding would lead to the fact that "we will be forced to lay off a large number of people, and the entire branch of our shipbuilding will be upset."

His English colleagues confirmed: "England has the highest interest in the development of shipbuilding, in trade for the sake of life and prosperity." Twelve-inch

shells weighing half a ton were, of course, a very peculiar guarantee of peaceful trade.

And for some reason, the Lords of the Admiralty did not come to mind with the new series of peaceful dry cargo ships as a means to support the economy. Already in the eighties, their compatriot James Joll, professor of international history at the University of London, describing the origins of the First World War, believed that the naval arms race launched economic processes that were "difficult to stop." The professor obviously put the barge ahead of the tugboat. It is the economic processes of imperialism that have launched the arms race. The arms race led to war - exactly as

Engels prophesied. As we know, in 1904 an agreement was concluded between England and France. In 1907, Russia joined it and formed the Tripartite Accord (on paper, however, then not fixed). "Entente" means "consent", but to understand the price of this "consent"

it is impossible without the already familiar word "Fashoda" ...

Until the summer of 1914, there were seven years left, and they passed in polishing the situation on the "abrasive" of a number of conflicts and provocations of various kinds.

So, on August 31, 1907, Russian-English conventions were signed on Persia, Afghanistan and (don't smile, reader) Tibet. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire A. Izvolsky and Ambassador Sir Arthur Nicholson exchanged identical notes.

Lamzdorf was replaced by Alexander Nikolaevich Izvolsky, who had previously been an envoy in Copenhagen. Ever since the conflicts around Schleswig and Holstein (not a baron, but a province)

Danish court circles were sharply anti-German. Izvolsky perceived these sentiments, and the seed fell here on completely prepared soil. He was an interesting person. Either a Mason or not. At one time - a minister-resident in the Vatican. A clever and inventive man,

he strengthened the Russian-French alliance by such - at that time new - methods as organizing performances of Sergei Diaghilev's ballet enterprise in Paris. Izvolsky played a by no means positive role in the history of

Russian diplomacy, and, of course, he contributed to the preparation of the world war. He was also a supporter of rapprochement not only with France, but also with England. There were many different rumors about the Russian-English

negotiations, and the atmosphere of secrecy around them, of course, unnerved both German politicians and the broad masses of the people in Germany. Such a reaction was quite understandable, since at the end of the negotiations in the European press it was widely stated that Russia, they say, even in the event of a victorious war with England for itself, would not be able to receive such a "gift" that it received without a war. And the "gift" was "still the

same". First, Britain got Russia to abandon its active policy towards Afghanistan. The Afghans traditionally hated the British and, significantly, successfully resisted them. Afghanistan also traditionally had a good attitude towards Russia, which could not and did not want to conquer it, but could cooperate with it economically and, in the future, politically support it. The Russian signing of the convention with England has deprived us of such a completely reasonable prospect. Academician V. Khvostov believed, however, that the convention did not allow England to "annex Afghanistan, liquidating it as a state." However, in reality this was not allowed to England by the selfless struggle of the Afghan people, who did not bow their heads and did not lay down their weapons, which the Afghans knew how to wield. The fact that St. Petersburg and London were mutually obligated to

completely renounce actions in Tibet, even to the point of refusing to send scientific expeditions there, might look like an unfortunate joke if this "joke" did not exist in the form of an interstate agreement. We, even by the beginning of the 21st century, who had not really mastered Siberia,

"blocked" the way to Tibet, where the expeditions of Przhevalsky, Roborovsky, Kozlov, and even the artists Vereshchagin and Roerich, had difficulty reaching. And the most "significant"

result was the agreement on the division spheres of influence in Persia (Iran).

Tarle was surprised at the "generosity" and even "simplicity" of the British because "England gave (? - S.K.) Russia the northern, richest part of Persia, took the smaller and worse southern part, and thereby gave Russia the opportunity to occupy a very solid strategic position for moving further south towards the Persian Gulf in the event that relations with England ever subsequently deteriorated.

Tarle was not ironic, and in vain. After all, with such a "generous" gesture, instead of unnecessary adventures on the Korean Peninsula, we were offered to get involved in new unsustainable adventures now in the Middle East ... What a "firm

strategic position" there! A fragile stone, standing on which you risk falling and breaking your neck. What is there "movement to the bay"! Not to the Persian Gulf, but to the swamp, any movement outward, and not inward, led us to our natural geopolitical boundaries, which ran no further than along the southern edge of the Caspian Sea. So the "gift" was, as they say, with a flaw ... And with a double bottom.

And both the course and the results of the negotiations were designed for the final fastening of Russia to the Entente, to the London and Paris stock exchanges. The second goal was to further quarrel between the Russians and the Germans. Russia was provoked by the German plans for the construction of the Baghdad railway

- they say, they threaten the future Russian rule in Northern Persia. In fact, such a road would be a convenient route for some flows of Asian Russian exports, while there is no question of our future "dominion" in Persia.

could.

Lenin, by the way, appreciated the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, they were rightly preparing for war with Germany. But the opposite flank of smart Russian politicians looked the same way. Pyotr Durnovo (we will talk about him later) rightly believed that any policy,



friendly to England is thereby hostile to Germany, and Russia cannot quarrel with Germany and especially fight with her. More precisely, maybe, but without success for yourself. Yes, and there is no need for Russia, because there is no irreconcilable clash of interests between Russia and Germany.

This is an opinion Tarle slightly mocked. The Germans, after the publication of the conventions, had no time for irony. They publicly declared, not without reason: "The Reich is in danger! England has completed the political encirclement of Germany."

Even before the exchange of signatures between Izvolsky and Sir Arthur, from August 3 to 6, 1907, the first meeting after Björke between Wilhelm and Nicholas II took place - this time in Swinemünde. Its atmosphere was also "marine", that is, unreliable. Izvolsky, who accompanied the tsar, tried to slip the Germans the so-called Baltic Protocol with a clause on "the removal of England from the Baltic." Wonderful are Your works, Lord! But the deeds of Satan are even more wonderful ... The Anglophile Izvolsky suddenly showed (to the Germans) a clear hostility towards England. Why did it happen? The Germans (von Bülow was with the Kaiser in Swinemünde) reasoned correctly: Izvolsky wants to provoke them, and then show the "unfriendly" text with a German signature to the British. As a result, Berlin adopted the draft Protocol, deleting everything anti-English from it. But in any case, the Protocol turned out to be an empty piece of paper in advance, because a truly businesslike spirit was leaving Russian-German relations as such ...

In the Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909, to which von Holstein managed to apply a weakening but pointing hand in the right direction, Russia was again firmly and deftly tied to the problems of the Balkan Slavs. Then there was another test of strength - in Morocco. In 1911, with the arrival of the German gunboat

"Panther" in the Moroccan port of Agadir, the Franco-German Agadir Crisis began, where the "Golden International" tried the Triple Entente for the fortress. "The Panther's jump was preceded by the occupation of the Moroccan capital of

Fez by the French. In Morocco, Germany (especially the Mannesmann Brothers monopoly") had serious capital investments. And Germany demanded compensation. France threatened war, to which England was actively pushing it at first.

It is indicative that the French socialist Jean Jaurès at that time carried on active propaganda against the government, declaring that it was a senseless crime to risk innumerable victims of the war with Germany because of Morocco. The elite of France thought differently, but the reason for the war was really small.

It ended up that an international conference was held in the Spanish city of Algeciras, where the "panther" ideas of Germany were seriously pinched. Russia participated in the conference, but lagged behind the Anglo-French Entente. For the "Golden

International" it was then, although dangerous - on the verge of an explosion - but again, only a trial game. Before "brewing" a general squabble, it was necessary to test and evaluate a lot, including Russia's readiness to go against its own interests. The Roman Empire was already bogged down in the web of Witte's external debts, like a careless fly, but then even she began to twitch and ask France to go with the Germans to the world. It would be very dangerous for the king to get involved in a war because of someone else's colonial strife. And the combination "Fets -

Agadir" as a test was completely successful. After it, it became clear that in order to involve Russia in the war, it was necessary to look for another reason. And

about how important it was for France to keep the Russian factor in its hands, says such a detail. Although Russia gave the French only sluggish support at the Algeciras Conference on Morocco, in April 1906 it received a new loan of 2,200,000,000 francs (843,000,000 rubles) as encouragement, which saved tsarism, shattered by the first Russian revolution, from financial collapse...

"The Panther's jump turned out to be useful in that it helped to better understand the reserves of Anglo-German consent. In reality, they were small - during the Agadir crisis, England eventually announced that it would take the side of France. British Foreign Secretary Edward Gray (about whom We will talk in detail later) assessed the situation as follows: "In the event of a war between Germany and France, England would have to take part in it. If Russia were involved in this war, Austria would also be involved. Therefore, it would not be a duel between France and Germany, but a European war."

For those who stood behind Gray, a European war in which Germany and Russia, Germany and England would fight against each other, was necessary. However, it would be unwise for international capital to start it in 1912. Although many years had passed since the Fashoda crisis, armaments had not yet been accumulated in abundance, and even the "colonial" reason for a European war looked completely doubtful in the eyes of the peoples. Therefore, by intervening in the situation on

the side of France in the purely political, and not the military phase of the Agadir crisis, England calmed the passions for the time being. Nevertheless, England, although it

was part of the Entente, had its own forces capable of seriously negotiating with Germany if the Kaiser went, for example, to reduce the pace of naval armaments. Such a step on the part of Germany would have been regarded in England as clearly peaceful ... But the Germans prevented it from being made ... by the British themselves. To be more precise, those English "subjects" whose subjects increasingly became England itself.

Tirpitz agreed to get along with the British on the condition that the Reich reduce the program for building dreadnoughts from four to three, and the British their own from eight to four. With all the inconvenience for England, there was something to talk about. The director of the same "Hamburg - America line" Ballin, who competed with the British on the transatlantic lines, was inclined to ideas of rapprochement with former competitors. He was supported by the banker Ernst Cassel, a personal friend of King Edward VII. Cassel, together with

Lord K. Revelstoke and the oil businessman K. Gulbenkian, founded the National Turkish Bank in 1910 and, in alliance with the German Deutsche Bank, were going to finance railway and oil projects in the Middle East. These were, of course, imperialist plans, but on the scales of war and peace they threw not twelve-inch "weights" of shells, but rails and drilling rigs.

columns.

If England took a position of mere neutrality in any political conflict, then there would be no military continuation of such a conflict. And just such, that is, a peaceful version of the stabilization of Europe, did not suit international capital from any point of view.

Winston Churchill, who faithfully served this capital all his life, in 1912, being the first Lord of the Admiralty, hypocritically suggested that Germany arrange a "sea vacation", that is, interrupt the construction of ships for a year and a half. In 1913, he hypocritically repeated his proposal. He was truthful and sincere in March 1912, when he declared in parliament that from now on he would build new dreadnoughts 60% more than Germany.

The "hag" of the future war began to be gradually spurred on with a whip ... And England was among the most active "coachmen", although she diligently adhered to the position "I am not me, and the horse is not mine, and I am not a cabman."

But here is how the famous leader of the Duma extreme right, the Kursk landowner Markkov II, later assessed that period. Nikolai Evgenievich seemed to be a peculiar person, he was known, so to speak, as a classic expression of "rabid" monarchism. A wealthy landowner, he was inseparable from the autocracy, because with his fall he lost everything (he lost everything). In exile, Markov wrote the book "The Wars

of the Dark Forces", where he deduced all the misfortunes of society from the Masonic conspiracy. Not having the slightest idea that the social process is determined by an objective economic factor no less, if not more, than by any subjective group efforts, Markov now and then hit the sky with his finger. But he was not stupid in his own way, and at any rate well-informed. One cannot but agree with his opinion: "As soon as the Masonic influence drew Russian diplomacy into the arms of the 'perfidious Albion' ruled by the Masons, Russian-German relations immediately aggravated, and Russia found itself drawn into a world war." Markov overestimated (or rather, completely misjudged) the significance of the Russian-French alliance and believed that it was he who kept Europe from war.

But he caught the sinister role of England and the "dark forces" correctly. However, England had to withstand the onslaught from the other side. If in 1907 147,498 workers were on strike in it, then in 1909 - already 300,819, in 1911

- 931,050. A decent growth ... August 11, 1911.

The Daily Mail wrote: "The strikers are the masters of... the situation... Civil

war - fortunately accompanied by only minor violence - is in full swing. "It is unlikely that such new

features of English life suited the English elite, accustomed to being the master of the situation. And if Lenin's slogan was to turn the imperialist war into a civil war in the interests of labor, then the capital was also not a fool and led the cause to turn the beginning civil war into an imperialist war, because such a war reduces the number of eaters and adds jobs.

However, planning the first military impulse from England was not the best decision for capital. It would be better to use France. Better yet, Russia. In 1912, Raymond Poincaré became the prime minister of

France, and then, in 1914, its president. A man of the French magnates of heavy industry, an attorney of the Schneider concern in Le Creusot, a native of Lorraine, which was torn from France after the Sedan, Poincaré focused exclusively on the war, like the guns produced by Schneider-Creusot.

"Poincaré is war," said intelligent people immediately after the "Golden International" of capital put him in charge of the final military preparations. By the way, this nickname alone ("Poincaré-war") is enough to see the falsity of the statement about the sole responsibility of Germany and its Kaiser for unleashing a world conflict.

In order to regard Poincaré's coming to power as a sure symptom of the readiness of French capital for an imminent war, there were more serious reasons than catchy verbal labels. The very personality of Poincaré, his entire political system was ideally suited for the war insofar as he was emphatically indifferent to the problems of domestic politics, giving all of himself to foreign policy. Moreover, the policy is aggressive, revanchist and offensive. Poincaré became president of France before the war because his presidency was bound to become

"military." Among a hundred or two of the first behind-the-scenes and public figures who, in the name of personal selfish

interests, brought the world massacre closer, Poincaré is perhaps the most consistent and integral

exponent of the idea of war. And his nickname was, in a sense, mathematically accurate. After all, it arose after the statement "My cousin is war," which flew from the mouth of Raymond Poincaré's cousin, the great French mathematician Henri Poincaré.

Stefan Pichon, who was French Foreign Minister in 1906-1911 and in 1913, believed that if not Poincaré but Clement Falière (President of France until 1913) had been at the Elysee Palace in 1914, then there would have been no war.

Both Pichon and Falière had a hand in the war, in its preparation, but it is not in them and not even in Poincaré. The opinion of Poincaré's colleague Stephane Pichon is important because it once again refutes the myth that Germany is the only culprit and initiator of the war. Chapter

#### 4. Balkans

and

traps... Even before

the "Poincaré war", two fleeting Balkan wars took place, which made it possible to arrange the scenery for the prologue of the First World War. At the same time, some tactical ideas and new methods of warfare were tested, which were fully developed in the near future. For some reason, they

believe that the first Balkan war between the basically Slavic Balkan Union (Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece) and the "Young Turkish" Turkey was blessed and pushed by tsarism. But this explanation is both superficial and incorrect, although outwardly everything was so. Slavic troops fought not with

Russian, but with French weapons, Turkish with German ones (and General von der Goltz actually commanded them). The Balkan Slavs were closest to us both in language and in inclination of the heart, especially the Serbs. Nevertheless, Russia had nothing to do in the Balkans, because over the decades of its Balkan policy, it gained only fame and acquired in the Balkan capitals the graves of Russian soldiers and boulevards named after Russian generals. Morally, Russia had "impenetrable" positions here, but materially, in fact ...

The Balkan Union was the spokesman for the interests of the Slavs only in the speeches of its leaders. Nikolai Nikolaevich Beklemishev, an interesting Russian analyst, said in 1914 on the eve of the World War:

"The Balkan Union took place precisely to transfer the lands of European Turkey to more solvent organizations, which were burdened with new obligations due to the need for military loans. It goes without saying that a significant part of Turkey's obligations were intended to be transferred to the Slavs, as the most compliant payers, and this redistribution had to deal with the technical commission in Paris." The question is, what does Russia have to do with it? And where are its benefits - at least

economic, even political?

The best help to the "Slav brothers" would be our internal development, which would allow a strengthened Russia to lead the Slavic world in the future. As for the possible

interception of the influence and cooling of the Balkan Slavs towards the Russians, this would prove, firstly, the fragility of their feelings for us, and, secondly, that it was not worth making a garden here before.

Alas, other moods set the tone for the Balkan sphere of Russian politics. The Russian envoy in Belgrade Hartwig - an ardent Germanophob, Slavophile and supporter of Serbia's all-round support - was hardly right in his views. Because too often Russia had to take the rap for those who were not very grateful to us for it ... Back at the beginning of the 20th century, A. Koni, a

contemporary of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, wrote interesting memoirs about that time, where it was said: "Brothers" turned out, according to the general unanimous opinion of the military, "scoundrels", and the Turks, on the contrary, "good honest fellows" who fought like lions, while the liberated brothers had to be extracted from corn ...".

And here is Tarle's opinion (here it is accurate, since his beloved Anglo-French people are not offended): "The Crimean War, the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Balkan policy of Russia of 1908-1914 are a single chain of acts that did not have the slightest sense since point of view of the economic or other imperative interests of the Russian people.

It would not be superfluous to give an assessment of the Russian eastern policy of the General Staff by Major General Yevgeny Ivanovich Martynov: "For Catherine, mastering the straits was the goal, and

patronage of the Balkan Slavs - a means. Catherine, for the benefit of national interests, exploited the sympathies of Christians, and the politics of later times sacrificed the blood and money of the Russian people in order to arrange the Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs and others, allegedly devoted to us, fellow tribesmen and fellow believers at their expense. "Eh!" , - I myself will add ... Yes, if, dear reader, the forces and money that we

"thumped" in the Balkans in the name of Skobelev's exploits, but ten years before that, were invested in the Russian-American Company in Alaska - then still RUSSIAN Alaska, then we wouldn't have to sell this Alaska to us for a pittance.

General Martynov did not use the bitter words "allegedly devoted to us" with an empty head. In his assessment, in Koni's assessment, no particular exaggerations are seen, if you know that the combat losses of the Russian Danube army during the war amounted to approximately 40%, the allied Romanian army - less than 15%, and participation in the liberation of Bulgaria from the Turks "Bulgarian militia "was episodic. Serbia then also put up troops against the Turks, but modest both in number and in their combat activity.

Koni was hardly exaggerating when he wrote: "The shedding of the blood of a Russian soldier, torn from a distant chicken hut, bast shoes and chaff, to ensure the well-being of his" brother ", walking in boots, growing fat on meat and corn and carefully hiding from his eyes" savior" a densely stuffed egg-box in the underground of his solid house with stoves and household appliances." However, the experience of the then "liberation of the Slavs", which cost Russia 200 thousand (at that

time!) Lives, did not go to the future for us. Tsarism still looked at Tsargrad - Constantinople-Istanbul and hoped that the "brothers" would be help in such a campaign.

Now, in the 10s of the 20th century, thunderous speeches were again heard in St. Petersburg about "Slavic unity" and the need to "support the brothers against the infidels." We already

know Beklemishev's opinion about the essence of the Balkan Union. And here is what E. Tarle says about the Balkan wars of the 20th century:

"Serbia and Bulgaria live ... by agriculture and cattle breeding, and for them ... the question



Macedonia (one of the main reasons for the war with Turkey. - S.K.) was ... the issue of new arable land and new pastures ... For Serbia, the acquisition of Thessaloniki was tantamount to access to the sea, which was so needed by the exporters of Serbian cattle and raw materials".

This is the real background of the case, reader. What is the interest of Russia here? He is not.

The First Balkan War began on October 9, 1912, and on May 30, 1913 it ended with the victory of the Slavs. By mood and formal results, the war could be called national liberation, but the true essence was expressed by the word "rehearsal". The Balkan countries played the role of soldiers here, and Russia - a dummy manager. And from now on, Russia and the Slavic Balkans were connected visibly. Not only the

gymnasium teachers, but also the newspaper boys now firmly knew: we will not give offense to the Slavic brothers - neither the "Turk", nor the "nemchur". Considering that the New Berdichev ..., that is, the St. Petersburg Cadet "Rech" was in the hands of Gessen and Vinaver, the lively "Birzhevye Vedomosti" - Propper, the rollicking "Den" - Kogan and Bikkerman, the popular cheap "Kopeyka" Gorodetsky, Moscow "professorial" "Russian Vedomosti" - Iollos (the famous Zionist Zhabotinsky was a foreign correspondent here), then the "truly Russian spirit" in all sectors of society was constantly and consistently maintained. In the mass Russian consciousness, Germany was actively made into an enemy.

The provoked meaning of the first Balkan war is clearly visible from the fact that the former allies did not have time to celebrate the victory, when the second Balkan war began - now between Bulgaria, encouraged by the Germans, and the rest of the participants in the Balkan Union, which were joined by Romania and ... Turkey.

Everything was finished quickly: from June 29 to August 10, 1913, Bulgaria was defeated, and part of its new lands was jointly plucked by "brothers" - Serbs, Greeks and Turks. Turkish shares strengthened somewhat, and now Paris could not be afraid of the destruction of Turkey, in which 63% (almost two-thirds, by the way!) Of foreign investment was of French origin. The theme of the straits was already mentioned in the Balkan subjects cited. And

another persistent delusion was the usual

confidence that in the world war that began soon, it was not Russia that fought just for the possession of the Black Sea straits and that it was the straits that the Entente was going to pay off with Russia in the event of a common victory. Alas, reader, the Russian Ivans also paid "for the straits" with their lives against the future profits of the same Rothschilds. They and the Nobels needed the straits as the owners of Russian oil. The straits were needed by French capital, which owned the Donbass and the heavy industry of the South of

Russia. The "Russian" straits also blocked German interests in the Middle East - already for the glory of the English Rothschilds (and with them - the oil magnate Deterding and company). However, the British were more counting on the fact that the Bosphorus-Dardanelles "catch" of Nikolai Romanov would be shared by everyone.

Nothing "shone" for us in the Balkans themselves, although in Russia then they thought differently. There is an interesting document - "Note of State Councilor A. M. Petryaev." Alexander Mikhailovich Petryaev knew the Balkans well - he served there for a long time as a consul. As a friend of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1917, he wrote: "England and France will not contribute to the formation of a large Slavic state on the shores of the Adriatic, gravitating towards Russia. They will undoubtedly prefer the creation of an independent Croatian kingdom, which will completely fall under their influence." But

Petryaev was wrong. Yugoslavia was created on the basis of the unification of Serbia and Croatia with the support of the Entente. In May 1915, not in Slavic Petrograd, but in foggy London, the Yugoslav Committee was formed, headed by the Croat Ante Trumbich, who played an outstanding role in the post-war South Slavic state structure. With the help of the British.

It's not for nothing that the British Foreign Minister Gray spoke calmly to the Russian Cadet leader Milyukov during his London visit in 1916: they say, how the Serbs and Croats will get along there is their internal affair, and it also, they say, concerns Russia - not England.

It will not be superfluous for us to remember that Bulgaria "brothers" in the 10s of the 20th century was economically most closely connected with Germany and Austria-Hungary. So, quarreling with the latter, Russia did not improve relations with the Slavs-Bulgarians.

But Bulgaria, both politically and economically, was for us more accessible (and, therefore, more promising) than, for example, Serbia.

And it would be right to say, reader, that Russia fought with two real goals: firstly, to make Germany from a friendly state into a mortal enemy and, secondly, to finally let itself be tied up by external influences and debts in order to become the patrimony of transnational capital.

Henry Noel Brailsford in *The War of Steel and Gold* wrote: "From 1854 to 1906 the City boycotted Russia. The 1906 loan followed apparently inspired articles in *The Times* which predicted a political agreement (it followed in 1907 - S. K.). Finance (that is, the English and French Rothschilds. - S.K.) and diplomacy in the modern world have become necessary to each other. If any power or group of powers held a monopoly in the world money market for at least a

for several years and deliberately used it in political

purposes, it would eventually dictate its will to Russia ... Russia is vulnerable, because it depends on its reputation in Western markets just like any of the republics of Latin America.

In addition to loans, another means also worked well, about which General Ignatiev, known to us, wrote bitterly: "Russia has long paid dearly for its technical backwardness, presenting a tasty morsel for foreign industry: without spending capital, by selling patents alone, which bore the loud name "technical assistance", it was possible to take any profits from Russian factories. "Technical assistance" was one of the most reliable means for turning Russia into a colony and a good help for foreign espionage.

Of course, in Russia itself they were silent about this, and for the "patriotic" Russian public they composed a fairy tale that is still in circulation today about how beautifully "Christ-loving" Rus' will heal after the victory over the "Huns". Time added to it one saying: "Oh, if it weren't for the damned Bolsheviks" ...

The whole "idyll" is shattered by iron statistics. On the eve of the October Socialist Revolution in 1917, Russia's public debt exceeded 60 billion rubles, which

amounted to seventeen pre-war annual state budgets. External debt totaled 16 billion, of which about 9 were short-term debt.

What did it mean? In the event of a "war to the bitter end", one of the "winners" - Russia would almost immediately have to pay the West almost three pre-war budgets, not counting the fact that out of 19 billion short-term domestic obligations of the treasury, the share of Anglo-French-overseas capital also accounted for a lot .

Well, how can one not recall Lenin: "Is there an economic opportunity in the era of" financial capital "to eliminate competition even in a foreign state? Of course there is: this means is financial dependence and buying up sources of raw materials (which was exactly what the British and French were intensively doing in Russia. From .K.), and then all competitor's enterprises".

So I don't know how it would have been if there had been a separate peace between tsarist Russia and Germany, but with her joint "victory" together with the Entente, the "peaceful" conquest of Russia by the latter would have been ensured!

Later, having become acquainted with Durnovo's note, we will see that some of the Russian ruling elite saw such a threat even before the war, but ... But even appeals directly to Nicholas II were futile.

Before the war, Russia's gold reserves weighed more than two and a half thousand tons. The external debt, which arose as a result of military spending, immediately "ate" four-fifths of this golden mountain, mined by Russian people from Russian bowels.

This is the future for which the Russia of the Romanovs and Witte sent millions of Ivans in gray overcoats to the western borders of the empire, tearing them away from millions of Marys. And only the bright flowers of Ivan da Marya, which bloomed in the spring over the soldiers who had gone into the ground, later reminded of wasted lives, destinies and love.

The Balkan wars made it possible to set the penultimate points. All the active main participants in the future conflict at a series of meetings and negotiations once again looked at each other and the enemy at the enemy. Someone was more ready, someone less, but it was already possible start off.

Kaiser Wilhelm, confident both in himself and in Germany, had every reason to do so. Even the famous French political

the figure Edouard Herriot, a convinced antagonist of Germany throughout his long life, admitted: "Germany opposes us, in addition to a formidable army, an impressive organization. It benefits from everything, drawing from all areas of practice and mind." And Germany was really ready to mobilize, the people were really united and organized,

And Russia? On the one hand, the Russian "top" swaggered. On the other hand, the state of affairs in Russia could be understood by reading at least such a pearl of state thought as the decision of the tsarist government of December 15, 1909, which stated the following:

"Improvement of methods of movement in airspace and practical testing of new inventions should be to the opinion of the Council of Ministers, it is predominantly the subject of private self-activity. By the beginning of the war, thanks to the talent and energy of

Igor Sikorsky, we had, however, "Ilya Muromets", but the overall picture turned out to be bleak: Germany produced up to 2,000 aircraft per month during the war (hereinafter, the maximum monthly level achieved is indicated) , France - 2,500, England - 2,700, USA - 2,650 and even Italy - 1000. And Russia -215 (two hundred and fifteen!).

As for Nikolai Romanov, he was losing the last remnants of respect even among honest people from the privileged classes. In the summer of 1908, the Russian tsar paid a visit to Sweden for the first time in history. The Russian mission, headed by envoy Baron A. Budberg and military agent Ignatiev, boards the Swedish boat, which raised the Russian embassy flag. At the same moment, the Stockholm raid is engulfed in smoke: warships and ancient fortifications are saluting in our honor.

The Russian squadron is late, but here it is - with the royal yacht "Standard" in front. Budberg is preparing to transfer to her, and then the commander of the nearby Swedish destroyer suddenly reports into a mouthpiece: - They transmit from the yacht: "Do not take the envoy on board!" Proud Budberg turns purple, disciplined Ignatiev and marine agent Petrov are silent, perplexed. Already on the shore they find out: they did not want to be allowed to the highest breakfast.

And a year before this royal trick, the Swedes met Wilhelm II on the same roadstead and watched how the yacht that had stalled

"Hohenzollern" received the envoy of Germany. Wilhelm went out to the ladder, took off his cap and kissed him three times in front of the Swedish squadron.

However, the Stockholm episode was only an intermediate link. It has long been said in Russia: "Khodynka began, Khodynka will end" ... But how did it start?

In May 1895, Nicholas II and Empress Alexandra Feodorovna ("Alik") were crowned in the ancient capital - Moscow. Among the coronation celebrations, there was also a folk festival on the Khodynka field. From the "kings" they promised a bag of sweets, a bun and a piece of sausage, and a "coronation" commemorative mug.

"Gostintsev" prepared 400 thousand, and about half a million came "for the holiday"! In normal times, military exercises were held here, the field was dug up and dug up with ditches and trenches. They were covered with boards, but what did those boards mean when a crowd of half a million pressed forward? People came in advance, a day in advance, accumulated, there was a wild heat.

They began distributing bags, the crowd succumbed, the first crushed screamed. And after a couple of hours, only about 1,300 corpses were taken away from the field (according to official data, and according to unofficial data, about four thousand). In total,

10,000 people were affected. We have a document written personally by His Imperial Majesty. Nikolai was a scrupulous person and kept a diary until his execution. Here are the records of those days ... "May 18. Saturday.

Until now, everything went like clockwork, thank God, but today there was a great sin. There was a terrible crush on the Khodynka field, and terribly to add, about 1300 people were trampled!! I learned about it at 10 1/2 o'clock, a disgusting impression was left from this news. At 12 1/2 we had breakfast, and after that Alik and I went to Khodynka. Actually, there was nothing there; the music played the anthem all the time and "Glory to !" Both were given at Mom's at 8 o'clock. We went to the ball to Montebello (French ambassador to Russia. - S. K.). It was very nicely arranged. After

dinner, we left at 2

o'clock on May 19. Sunday. Real heat began in the morning At 11 o'clock we went to Mass. At 2 o'clock Alik and I went to the Staro-Ekaterininskaya hos

barracks and tents in which lay the unfortunate victims of yesterday. We went straight to Alexandria, where we had a good walk. At 7 o'clock the banquet began. At 9 1/2 o'clock we went to the village of Sergei. Drank tea.

May 20. Monday. The

day was excellent. Let's go to mass (not to a memorial service! - S.K.) at the Chudov Monastery. At 3 o'clock I went with Alix to the Mariinsky hospital, where he examined the second group of the wounded. There were 3-4 severe cases (that is, the "kings" were shown a few victims. - S.K.). Dined with Mom. At 10 1/2 we went to the governor-general's ball. May 21st.

Tuesday. We got

up late with a wonderful morning. At 11 1/2 we went to the Khodynka camp (not on the field - to grieve, but to the parade show. - S.K.). After the prayer, all parts went well. At 3 1/4 we went to Alexandria, where we walked and drank tea. At 10 3/4 we went to the ball at the Noble Assembly. "And that's all ... There is not a word more about the

tragedy. But it goes in a stream; they rode a boat, ate, drank tea, honey, dined, dined. And a piece climbed into the throat Later, Russia will remember him both quadrilles

to the groans of the dying, and dinners to the tears of orphans. The Kaiser, on the other hand, was very popular in the

country... of the commission for the study of Fram's still tanks. Unfortunately, these stabilizers at sea did not work in the sphere of politics, but the common work united the Russian engineer and the senior mechanic of the Meteor, the German Schroeder, well.

In the evenings, they whiled away the time in long conversations, and somehow Schroeder said animatedly:

Oh, our Kaiser knows how to find a way to simple hearts!

And to your old seabass heart too? - jokingly asked Krylov. Aleksey Nikolaevich, judge

for yourself... Once we gathered in a group in Hamburg in a modest pub for a mug of beer. You know how it happens: it's raining outside, a chilly evening, and at the table - old friends and a good German song. Suddenly... the door opens and the Kaiser enters.

One?

Alone, and even without an umbrella, in a wet

overcoat. And you? Of course, we  
jumped

up, silent. And he? - And he grinned and said: "What are you talking about? Sing  
me "Watch on the Rhine", but treat me with a mug of beer" ...

- And you treated

me? Ah, Alexey Nikolaevich! Never have I sung so cheerfully! That evening I  
drank the best mug of my life! And then? Then  
he sat

thinking, and said: "Thank you, friends! You are having a good time" ... And he  
left. In such episodes, of course, they could not do

without theatricality - the Kaiser liked to show off. And the class warehouse of  
life from beer "impromptu" did not disappear. At the celebrations on the occasion of  
the descent of the next dreadnought, the Kaiser was surrounded not by sailors with  
working corns, but by the elite in tailcoat pairs and snow-white dresses, shining with  
diamonds. In the crowd, watching this from the side, there was sometimes a young  
Austrian Adolf Schicklgruber with a "Kaiser" mustache and to himself was indignant at  
the unfair distribution of roles at the celebration of life. He believed that its true creators  
also have the right to their share of honor and glory, but so far he only looked  
enthusiastically at how the steel mass slides off the slipway, dropping drops of  
"baptismal" champagne from the skin. Another year will pass, and he will find himself  
in the trenches of the war, which Wilhelm will personify from the side of Germany. But  
did Wilhelm start it? And did the Kaiser want war, and

not German military power? There were many contradictions in the figure of  
Wilhelm II, inseparable from any imperialism, and even more so from German. The  
peculiarities of the Kaiser's character only gave these contradictions a special flavor.

Academician Tarle - according to some contemporaries, and according to his own  
understanding - argued that the basis of Wilhelm's personality was the instinct of self-  
preservation. Like, he never flew on an airplane, he didn't go down on a submarine  
under water, which from him

expected.



Tarle was civil, intelligent, far from poorly at aircraft and from the submarine fleet, and clearly lost sight of the fact that in the days before the First World War, planes that took off did not always land safely, and boats did not always resurface. That is, Wilhelm (as head of state) simply did not have the right to risk himself in vain. The biography of Wilhelm contains many very mysterious moments. Here, for example, one

of them. On October 28, 1908, the English "Daily Telegraph" published a conversation with the Kaiser. In a strange way, the censorship of both the Chancellor and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs missed the article. Later, however, there were confusing explanations that, they say, they simply did not read it, as if it was about some insignificant piece of paper. Meanwhile, the publication of the "Daily Telegraph" caused a reaction more than violent. Wilhelm complained about England's hostility to Germany, talked about the desirability of friendship between the two countries, and reported that during the Boer War he had rejected a secret proposal from France and Russia to jointly attack England. In Germany, a newspaper storm also arose over the

"careless", "reckless" interview. He assessed as political and diplomatic dilettantism such a move by the Kaiser and Tarle. But Wilhelm's actions are more likely to be seen as his clever sounding, coordinated with the Foreign Ministry, and an attempt to upset the newly formed Entente. The use of the press by a leader of this level for probing purposes was new at that time.

No, Wilhelm was not easy. And it is very difficult ... Count Ignatiev, who knew Berlin well, did not speak disparagingly of Wilhelm, although he also did not feel sympathy for him. "Among the colorless monarchs of the beginning of the century, such as Nicholas II," wrote Ignatiev, "Wilhelm undoubtedly stood out for his natural talent, fettered by narrow monarchical ideals, and with his dangerous fantasy served as a good cover for the completely unfantastic deployment of daring plans" ... I will already note himself: so the daring plans were drawn up not without the Kaiser.

The same Ignatiev, once in Berlin watching the daily watch parade with an orchestra passing under the windows of his hotel room, correctly guessed that "this external drill was part of the combat education system not only of the army, but of the entire German people."

The method worked, and Tarle, exposing Wilhelm as an exceptionally narrow-minded, superficial fanfaron, himself, perhaps, did not penetrate very deeply into the essence of the far from simple problem of building the life of a real state organism. And Wilhelm was far from being an amateur. He, for example, disagreed with Bismarck in his views on the social question. Bismarck intended to drown the labor movement in blood, while Wilhelm insisted on social reforms from above and even put forward the idea of an international conference on social and political issues.

And he ruled not in the obediently scratching "Race", but in a civilized European state. To understand today how the monarchs of both countries, Russia and Germany themselves, differed, it is enough to know how they disposed of their most valuable philosophical and purely military asset - people - in the coming war.

The German reservist was a better fighter than a young conscript. Moreover, the reserve German non-commissioned officer was good. However, the Russian "non-commissioned officer" of the reserve was not very inferior to him. And sometimes he excelled in command, combat qualities and educational abilities (from the tsarist non-commissioned officers then good Soviet generals turned out). In education, of course, there was a difference, but for many years the difficult "tsarist" service made it possible to develop quite professionally suitable junior commanders.

And this "gold reserve" of the Russian army was driven into service by the rank and file by general mobilization. Almost ready officers and platoons in the very first months of the war laid down their lives in Galicia, in East Prussia. Now there was no one to teach the Russian recruit.

And the Germans did "exactly the opposite." Their non-commissioned reserve officers, enriched in addition to the past army and life experience, became a reliable backbone of the German troops. As you can see, Wilhelm and his generals, in contrast to "Cousin Nika" and his mediocre generals, well understood that "cadres decide everything."

Militaristic propaganda in Germany was put on a grand scale, taking into account the theatrical inclinations of its "first soldier". So, with the outbreak of World War II, he attached a siren to his car with the leitmotif of the "eternally looking for a new" god Motan from Wigner's opera "Ring of the Nibelungen". The Kaiser's car raced through

Berlin, he was overtaken by motives  
"coming victory", fully approved by the German masses.

The craving for pose and effect did the Germans a disservice. They gave more than enough reasons to poke a finger in their direction. General Brusilov in the summer of 1914 rested in Kissingen, Germany. The Sarajevo crisis had already begun, the Germans cursed the Serbs, and at the same time the Russians standing up for them. A model of the Moscow Kremlin was erected on the central square of Kissingen and set on fire from all sides to the thunder of the combined orchestra. Brusilov recalled: "Smoke, smoke, the roar of collapsing walls. Bell towers and crosses tilted and fell to the ground. The crowd applauded and its fury knew no bounds. Over the ashes of our palaces and churches, under the roar of fireworks, the German national anthem thundered." The picture is impressive, you will not say anything. And among the documents of diplomacy there is enough evidence that that summer the Germans were ready to fight no longer with mock-ups. Brusilov's story is clearly true. Stupid chauvinism, alas, is equally disgusting in all countries. In less than a month, a mob of vandals encouraged by the authorities in St. Petersburg once again smashes and plunders not a model, but the German embassy. The valuable art collections

of Ambassador Pourtales will perish forever. The burning models of the Kremlin will still come back to haunt the Germans at a great historical distance. The restless Pikul will mention them. But how! Correcting the historical fact in the right direction is easy. To do this, you need to tear him out of the living life of THAT era. Pikul did just that: he told about the Russian St. Basil's Cathedral, collapsing into German fire - a fake one, and next to it he mentioned Bismarck, and ... And the factual montage is ready: the

Germans, in their dreams, burned Russian Kremlins already in Bismarckian times. And after that, it is somehow forgotten that not a mock-up, but a real Kremlin was burned (it happened in our history) by "nice, charmi

But Pikul's "montages" in 1914 were still far away. So far, militant performances in German squares have allowed the Franco-Russian Entente to assure that Berlin is about to start the war.

Academician Khvostov in his "History of Diplomacy" as the most convincing evidence that "it was Germany that started the war in August 1914", quotes a letter from the German Secretary of State G. Jagov to the ambassador in London: "Basically, Russia is not ready for war now. France and England they also do not want war now. In a few years, Russia will already be combat-ready. Then she will crush us with the number of her soldiers; her Baltic Fleet and strategic railways will already be built. Our group is weakening (meaning the decrepitude of Austria-Hungary. - S.K. .) This is well known in Russia, and therefore they certainly want a few more years of peace." Von Jagow's statements have become classically famous, they are quoted by many, however...

However, von Jagow wrote the above words to Prince K. Lichnowski, a convinced Angloman and Anglophile! Later, Jagow would even accuse Lichnowski of being too pandering to England. But during the war, Jagow himself was a supporter of reconciliation with England, the conclusion of a separate peace with us. He complained: "It's a pity that there is no authoritative power in Russia and the peasant must bleed to death"...

If only the Germans were aggressive (in relation to Russia), then how then should one understand that it was not the Kaiser, but the Slavic "Mlada Bosna", "Narodna Selected", the Serbian officer secret organization "Union or Death" (also known as "Black hand") created a situation in which Russia had to be brought into the trenches? On June 28, 1914, in Bosnia, in Sarajevo, the heir to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was killed, who had come there to the maneuvers of the Austrian army.

The Serbian counterintelligence and its chief, Colonel Dragutin Dmitrievich, who is also the leader of the "Black Hand", nicknamed "Apis" ("bee", lat.), were involved in the

assassination attempt. Apisom was also the name of the sacred bull of the ancient Egyptian god Osiris. The bull was associated with the cult of the dead: it contributed to an increase in the number of sacrifices. (It is interesting that Pikul, obviously not knowing the exact meaning of the word "apis", attributed to him just "bull genealogy"),

And it was the second symbolism that fully justified itself. Dmitrievich-Apis served the cult of the dead, though not alone: back in May, he received a provocative telegram from ... the Russian General Staff, informing the Serbian General Staff about the upcoming attack by Austria-Hungary on Serbia. It was falsely reported that this was decided at a meeting (actually held) of Wilhelm and the Archduke in the Bohemian castle of Konopishte near Prague. And the maneuvers are just a screen for the concentration of troops on the Serbian border.

Russian military agent (attache) Count Ignatiev wrote later: "A lot of the mysterious and inexplicable, especially in Russian affairs, was left behind by the world war." Recalling the pre-war impressions of his general staff, the count also reflected in this way: "How, for example, can one explain that at the head of the most important secret business - intelligence - were officers with such non-Russian names as Monkewitz, patronymic Avgustovich, and Enkel, named Oscar ?". The Soviet historian Mikhail Pokrovsky directly believed that the assassination of Franz Ferdinand was provoked by the Russian General Staff. Well, it may very well be, but with one amendment - by certain circles in the Russian General Staff, connected with certain circles in Russia and outside it. Knew, it seems, about the preparation of the assassination and the Serbian Prime Minister Pasic.

But no less significant are the opinions that the murder was organized in Vienna. If you follow the last hours of the life of the doomed Archduke, then it becomes similar to the fact that this is also true. The

"security measures" adopted guaranteed one thing: danger. Slow driving along crooked streets, crowds of people and ... a place specially cleared of people for a bomber. The first attempt that day was unsuccessful. The bomb flew under the wheels of the rear car and wounded the adjutant.

Instead of stopping the patrols, the Feldzekhmeister Potiorek, responsible for security, again carries Franz Ferdinand through the streets and does not even cover him with bodyguards on the steps. On the left side of the heir and his wife, Count Harrach voluntarily insures, but Tavrilo Princip puts a series of bullets into them from the right footboard. Just when Potiorek orders the driver to slow down.

Franz Ferdinand was married to a Slav (Czech) - Countess Chotek (Princip shot her too) - and had plans to create a Western Slavic state within a single empire. Hitler in "Mein Kampf" even called him "a great friend of the Slavs." The future Fuhrer here, of course, gave the Archduke an overly specific characterization.

I don't know why the former English diplomat Edward Gray was drawn to frankness, but in his "Memoirs" he admitted: "The world will probably never have a story about the whole ins and outs of the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. a man who knows everything there is to know about this murder." How, one wonders, did Edward Gray know that "no one" "knows anything" about the assassination attempt? This is how people usually write, not only well-informed, but also involved. Gray's words give reason to assume in events such a parallelism of the actions of the most diverse forces, when all the threads really slip out of the hands of any individual person ...

A day before the Sarajevo assassination, the famous Grigory Rasputin was seriously wounded in his homeland, in the Siberian village of Pokrovsky. His former adherent (or maybe even his lover) Feonia (Khionia) Guseva stabbed him in the stomach with a knife, then ran away from the men chasing her, shouting "I'll kill the Antichrist anyway!", and later tried to stab herself. During the arrest, a copy of the newspaper

Svet was confiscated from Guseva, with an article about Rasputin by a prominent freemason Amfiteatrov, who had lived in Paris since 1905. And the next day in Sarajevo, Gavrilo Princip was more fortunate: he killed the Archduke. Cross-matching of data leaves no room

for doubt

What:

a) Rasputin really healed the hemophiliac prince, and this somewhat excuses Alexei's mother as a mother, but does not at all whitewash her as an empress; b) Rasputin was, as they say, a

"sharmer" and knew how to charm people - especially those with an unstable psyche (as was the case with the imperial family); c) Rasputin was an obvious and very vile doll in the hands of

"dark forces" that have stuck in the teeth of the "left", "right" and "center".

But...

There is also no doubt that Rasputin thought correctly on the question of the war and did not want a war with Germany that was unnecessary for Russia. I didn't want to myself, apart from someone else's influences. In common sense, he, an illiterate, but sharp-witted peasant, cannot be denied. He reasoned simply: "Germany is a tsarist country. Russia is also ... Fighting them with each other is calling for a revolution. Revolution, that means - the kings" by the hat. "Where are

Gregory?" In exactly the same way (literally the same, adjusted only for the difference in the dictionaries of the peasant and the monarch), Wilhelm II argued from the heights of education and the throne in his letters to Nicky. There he persistently dissuaded Nicholas from friendship with the "republican" France, which cut off the head of Louis XVI.

It was, of course, not a matter of republicanism, but "Willy" obviously, not without reason, believed that such arguments would reach "Nika" faster. For us, one thing is essential here - the Kaiser talked about the world. Even if as a guarantee against revolutions,

but the world! The king reacted sourly. However, Rasputin clearly had more influence on Nikolai than on Wilhelm. In the tsar's diary, the name of the "old man" does not come across very often: Rasputin for the tsar was as holy as God, whose name it is not recommended to mention in vain. And the "holy devil" could turn out to be a particular factor influencing the general change in policy, that is, Nicholas's refusal at the decisive moment from the war, despite the external pressure of the environment. After all, "Gregory" was an element of the inner life of a stubborn and self-willed emperor, and therefore the "Rasputin" factor was worth a lot!

According to the testimonies of knowledgeable participants of the era, Rasputin decisively thwarted Russia's participation in the first Balkan War, playing a positive role here as a politician. The logic was the same: "Where, they say, should we meddle, wherever here, at home, not everything is in order," although in this fact, too, the perversity and aimlessness of the Russian autocracy manifested itself very convincingly.

There is such a "king of the Russian action movie" Alexander Bushkov. He treats history like a lover of beer with caviar roach: once or twice and butchered in the best possible way - drink and play soul ... But Bushkov's eye is sometimes not only sharp, but also true. In his outrageous book, *The Russia That Wasn't*, he wonders if there was an opportunity for the Russian Empire to avoid

Russian-German war, and believes that there was such a possibility, and the key is in Grishka Rasputin.

In fact, the "keys" to war are always "gold" and not personal, but Bushkov is not mistaken that the war was not inevitable. Although Russia had been preparing for a war with Germany for a good ten years, the "German" war, even in the early summer of 1914 and even after Sarajevo, was by no means obvious to the vast majority of Russian society (including the broad army masses). The war fell on the Russian head as unexpectedly as snow would have fallen on it in August. And under certain circumstances, Grishka, perhaps, could become a "straw" that would break the back of the "camel" of war.

There are those who wish to regard Rasputin as an exceptionally moral figure, the leader of certain "spiritual Christians" and the protector of the Russian land. All this, of course, is nonsense. But it may very well not be stupid that Grishka really could have been stabbed with a knife on the eve of Princip's shots according to an agreed plan. And, perhaps, it is not for nothing that the coincidence of two events has long attracted the attention of researchers in the West. Especially in Germany, where they sometimes say that St. Petersburg is doubly guilty of the war. The author of the most

interesting book "23 Steps Down" Mark Konstantinovich Kasvinov makes fun of such versions, but he himself writes unconvincingly: history, they say, "moves at an hour in too illogical, irrational moves." The thought is strange! History moves sometimes really

like this, but

only for those who do not see how it is driven. And who... And why...

And the attempt on Rasputin very well coincided in time with the Sarajevo shots. Later, he said that if there had not been an incident with the "cursed" Theonia, there would have been

no war. And if there are reasons to see the hand of certain Russian circles in the actions of Apis, then it is all the more logical to admit their participation in the events of the Protection. Kasvinov believed that it would have made more historical sense if the results had changed: if Ferdinand had survived, and Rasputin had been slaughtered. It seems that Rasputin was simply cut short due to the racial habit of hack work. After all, even the Decembrists were hanged in such a way that they broke down and complained: "Oh, Rus



in a hundred years nothing has changed: they have not really managed to kill.  
One way

or another, but in the general scheme of events, such details only  
dramatized the background and added spice to it.

era.

England was losing its primacy and wanted to improve its affairs by  
physically destroying the military power of its main European competitor -  
Germany. France sought

revenge for Sedan and the return of lost  
lands.

USA... Well, the USA has almost reached the first position in the world,  
and now, at the expense of the war, they hoped to take Europe into their hands.

And each of this trinity achieved its goals only by war! Only war could  
destroy the German fleet and undermine Germany's colonial demands. Only  
military revenge returned Alsace and Lorraine to France. And only the war,  
and, moreover, a long one, made the States the master of Europe and the  
world. By the way, Benito Mussolini, then still a socialist,

pacifist and editor of the socialist organ "Avanti", understood the balance  
of power better than State Councilor Petryaev. On the day of the Sarajevo  
assassination, he immediately told fellow journalist Michel Campana: "The  
situation is clear. The Central Powers, by attacking Serbia, are thus attacking  
England and France. A general conflict is inevitable." As you can see, the smart  
promising politician did not even mention Russia.

No, the war was conceived in Washington, New York, London and Paris.  
And in St. Petersburg? Well, the bureaucratic St. Petersburg with the exchange  
New Berdichev could really take over the technical implementation of someone  
else's guiding ideas.

As for Berlin, he, perhaps, did not want war as such, but "a place in the  
sun." If the old colonial powers had made room, if Russia, instead of preparing  
for war with Germany, had actively cooperated with her in establishing economic  
coexistence, then Wilhelm and German Capital might well have preferred to  
war such a peaceful development of a situation in which Germany's role in the  
world would justifiably increase.

However, for us, the reader, what is important now is not who and how organized the assassination of the Archduke and what accompanied this. It is more interesting to understand why it was committed in the Balkans? Although it is already clear: in order to certainly draw Russia into the war, for which the Balkans (and only the Balkans) have become the only "painful" point in Europe. Of course, one

can say that Serbia thus wanted to involve us in its problems, but it is impossible to explain the "Sarajevo" turn of events by simply counting the Serbs on helping Russia in the conflict with Austria.

And even more so, the Kaiser and Germany cannot be blamed for drawing Russia into the war.

Yes, Konradi, chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, believed that the Germans were called upon to plant culture among the Slavs (Moltke Jr. spoke, however, of the future struggle between Germanism and Slavdom as a struggle between two cultures). But even

generals who are competent in military affairs are far from always versed in politics, and even more so in economics. And the economy objectively provided friendly Russian-German

relationship...

The fundamental German plan of the chief of the German General Staff A. Schlieffen (who died in 1913) was to strike at France only in the first place, and after its defeat, go to Russia. However, the plan was based on bypass

movements - a kind of "strategic Cannes". In Europe, it really happened: the Germans entered the heart of France through Belgium. But in Russia of that time, the Germans simply had nowhere to make a "knight's move", especially since the Germans would have to go through Russian Poland before Russia proper.

Therefore, Schlieffen did not at all intend to deal a decisive blow to Russia. He was sure that the defeat of France would bring tsarism to its senses, and everything would be limited to a military demonstration. In short, the German memorandum with the title: "War against France" turned out to be more real. So that the situation itself forced the Germans to add it, inserting large letters "... and RUSSIA", Sarajevo shots sounded. Only giving confrontation with

the Austro-German bloc "general Slavic" meaning, one could count on widespread approval in Russia of the war with Germany.

I think the reader will be interested to know that almost a year before the Sarajevo provocation, at the height of the first Balkan war, Lenin wrote in Pravda on May 23, 1913: to the whole "German world". Pan-Slavism, the idea of uniting all Slavs against the Germans is a danger, the chancellor assures, and refers to the noisy manifestations of the Pan-Slavists in St. Petersburg. An excellent argument! Manufacturers of guns, armor, cannons, gunpowder and other "cultural" needs want to enrich themselves in Germany too, and in Russia, and in order to fool the public, they refer to each other. Germans are frightened by Russian chauvinists, Russians by Germans "... It is said magnificently, but Lenin looked from the standpoint of a truly Russian person, with an

outstanding statesmanship, moreover. He perfectly understood how Russia did not need a war in general, and even more so a war with Germany - Russia was not even ready for a full-fledged defensive war. And so Lenin ended his thought about Russian and German chauvinists in the following way: "Both of them

play a miserable role in the hands of the capitalists, who know perfectly well that it is ridiculous even to think about Russia's war against Germany." Lenin, on the other hand, believed: "A war between Austria (not Germany. - S.K.) and Russia would be very useful for the revolution, but it is unlikely that Franz Joseph and Nikolasha will give us this pleasure." Alas, the last Romanov lacked both a sensitive political mind and a sense of the

Motherland. What can we say about the Ryabushinskys, Guchkovs, Konovalov, Tereshchenko, Brodsky, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich? No, these wanted a speedy war no less than the Germans, and apparently even much more. The already mentioned Russian monarchist Markov II smashed both from the pages of his

"Zemshchina" and from the Duma rostrum the "progressive" bloc, but he did not see all of its connections, naively believing that "while there was Franco-Russian (meaning - without England - S.K.) union, there was no war, there was no smell of war.

Markov did not know that just a few days after January 17, 1913, when Poincaré was elected president of the French Republic, he told the Russian ambassador in Paris Izvolsky: "It is very important for the French government to be able to prepare French public opinion in advance for France's participation in the war, which may arise on the basis of Balkan affairs". Is it possible to show more concisely and more revealingly

that the imminent war and the very geographical point of its origin were predetermined not by the policy of Berlin, but by the policy of those forces to which the French elite adjoined, which Markov simply stiflingly enlisted as peacekeepers? The first act of President Poincaré was the recall of

Ambassador Georges Louis from St. Petersburg and the appointment of Theophile Delcassé, one of the "fathers" of the Entente with a reputation as the main enemy of Germany, in his place. Tarle condemningly reports that in

Germany this was perceived "as an insult, a threat, a hostile demonstration." Actually, that's how it was!

The appointment of Delcassé was, as usual, previously agreed with St. Petersburg. And from this, Poincaré's trick acquired a particularly provocative and sinister character. And then there

was Nicholas II, at the suggestion of Izvolsky and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov, departing from the custom of awarding the heads of foreign states with the highest award in the empire only on special occasions, immediately presented Poincaré with the ribbon of St. Andrew the First-Called.

Everything looked like that on the front line of the anti-German front France was advanced, and Russia was its second echelon ...

And that was not all. In the end, the immediate European situation depended on the position of England. Very many historians, even after the war, could not get rid of the superficial confidence that everything was determined by the inevitability of a "trial of strength" between Germany and England, since it was these two countries that were most industrialized. In 1907, the percentage of workers and employees in trade, transport and industry in relation to the entire economically active population was 45.8% for England, 40% for Germany, and only 24.1% for the USA. The US factor thus considered

secondary even such a historian-encyclopedist as Yevgeny Viktorovich Tarle. But the

growing rivalry between England and Germany was not so much a reason as a convenient "drive belt" for the mechanism of unwinding the war in the interests of the United States. And, in fact, not even the United States, as the state of the American nation, but the United States as the new and final residence of the Golden Capital.

It was Capital who now ordered the scripts, painted the roles and selected performers and directors. As

for England, the British side played their pre-war game brilliantly. She managed to imperceptibly completely subjugate French and Russian foreign policy, although outwardly the impression arose that England could and was ready to come to an agreement with Germany at any moment.

Even a year before the war, during the Balkan Wars, England supported Austria-Hungary and Germany against Russia, with which she was already bound by the "cordial consent" of the Entente. And inside the Entente, she got away with it quite well. Moreover, the Entente itself, until September 1914, was held only by "cordial consent", because it was not documented, by a special treaty, before the start of the First World War. Albion's trick is more than clever.

No less adroitly, with the help of England, Russia's "Japanese fears" were timely eliminated. Russia could realistically expect Japan to act against her if the Russian army was tied up in a war in Europe. Russia's doubts

were eliminated by the alliance concluded with Japan by one of the Entente countries - England. And, of course, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was one of the additional factors that guaranteed Russia's participation in a future

European war. And how skillfully England put up a "smoke screen" of almost Germanophilia! Seeing only her, Germany was sure that England would not get involved in her conflict with France and Russia tied up by France. The Kaiser was a brave warrior, but the British circled him like a beardless youth ...

However, the "English" is a collective concept. In life, these were specific people. And it does not bother us, the reader, to take a closer look at

to someone who, unlike the German Holstein, quite officially directed the foreign policy of England from 1905 to 1916 ...

Sir Edward Gray (later Viscount Fallodon) became Foreign Secretary at the age of forty-three. Well-bred, of an old Whig (that is, liberal) aristocratic family, restrained features of a thin and even emaciated face, thin, tightly compressed lips, a quiet (according to Churchill's definition - "graveyard") voice. A staunch anti-Soviet, he died just in the year Hitler came to power - in 1933. According to people who knew him well, Gray was a classic, sophisticated hypocrite and had only one sincere passion - the study of English songbirds, to which he even dedicated a special work. Here is a very lively characterization of him: "Sir Edward did not like to talk a lot; the little that he said, he often preferred to express it unclearly. or complete emptiness, that is, the desire to evade the expression of one's own thoughts. A childless widower, most often unsociable, not knowing foreign languages, he, according to some, "did not like foreign policy." It would seem that he is not the best candidate for the post of head of the foreign affairs agency. But he sat in his chair for a long time, firmly, and in the years, as they say, "fatal". And he held foreign affairs firmly in his hands. In short, Viscount Fallodon looked like a person, although not as eccentric as Baron Holstein, but also quite peculiar. And with the same "generic" signs of a powerful attorney, who, however, preferred to rule through intermediaries like Sir Edward. The leader of the "liberal-imperialists", he was

close to Lord Rosebery - the very same, relatives of the Rothschilds. Accordingly, the main tasks of the "English Holstein" were: 1) fastening France and Russia to England (that is, in the future, to America as well); 2) drawing such a visible line towards Germany that the Germans would not be afraid, in the event of a war with the European continent, to get a war with England at the same time.

The latter is sometimes also called "lull vigilance." That is, it was Gray who first of all prepared the First World War from the Anglo-Saxon side. He later claimed that "for ten consecutive days" he did everything to keep the peace in July 1914. And Gray was reasonably answered to such a statement: "Yes, you did everything for ten consecutive days to keep the peace, but before that you did everything for ten consecutive years to cause war."

Incidentally, the former General Staff Colonel of the Russian Army, the future Marshal of the Soviet Union Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov wrote about "grey's strokes characteristic of hypocrites in describing the nature of a future world war." Here it is said, as printed. He deceived

Gray (more precisely, they deceived Gray) Germany, and indeed on a sanctimonious scale. In the prewar years, England allegedly agreed to conclude a convention with the Reich on cooperation in the Middle East... It also agreed to an agreement on the division of Portuguese colonial possessions in

favor of the Reich. The "Iraqi" convention was supposed to be signed on June 15, 1914, but then the act of signing ... was "somewhat postponed." The "Portuguese" agreement was ready in May 1913, then initialed in August. Gray delayed and delayed its promulgation, and appointed the signing for ... the end of July 1914. It was Ambassador Lichnowsky's unjustified agreement to postpone the publication of the treaty on the Portuguese colonies that Secretary of State von Jagow later accused him of as the main London miscalculation of German diplomacy.

Although, could the Anglophile Lichnowski refuse the "best friend of the Germans" in his request for a "small" (only before the start of the World War!)

respite? The war arrived so on time and so "successfully" saved the future Viscount Fallodon from having to sign documents strengthening Germany, that there is every reason to believe that the Kaiser was far from eager to start a war in the summer of 1914.

Gray's colleague, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill (whom we will have occasion to commemorate more than once with an unkind word), cheerfully declared with his inherent energy: "Never during the past three years have we been so well prepared." The State of the British Armed Forces and Industry Churchill

imagined, probably better than von Jagov. And the confidence of the German Secretary of State in the unpreparedness of England proves one thing: that the British really deceived and deceived the Germans.

In addition to the moral portrait of the British Foreign Minister, the following fact is interesting. When the creator of Sherlock Holmes, Arthur Conan Doyle, in the 1900s, angrily protested against the Congolese policy of the Belgian King Leopold, who flooded the Congo with blood and tears, Sir Edward believed that the hype around the Congo threatened European peace. Although, on reflection, you understand that it's probably not a moraine here ... You push

Belgium away from the Entente, and what if that one - God forbid! will Germany allow the transit of troops through its territory to attack France? And how, then, with a convenient pretext for England to "stand up" for the "outrageous" Belgium and enter the war? After all, Sir

Arthur looked far ahead ... Immediately after the Sarajevo shots, Gray once again demonstratively emphasized England's disinterest in the development of tension and

managed to create a complete illusion among the Germans that England would not participate in the war against Germany. The incitement was not so much subtle as it was quite dishonorable. Later, historians will explain the behavior of England by her worries about the growing de German naval power, but here is how the naval forces were correlated in the main naval theater in the North Sea. England had in the "Grand Fleet" ("Big Fleet") and "Channel Fleet" 20 dreadnoughts, 38 pre-dreadnoughts (battleships), 5 battlecruisers, 67 cruisers, 192 destroyers and 68 submarines.

boats.

The German high seas fleet included 15 dreadnoughts, 22 pre-dreadnoughts, 3 battlecruisers, 25 cruisers, 137 destroyers and 24 submarines.

The total number of the heaviest ships of the super-dreadnought, dreadnought and pre-dreadnought type in England looked even more impressive - 66 against 37 German. That is, the British had a clear advantage, especially given the French fleet (though weak), excellent coastal defenses and well-defended naval bases.



The British increased their naval power more intensively.

In the Baltic Sea, the Russian Baltic Fleet overwhelmingly outnumbered the German forces, and therefore the Germans faced the need to transfer part of the ships from the North Sea to the Baltic through the Kiel Canal (which they later did).

No, it wasn't the Navy. First, England wanted war only slightly less than the United States. The Yankee war promised only and exclusively numerous benefits: an increase in production, a decrease in unemployment and social tension, the financial enslavement of Europe, the strengthening of its political influence and the creation of a mass army. And all this - without the slightest risk to their territory, without the risk of losing the war. But England also

hoped to fight off only by an expedition to the continent without prejudice to her country. And at the same time, she intended to defeat the dangerous German competitor, whose goods were increasingly crowding out the British on the world market. However, such considerations could and did concern the elite. As for the ordinary Englishman, he did not know how to fight on land with his own kind (with Europeans) and did not like it. No wonder Bismarck once laughed: "If England landed troops on the coast of Germany, I would simply order the police to arrest him."

So it turned out to be as difficult to move the masses of the British "to the continent" as to move the overseas "Yankees" to the war. How the US elite coped with hanging "bells of belligerence" on the average American, we will know in due time. But the technology was applied the same as in England. It was well described by General V. Fedorov, who visited the "Island" in 1915 with the mission of Admiral Rusin:

"Newspapers and magazines, posters and leaflets, public reports, patriotic manifestations, cinema, theater" ...

Near Nelson's Trafalgar Column, a booth was constantly staged on a grand scale to record volunteers for the front. As a result, the "Kitchener" army (named after Minister of War G. Kitchener) grew before our eyes: from 200 thousand to 1 million in a year. Accordingly, military production also grew,

which was greatly facilitated by the "Decree on the Defense of the State" adopted immediately after the start of the war.

Correspondingly, centralization and capital control over the life of the country increased, which became a sign of a new era. Previously, at least you could die at your choice. Now even this "democratic freedom" of the European was increasingly deprived. Both the war and the home front

acquired features of totality. And as a result, the profits of the elite grew, that is, for the sake

of which all the boron cheese was strenuously and kindled. In the list of shareholders of only one Armstrong arms concern, which since the beginning of the century has paid dividends of at least 10 or even 15%, there were the names of sixty representatives of the nobility or their wives, sons, daughters, fifteen baronets, twenty sir knights, eight members of parliament, five bishops, twenty major officers and eight journalists. The war of the company could bring one thing - an increase in annual income by three, five, or

even ten times. There was something to try! The English magazine The Economist on February 13, 1915, already during the war, blurted out in fright: "Philanthropists express the hope that peace will bring international arms control. But those who know what forces actually direct European diplomacy are not carried away by

any utopias." .. Sir Edward Gray was not fond of utopias. He and his patrons were well aware that it makes sense to start a war only when Russia will fight against Germany.

Sarajevo was perceived differently by different circles. The murder of the heir to the Austrian throne could, of course, be considered a "casus belli", that is, a reason for war. But at first, Europe reacted to him with obvious indifference. Nicholas II did not mention this event in his diary. At that time, an English squadron with King George V on board was visiting Kronstadt, and the tsar left for history only information about canoeing and breakfasts with George. France, however, discussed the murder with fervor, but not of the Archduke and his wife, but of the editor of Le Figaro, Calmette, who fell at the hands of Madame Cailliau, wife of the French finance minister and leader of the radical party, Joseph Cailliau. (Let's say parenthetically that Calmette published Cayo's intimate letters to discredit her.)

Cayo was attacked not only by Figaro, but by the entire conservative, clerical (that is, ecclesiastical) and moderate republican press.

And she attacked for the simple reason that Cayo, until then obedient, from some moment began to interfere with the financiers with his idea of a progressive income tax. By the way, in 1912, Cayo was "put in sight" and too friendly tone towards Germany. His happiness is that in addition to the hatred of bankers, he also had the love of an outstanding woman. In France it was something, and Madame Caillaux was acquitted.

Franz Ferdinand was killed on June 28, and only on July 23 - a month later, the Austrian envoy in Belgrade, Baron Gisl, handed the Austrian ultimatum

to Serbia. "Petit Parisien" paid exactly half as much attention to the topic of the assassination of the duke as Madame Caillaux. In Germany and Austria, prominent military men went on vacation in July so as not to add "electricity" to the July atmosphere, already

rich in thunderstorms. In France, industrialists and merchants received cash income in gold louis and paid in gold. Edward Rothschild in the country castle Lafferier rolled costumed Persian balls. And in the early summer of 1914, "all", that is, elected, Paris saw a ball of precious stones. The superladies exchanged

jewels beforehand to show off in the truest sense of the word a dress the color of the stones that adorned it from top to bottom. An eyewitness wrote: "Red rubies, green emeralds, cornflower blue sapphires, snow-white, black and pink pearls merged into one brilliant firework. But white and blue diamonds dazzled most of all."

When the war became a fact, there was a chorus: "How unexpected!", "The war took us by surprise!". The French weekly Siman Financier wrote on August 1: "It only took a week to bring Europe to the brink of a catastrophe never seen before in history." This means that capital has carried out

its many years of work in a qualified and accurate manner. And what does a "week" have to do with it, if the French ambassador to Serbia complained back in 1911: "The French state has been put at the disposal of Le Creusot for every point in the world"? And here is another "drop", which reflects the

era ... In August 1913, at the 9th Conference of the Chiefs of the General Staff

France and Russia (then they were Joffre and Zhilinsky), Joffre demanded, in the name of the speedy concentration of Russian troops to attack Germany, to lay thousands (!) Kilometers of new railway lines - to double the lines Baranovichi-Penza-Ryazhsk-Smolensk; Baranovichi-Sarny-Rivne; Lozovaya-Poltava-Kyiv-Kovel and build a new double-track Ryazan-Tula-Warsaw.

Even before the 9th conference, at the request of the French, the section Zhabinka-Brest-Litovsk ("some" hundred kilometers) was quadrupled and a two-track track Bryansk-Gomel - Luninets-Zhabinka was built (there were already a thousand of

these kilometers). Zhabinka, Baranovichi, Luninets, Sarny, Kovel, Ryazhsk... Marsh, forest, backwater places... The then economic value was zero. But "strategically important directions". On economic maps, small dots fell without a trace into the large-mesh grid of parallels and meridians, but on staff maps they occupied the most honorable place.

Thousands of steel kilometers would be very useful for our Russian economy to unite into an integral complex of industrial regions, granaries of grain and fish, forest and steppe zones, And instead - at the behest of a foreign golden clan and in its name - Russian artisans paved paths to nowhere along the impassable swamp ... Or rather, the path to war. ahead of time! No, to say that

everything happened so unexpectedly would be reckless. In the January issue of the organ of the Russian military ministry "Scout" for 1914, the Minister of War V.A. Sukhomlinov wrote: "We all know that we are preparing for a war on the western border, mainly against Germany. Not only the army, but the entire Russian people must be ready for the idea that we must arm ourselves for a fighter (what a style, reader! - S.K.) wars against the Germans and that the German empires must be destroyed, even if hundreds of thousands of human lives had to be sacrificed. It was, of course, not only an anti-German, but also an anti-Russian

provocation. Wasn't Poincaré's demand to spend French loans on the construction of strategic railroads to the German borders a similar provocation? And isn't it

Was the visit of the "Poincaré war" to Russia after the Sarajevo assassination a

provocation? The President of France came to St. Petersburg to meet with the Tsar before the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia - on July 20th. And his whole visit looked like a challenge to Germany. Nicholas II these days ahead of schedule promoted cadets of the graduating classes of military schools to officers and loudly declared that France needed to hold out for ten days until Russia mobilizes and "imposes" the Germans "as it should

Sukhomlinov was dismissed in disgrace on June 11, 1915, arrested on April 21, 1916, and imprisoned in Petropavlovka. Nicholas II released him. In the summer of 1917, the general was nevertheless tried, on September 12 he was sentenced to life imprisonment, and he immediately fled ... to Germany. There, in a villa in the Wannsee near Berlin, after the war, he also could not resist confessing: "If anyone ever ... takes up the clarification of the behind-the-scenes history of the outbreak of the war, he will have to pay special attention to the days of Poincaré's stay in St. Petersburg, and also the following time from about 24 to 28 July".

Poincaré obviously came for an inspection, firstly, and for cutting off all the mooring lines that bind Russia to the world, secondly. Everything turned out as planned: "patriotic" anti-Germanism in Russia has reached a level after which it is necessary to restrain the "horses" for the time being.

The French tried to spoil Russian-German relations not only at the highest - presidential level, but even in small things. On July 14, 1914, a military parade "in memory of the capture of the Bastille by the revolutionary people" was held on the Longchamps field near Paris. The flowery spectacle in a purely French spirit was over, the military attachés were getting ready to go home. And then our Count Ignatiev was asked to sit in an open car along with his German colleague - they say, the organizers are afraid of the hostile cries of the crowd at the German. The car started, and the audience shouted from all sides: "Vive la Russie! Vive les russes!" ("Hurrah for Russia, hurray for the Russians!"). Ignatiev did not long for a war between Russia and Germany - quite the contrary. And, having lost to the French, he, of course, blundered. I did not realize that the German would be offended by such a deliberate demonstration of "Russian-French warmth." If he rode in a separate

car, he would be angry with France, but, as it turned out, involuntarily with Russia. What the French wanted. A trifle?

No! In the same way, the French will do us harm in more than twenty years, pushing Germany and the USSR at the World Exhibition in Paris in 1937. Then the French quite deliberately took the territory under the Soviet and German pavilions against each other. And then, in advance, in order to stir up, they showed the layout of the Soviet pavilion to the life architect of the Fuhrer Speer. The effect was amazing: as a result, Mukhin's inspired, forward-looking "Worker and Kolkhoz Woman" marched straight at the Germans, and an imperial eagle hung predatory from a height above the Russians.

In the pre-war period of 1914, there were enough such "trifles" both in Paris and London. At the beginning of July (6th), the German ambassador von Lichnowsky informs Gray of the Austro-German consultations that have just ended in Potsdam and adds "in complete confidence": - In Berlin, they believe that, in

view of Russia's weakness, it is not worth holding back Austria-Hungary.  
- Yes, Russia, alas, is weak, -

Gray "agreed". At the same time, he shook his head so regretfully that there was no doubt: he would very much (well, simply very much!) Want Russia to be strong, but where, they say, can you get away from the facts. Such insidious English

"assessments" only inspired Berlin. And now a Russian military agent in England reports to St. Petersburg: "The British General Staff is sure that Germany is pushing Austria to war." Well, still - this General Staff, but in a conversation

with a Russian, would say something else at such times! England has always been able to provoke simpletons ...

At the same time, Gray assures the ambassadors of Austria and Germany, Mendorff and Lichnowski, of the strict neutrality of England and its desire to settle the Austro-Serbian conflict by peace. On the eighth of July, Sir Edward received the Russian ambassador, Count Benckendorff ...

- I am extremely concerned about the seriousness of the emerging situation, Count, painedly said the head of the Foreign Office.

"Yes, you can slip on this slope, unless you have a strong spirit and a strong will," Alexander Konstantinovich agreed. "Well said," Gray perked up somewhat. - And that is precisely why I am

convinced that Russia needs to strongly support Serbia and protect it from the arbitrariness of the Austrians. Your authority with the Slavs,

your strength...

Benckendorff politely kept quiet and only made an indefinite gesture with his hand and you, they say, gentlemen, how are you? Gray,

however, did not see a hint, and Benckendorff had to ask this question out loud:

"But England, obviously, will have to intervene, if not with us for Serbia, then for France? Gray again

became impassive and spread his hands: - We are always on the side of the offended and in need of help, Mr. Ambassador. But according to our data, then Russia will be in the most difficult position. I have accurate information: in the event of war, Wilhelm and Moltke will very quickly move the center of military operations from west to east. Germany sees its main enemy in Russia... Gray lied to his face. So what? Two decades will pass, reader, and the policy of provoking the USSR against Germany will be pursued by Gray's

former colleagues in the Cabinet, Lloyd George and Churchill, in conversations with our plenipotentiary Maisky. Another time, older figures, but the goals and methods of British diplomacy will not change. In the meantime, it is necessary to push tsarist Russia, because without Russia it is impossible to start a war in every sense. The only reliable guarantee here could be either Russia's declaration of war with Germany, or vice versa. But it was absolutely necessary to ensure that the conflict took shape first between these two powers. Only after they were bogged down in mutual mobilization actions after the official declaration of a state of war among themselves, it was possible to move the cause of the Great War further. It is impossible not to

mention another subtle point. In the book Europe in the Era of Imperialism, which I have already quoted many times, Academician Tarle stated that the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hellweg was an active

supporter of the war. But here is how the Chief of Staff of the Red Army B. Shaposhnikov assessed the same Bethman in his work "The Brain of the Army": "A tragic personality - one of Bismarck's successors in the chancellor's post - Bethman-Helweg thought to achieve the intended goals exclusively by peaceful means, pursuing a policy of "without war ". Bethmann proceeded from the premise that the rapid development of Germany's productive forces would so far surpass the rest of the states that their competition would be excluded."

Shaposhnikov fought with the Germans at the front. But Tarle differed on paper, accusing Bethmann of the fact that in 1914 Germany saw the main enemy not in France, but in Russia, on the grounds that "victory over France seemed difficult, but quite possible; victory over Russia - and easy and sure." How right was the

academician?.. There is no doubt

that if Germany had hit Russia first (and not France - as it was in reality), then France would not have actively intervened. What else was missing - to shed the blood of French chevaliers in the name of the lives of the blue-footed peasant!

But the Germans would have been provided with the support of the Austrians. And this is not counting the support of Yevgeny Viktorovich, who attributed to the Germans hatred moods towards Russia.

So, an "easy victory", a quick voyage along the western flanks of the Russian Empire, the annexation of Courland, the Russian part of Poland, Livonia and Estonia. Then - reconciliation with Russia on German terms - and Russia is discarded

from the accounts. Then it was possible to take a break, so that with the advent of new warm days, hit the

already lonely France. Well, isn't this the rational scheme of war for Germany if the Germans were so anti-Russian and were so arrogant about Russia, as Tarle described?

But in reality, the Germans strictly adhered to the Schlieffen plan oriented towards France and kept only insignificant forces on the Russian border. It somehow did not fit with blind enmity towards us. Maybe it was because our strength was neglected? No - the Germans were not so stupid and ignorant not to understand that in a defensive war Russia would at least not show weakness.



Germany did not want to give rise to tensions with Russia. On the other hand, St. Petersburg itself gave occasions for enmity every now and then - both bureaucratic, official, and exchange.

What was worth one noise raised in the fall of 1913 around the Turkish mission of General Liman von Sanders.

Türkiye turned to Germany with a request to carry out a complete reorganization of its army. The German arms factories, led by Krupp, were supposed to re-equip the new European-style army. Of course, there was

little joy for us in such a surprise. We did not have much friendship with Turkey, but there were real conflict zones in the Transcaucasus.

But the Germans could be understood. Self-respecting powers do not refuse such offers and opportunities. Here, after all, the loading of their economy, and the binding of Turkey to itself, and the interests of the Baghdad railway. So make noise - do not make noise, and Germany will not back down from the temptation. It was clearer...

Looking ahead, I will say that all the efforts of the Germans did not really strengthen the Turkish army. After all, the strength of modern armies is determined by the general level of development of society. And it was still too low in the then Turkey.

However, instead of putting a good face on a bad game and smoothing out the tension as much as possible by exchanging it for possible German concessions to us, Petersburg soared so that it was solely on our initiative that we smelled of our war with Germany one on one. Up to a certain

point, Russia was also incited from London. Sir Edward Gray pointedly made it clear that he was not averse to thinking about a joint appeal of the three powers (that is, England, France and Russia) to the Porte ... But before the war,

Sir Edward could not yet bring the matter (so all her timetable), and therefore, at the end of November, he declared that a collective note of protest was inappropriate.

In Berlin, Albion's ability to intrigue, of course, was not deceived. However, irritation with Russia was great because of the nervousness of St. Petersburg, which, of course, was artificially caused by London, Paris, New York ... He was very small

the occasion, and the result was very serious - Russian-German relations were spoiled just as the interests of the impending big war required. So, by the

beginning of 1914, Germany could already understand that St. Petersburg was capable of going to war against her. The mood of France has been known

since Sedan. The position of London in Berlin was assessed completely erroneously, because England skillfully played the role of neutral.

The Kaiser, his diplomatic and general teams knew how to think, but how could they evaluate the alignment of world forces in the same way as these forces were already deployed in reality? The Golden International, pursuing its interests, has already taken as a basis the plan for the rise of the United States through a world war. And not only Russia and France, but even England was assigned the role of a whipping boy.

Could Berlin think like that about "proud Albion", about the mighty "British Empire, over which the sun never set"? After all, from the standpoint of purely national interests, it was inappropriate for England to get involved in a European continental war directly.

Berlin counted on this, while London cleverly maintained such an illusion. In the name of what? The answer, although it was correct, sounded strange: in the name of ensuring that, as a result of a "victorious" war for itself, England ... would become America's debtor and begin to lose

its world positions. Tarle wrote mockingly: "Subsequently, in Germany, Bethmann-Helweg and other responsible persons were asked with irritation: how did it even occur to them to solve the problem in such a strange way? Why did it seem to them that they would not have to deal with the entire Entente?... In fact, if it was very difficult to answer this question even in 1919, it is clear that in 1913-1914 not only Bethmann-Helweg was mistaken in this respect, but also persons who possessed stronger intellectual means than this executive and, in his own way, conscientious bureaucrat."

Ironically, Evgeny Viktorovich about the German chancellor and his colleagues was still in vain. In the categories of the national policy of the state, the answer was really not found, and the Kaiser and his employees were, on the one hand, exclusively national

figures, and on the other hand, they did not study the social sciences. And that is why they failed to see in time (and later) that the situation is already determined by the supranational policy of the supranational figures of the golden clan. Thinking in terms of such a "policy", it was quite profitable and reasonable for the true masters of England to lead their country along a path unfavorable for her as a national state, the path of a direct

European war with Germany. The policy of the ruling elite of England was treacherous towards England of Elizabeth and Nelson, the yeomen of Robin Hood and London dockers, Chaucer and Dickens... So, could the nationalist, I repeat, leadership of Germany comprehend the logic of such a total national betrayal in time and foresee its scale? The last week of July was

the decisive but logical conclusion of thirty years of work by the Holsteins, Wittes, Grays, Rothschilds, Poincarés, Schneiders, Krupps, Armstrongs, Baruchs, DuPonts, Sazonovs, Guchkovs, Churchills and Roosevelts.

Brailsford, already familiar to us, wrote before the war: "The international relations of firms trading in arms are a tempting topic for satire. Capital is devoid of patriotism. A German firm finds itself under the leadership of French directors. French, German and American The French company Schneider and the German company Krupp (two of the largest cannon companies in the world. - S.K.) united in a syndicate to develop iron mines in Algeria. The number of people profiting from armament and war is relatively small compared to the entire population of the civilized world. But their individual significance is greater, they work in alliance with "society" (Brailsford meant, of course, "secular, high society." - S.K.), which considers the empire as a field for the career of its sons (that is, roses and grays. S.K.), and with financial circles (that is, the Rothschilds and others - S.K.}, who consider it an area for investment.

I can add a specific detail to the general picture of the unity of the Golden International. President of the supra-aristocratic

Joachim Murat of the Parisian racing society (a direct descendant of the Napoleonic marshal), following the example of many noble families, became related to Jewish capital by marrying the richest adopted daughter of the Alsatian banker Ettinger. Now

their time has come. But it has not yet come, because Russia was out of the game, and on July 23, Serbia alone received an ultimatum from Austria-Hungary with a time for reflection - two days. The Habsburg Empire was the weakest of the great powers, but it would not have been difficult for it to slam Serbia. It was hampered by the fact that Russian Foreign Minister S. Sazonov declared: Russia cannot allow Austria to "speak threatening language with Serbia or take military measures against it." Indeed, immediately after receiving the ultimatum, Serbia turned to Russia for help.

"Logic" was mutually strange. Recall, the reader, how academician Khvostov assured half a century later that in 1914 only Germany wanted war (read - with Austria-Hungary), and Russia had to wait a few more years, because it was not ready. So why then, one wonders, did the Sazono-you-Romanovs get out on the rampage?

Why did Nicholas II in February 1914 irresponsibly declare to the Serbian Prime Minister Pasic: "We will do everything for Serbia"? For what? After all, he had already been warned more than once about the recklessness of such sentiments - the same

leader of the right, Durnovo! Even if Austria occupied Serbia, what would happen? She would have earned herself another "national" headache, and Vienna had enough of them even without the Serbs. Meanwhile, Russia would have strengthened, Austria would have weakened, and then ... Then it would be possible to move on to another liberation campaign against the lands of the southern

Slavs. Alas, in St. Petersburg in the summer of 1914, no one thought sensibly. Serbia behaved even more irresponsibly. It is generally accepted that the Austrian ultimatum consisted of such clauses that, if carried out, would destroy Serbia as a sovereign state. Sir Edward Gray "simply stifflingly" Jesuitically "doubted" whether Russia could advise the Serbs to accept the ultimatum, and provocatively added: "A state that accepts something like this, in fact, ceases to be an independent state."

However, only that state is independent, sovereign, which can defend itself by military force. And if he cannot, he must lead

yourself accordingly.

However, Gray lied and in fact. The ultimatum was really tough in places: the Serbs, for example, had to dismiss officers from the army according to the lists presented by Vienna. But he still did not destroy Serbia and there were no catastrophic threats there. This is probably why the full content of the ultimatum is far from always given even in thick historical works. After all,

acquaintance with the main document, because of which (as everyone in the West and in the East say in unison) WORLD WAR began, raises the question: "Did the Serbs have even the slightest moral right to reject such an ultimatum at that time?" One way or another, 10 minutes before the expiration of the ultimatum, on July 25 at 5:50 pm, Serbian Prime Minister Pasic handed the answer to Baron Gizl. Serbia accepted all items except for one. Read, and then

reflect on the rejected item. After the Serbs accepted the conditions, if not liquidating the independence of the country, then still seriously infringing on it, they did not agree that the Austrian police should participate on the territory of Serbia in the investigation into the case of persons involved in the Sarajevo events. At the same time, the Serbs referred to the fact that this would be contrary to the Serbian constitution.

So, the Serbs rejected the only demand of the Austrians, which was just the most natural and legitimate, and at the same time the most unburdensome. If we recall that Serbia

intended to defend its fate with Russian weapons in Russian hands, then this was, firstly, in fact, a response from Russia, giving the go-ahead to the war. Secondly, in relation to Russia on the part of Serbia, such a decision was the most criminal and unforgivable meanness! After all, it turned out that the future blood of Russian muzhiks would infuse the Serbian leadership to an even greater extent than the Russian one ... The Austrians immediately began mobilizing

against Serbia, but everything was calm on its border with Russia. Nothing strange. Neither in Berlin nor

in Vienna would they be at all inclined to regard what is happening as the beginning of a big war. Upon learning of the Serbian response, Wilhelm wrote to Secretary of State von Jagow: "There are no longer grounds for war" ... However, at the same time, he believed that

Austria should occupy Belgrade and part of Serbia as a "guarantee". On July 28,

Austria declared war on Serbia, and on the night of July 29, artillery shelling of Belgrade began. In Russia, the General Staff immediately began to rush into mobilization. The tsar was inclined to announce either full or partial mobilization, and Wilhelm urged him by telegrams not to flog the fever. It really could not have been flogged, because Germany would never have struck the first blow at Russia. Its target in case of war was Paris.

In other words, if the tsar and the heirs of Witte had not been in a hurry, then even if Germany had risked war, we would not have been in imminent danger. You could even formally go to war, calmly mobilize and calmly protect your borders. And there - they would have looked ...

Passive

assistance to the victory of Germany over France, even after all the German-Russian misunderstandings, would be beneficial for Russia. But in St. Petersburg, the "Russian" newspapers were already describing how the chubby Kuzka Kryuchkovs were entering Berlin. The tsar was assured that if only a partial mobilization (against Austria) was announced, then it would frustrate the general one (also against Germany). Beneath all the patriotic leavened froth a true desire was hidden: at least some peasant masses must be called in as soon as possible, put them under arms and throw them against Germany in order to save France.

But France somehow immediately began to be cautious: it's one thing to walk briskly in parades, brandishing a sword in the direction of the "Prussians", and another to expect their invasion from day to day.

On July 30, the French mobilized five frontier corps and immediately, either out of cowardice or out of precaution, withdrew their advanced units from the border with Germany for ten kilometers. In order, God forbid, not to give the Germans a pretext for border incidents. President Poincare presented these measures to the Russian ambassador Izvolsky as proof of peacefulness, and General Joffre reassured the Russian military agent Ignatiev that this was a subtle maneuver, and it had been foreseen in advance by the mobilization plan.

The French could afford such a "subtle" game, since Sazonov and the General Staff did not forget about the problems of the "sons of freedom" ... In fact, immediately after July 23 in the border Vilna and

mobilization preparations began in the Warsaw districts - even before the official reaction of the king. The head of the Chernigov garrison, Colonel Bonch-Bruевич (soon to become a prominent staff general) received a secret package from Kiev with an order to immediately bring the garrison units into a pre-mobilization state on July 29 at five in the afternoon, which objectively forced Germany to be on the alert. Our mobilization

activity at that time was strangely combined with our diplomatic passivity just where Russian diplomacy needed the sensitivity of a tuning fork, that is, in Vienna and Berlin. Already after (!) the Sarajevo shots, for some

reason (?!) Sazonov allowed the Berlin ambassador S. Sverbeev and the Vienna ambassador N. Shebeko to temporarily leave "their" capitals. It is also interesting that almost all Soviet authors are silent about this important and significant "detail". And only Markov II, known to us, writes: "In those very days when the fatal question was finally decided whether the world war would break out or whether it would be possible to delay it at least for a while, there were no imperial Russian ambassadors in Germany or Austria-Hungary, - one was enjoying a vacation in his village, the other was gaining impressions in St. Petersburg. However, in mid-July,

Sverbeev was already back in Berlin and visited Secretary of State Yagov. But in those days, when something else could be corrected, our ambassador was really not there. And now, when the border districts were already mobilizing, Sverbeev could only sadly state in a coded telegram to Sazonov: "Having learned from me that we were really forced to mobilize four military districts ... Yagov, in great agitation, answered me that this unexpected news completely changes the situation and that now he no longer sees the possibility of avoiding a European war.

Already in exile, Sazonov distorted Yagov's opinion, exposing him as a kind of fatalist militarist, who believes that since the conflict is inevitable, let it break out as soon as possible. But he wrote down one of the creators of the Entente, Delcasse, as a pacifist. Obviously, after all the troubles and turbulent years, Sergei Dmitrievich also considered himself in the "peacekeeping" department, completely refusing his share of responsibility for the war. But the facts say otherwise!

In 1910, Kaiser Wilhelm met the new Russian

Minister of Foreign Affairs and, dismissing him, said:

- Finally I had to meet with the Russian minister foreign affairs, who thinks and feels like a Russian. Sazonov bowed in response, and Wilhelm added: - With a nationally minded minister, it will not be difficult for us Germans to live in peace and good harmony. Now the

"nationally minded" Sazonov was afraid that he would be late with the war against the Germans. On July 28, Nikolai calmly played tennis. At the end of the day, he noted in his diary: "The day was unusually restless. I was constantly called to the phone either by Sazonov, or Sukhomlinov, or Yanushkevich."

And on July 29, Sazonov, after a meeting with Minister of War Sukhomlinov and Chief of the General Staff Yanushkevich, seeks from Nicholas II a decree on general mobilization. It is suspended a few minutes before the head of the mobilization department, General Dobrorolsky, began to dictate a decree to the telegraph operators of the capital's Glavtelegraph. The reason was another dispatch to Nikolai from the Kaiser, who warned against a collapse. A "nationally" "tuned"

trio (a minister and two generals)

On the morning of July 30, they gather again.

- I have accurate information that the German mobilization is going on in full swing, said Yanushkevich.

It wasn't true. The Germans announced mobilization only on 1 August. More precisely, on the border with France, some mobilization activities began already in the last week of July, but on the Russian-German border, everything was calm. Count Ignatiev passed through Germany on 26 July. Here are his impressions: "In Eidkunen, the German border station, I met a familiar and ordinary environment, except that only the customs and railway employees seemed to me especially helpful. signs of the pre-mobilization period familiar to me from the academy: the lengthening of the landing platforms, the concentration of rolling stock to large stations, etc. But it was already getting dark, and I still did not manage to notice anything "...



But Yanushkevich "noted" something, and he and Sukhomlinov phoned the king. Nikolai, after listening to Yanushkevich, was brief: I stop talking. Your

Majesty, Sergei Dmitrievich conveys his most humble request to allow me to say a few words to you. -

Well ...

Sazonov picked up the phone: - Your Majesty, I humbly ask for an audience for urgent report.

Nicholas paused and agreed: -

Come at three o'clock.

As early as March 12, 1914, Sukhomlinov, in an "anonymous" article in Birzhevy Vedomosti, declared (clearly at odds with von Yagov here): "Russia is ready."

The leader of the Kadet Party, Milyukov, believed that "this article was fatal" and became "one of the impulses that caused the war." But further - more ... On May 31 (according to the European account, June 13, which, by the way, gives an amusing symbolic inversion: 31-13), the second article inspired by Sukhomlinov in Birzhevka stated even more abruptly: "Russia is ready, must be ready and France". The

government order (outfit) for rifles for our largest arms factory - Tula - was as follows: in January 1914 - five (five!) Pieces, in February - also five, in March - six, in April - five, in May - one (one!), in June - again one, in July - one training rifle. What, reader, do not believe? I myself have a hard time believing this.

But the source of information - the most authoritative - our famous gunsmith, general (of both the tsarist and Soviet armies) Vladimir Grigorievich Fedorov, then a member of the weapons department of the Artillery committee.

In his memoirs, Fedorov wrote later: "A few days before the declaration of war, the largest factory produces one training rifle per month! This is how the Ministry of War was preparing for an armed clash."

Looking ahead, I will say that with the beginning of the war, Fedorov went all the way to ... Japan for the badly needed Russian army, at least the old Japanese "arisaki".

In the meantime, the war has not yet begun, and at the end of July Sukhomlinov again serenely confirms "our complete readiness." Now he looked into the eyes of Sazonov, who had finished his telephone conversation with the tsar, and was impatiently waiting for what he would say...

At three o'clock I am in Peterhof, - Sazonov reassured him and Yanushkevich. - And this is what ... If I can convince him, then I'll call you, General, - he turned to Yanushkevich, - and you immediately call the Main Telegraph.

Good, - Yanushkevich agreed excitedly. - And then I'll leave the house, break the phone and in general you won't find me if the order to cancel everything comes again.

Sazonov went to the tsar. And two hours later, about five in the evening 30 July, he called Yanushkevich: - Now

you can break your phone ... A year will pass. In the autumn of 1915, Yanushkevich would telegraph Sukhomlinov: "The 3rd and 8th armies have melted ... The cadres are dwindling, and the replacements who receive rifles on the day of the battle (!!! -S.K.) vying with each other surrender ... No rifles, and 150,000 people are standing without guns. Hour by hour it doesn't get any easier. We expect manna from heaven from you. The main thing is, is it possible to buy rifles "...

And the German heavy artillery, not lacking in shells, tirelessly smashed the unarmed masses of peasants who had not only no cartridges, but, as we see, the rifles themselves ...

#### Chapter

5. The war is decided, the war has begun ... The first day of mobilization was scheduled for July 31st. On this day, at 12:23 Vienna time, the Austrian-Hungarian War Ministry also received a decree on general mobilization against Russia, signed by Emperor Franz Joseph. Comparing the time and taking into account the difference in an hour, we can assume that Austria decided not at the same time, but after us, although later the opposite was also asserted. However, the Austrians have not yet entered the war with Russia.

Not without a gentleman in the last pre-war days the highest German orders of the Black and Red Eagle Witte.

On March 22, 1906, in a telegram to the Berlin banker Mendelssohn regarding a possible German loan, he wrote about "wise principles proclaimed in Björk" ... The principles in Björk were proclaimed, as

we remember, really intelligent, but Witte himself torpedoed them.

Now he created for himself the image of an opponent of the conflict, but his recipe was this: "We need to jump on this crazy impudent Wilhelm in time." In what sense is it possible to "stick" and can the formidable tone of Russia, which is not ready for war (according to Witte himself), come to reason with Germany that is not badly prepared for it, Sergey Yulievich is not explained.

At midnight on July 31, the German ambassador Pourtales came to Sazonov once again. In the morning Nikolai himself received it, but what did Nikolai mean in Russia if it was necessary to rescue her, and not harm her? The conversation with the tsar came out empty, and now Pourtales stood before Sazonov.

- Mr. Minister, I am authorized by my government to convey to your government that if Russia is not demobilized by twelve o'clock on the first of August, then Germany will also announce mobilization. - Does this mean war? Sazonov asked.

- No, but we are extremely close to her. Kaiser Wilhelm was impulsive - no doubt. For a third of

a century of sole visible power, he developed a completely individual style: effective realism in details and energetic illusions in the overall vision of things. The Germany of his youth was but a Junker Prussia, and the Germany of his late maturity a mighty industrial Reich whose dominions stretched to the equator. And he was very inclined to believe that Europe should reckon with him more than with herself, because he was sure that he knew better than Europe how to ensure the good not only of Germany, but of the entire continent ... And is it really the Kaiser was wrong?

Even before the war, Pastor Friedrich Naumann had put forward the idea of a "Middle Europe" under German rule. Such a program was reinforced in the views of German industrialists and financiers. Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities on September 9, 1914, Chancellor Bethmann-Hellweg outlined these plans as the main goals of the war in a special note. It was supposed to create a Central European economic union consisting of Austria-Hungary, a weakened France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Poland, as well as Italy, Sweden, Norway under "actual German leadership."

How could such ideas be evaluated from the point of view of Russia's interests

and prospects? "Middle Europe" did not threaten Russia if Russia was concerned exclusively with its internal growth. A powerful united economy of continental Europe would immediately split all the Anglo-Saxon plans for world hegemony, but the same economy could help us build a mighty Russian state if external loans were used for these purposes, and not for the construction of "strategic" roads through the swamps. Could "Middle Europe" be the result of a

war? In principle, yes, but only if Russia did not participate in this war against Germany. It is possible that Wilhelm, Pastor Friedrich Naumann,

Chancellor Bethmann were not theoretically wrong in their assessments of the chances of "Middle Europe" ... However, in practice, in the real political situation that was realized by 1914, their views were a dangerous dream. She could turn into reality! But only in alliance with Russia. And Wilhelm waved his hand at such an opportunity - New Berdichev himself had long been pulling in the other direction. And this anti-German maneuver was carried out

there so cleverly that the course and meaning of events were not captured even by those who, by age, position and rank, would do well to be more perspicacious. So, the famous General Brusilov, even after

the First World War, was sure that "the external and internal German was omnipotent with us ... In St. Petersburg there was a powerful Russian-German party that demanded at all costs, at the cost of any was the humiliation of a strong alliance with Germany, which at that time demonstratively spat on us. What under such conditions could be the preparation of the minds of the people for this obviously inevitable war, which was to decide the fate of Russia. Here Brusilov clearly fails logic. After all, if the "inner German" was so

totally "omnipotent", then why would this war on the "outer German" be "obviously inevitable"? And it would be more correct to assume the opposite (alas, corresponding to reality): precisely because those to whom the Russian-German alliance was a bone in their gluttonous throat turned out to be omnipotent, a war absolutely unnecessary for Russia became "inevitable" from a certain moment.

I don't know how Germany "spit" on us there - being our largest trading partner, which, moreover, supplied industrial equipment for creating the latest industries, but I know that the Anglo-French did not spit on Russia. Yes, they kissed her, and in the same "attack of passions" that the notorious Judas Iscariot once experienced in relation to Jesus Christ ... By the way, once again about Brusilov ... Analyst V. Nikolaev reports

that the general, who was in the 20s at the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR for especially important assignments, in one of his lectures he named the main permanent strategic continental opponents of Russia - England, Turkey, Poland ... The audience was surprised - what about Germany, in the war with which Brusilov distinguished himself so much ? "We had nothing to share with her," the author of "Brusilov's breakthrough" replied, "we were simply pitted...". Well, what can I say, reader? Perhaps one thing: "OH!!!"... Immortal gods can treat those who betray them calmly. They have eternity. What about people? What about the peoples? For us mortals, there are critical moments when we either break the chain of disastrous circumstances, or become entangled in them even more tightly... Not the interests of the "German-Russian Party", but the interests of the Russian state dictated one decision: to abandon the conflict with the Germans. After all, what is sad is that even such a weak monarch as Nicholas II understood this intuitively (and therefore hesitated).

Yes, how could he not doubt the correctness of the anti-German choice, if in February 1914 a note from Pyotr Nikolaevich Durnovo, the most important figure in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire, lay on the emperor's desk. In 1884-1893 he was the director of the police department, in 1900-1905 he was a deputy minister, from September 1905 to April 1906 he was a minister, then completely dismissed from the ministry - not without Witte's intrigues. From 1906 he was a member of the State Council.

Durnovo suppressed the Russian revolution, was the leader and banner of the extreme right. Lenin called him a "wild dog" and over and over again used the formula "Dubasovs and Durnovo"... The class image of Durnovo is quite clear - he was a monarchist and a defender of the interests of the exclusively haves. He was so consistently and organically oligarchic that even the oligarchy recoiled from him. But

Durnovo's note contained the following: "The vital interests of Russia and Germany do not collide anywhere and give full grounds for the peaceful coexistence of these two states. The future of Germany is on the seas, that is, exactly where Russia has, in essence, the most continental of all great powers, there are no interests" ...

And what - isn't that the case to this day? Durnovo perfectly understood the senselessness of our struggle for the Black Sea straits, which "release" the Russian fleet only into the Mediterranean Sea, locked by Gibraltar and then controlled by England.

Further, Durnovo wrote: "I will say more, the defeat of Germany - in the field of our commodity exchange - is

unprofitable for us." And Durnovo did not limit himself to a simple statement, but described in detail the essence of mutual economic relations: "As for German dominance in the field of our economic life ... Russia is too poor in capital and industrial entrepreneurship to be able to do without a wide influx of foreign capital. Therefore, a certain dependence on or other foreign capital is inevitable for us until the industrial enterprise and material resources of the Russian population develop to such an extent that they make it possible to completely refuse the services of foreign entrepreneurs ... But as long as we need them, German capital is more profitable for us than any First of all, this capital is the cheapest of all, as it is content with the smallest percentage of entrepreneurial profits ... Moreover, a significant proportion of the profits received from German capital invested in Russian industry does not leave us at all, unlike the British and French capitalists, the German capitalists themselves are moving to Russia with their capital. The British and French are sitting abroad, choosing to the last penny from Russia the profits generated by their enterprises. On the contrary, German entrepreneurs live in Russia for a long time and quickly turn brown. Who has not seen, for example, the French and the British, who have lived in Russia almost all their lives and do not speak a word of Russian. On the contrary, how many Germans can be seen in Russia who, even if with an accent, broken language, but, nevertheless, would not explain themselves in Russian?"...

As for the economic aspects of the conflict with the Germans, here Durnovo thought just like a Marxist: "The consequence of this war will be such an economic situation that the oppression of German capital will seem easy. After all, there is no doubt that the war will require expenses far exceeding the limited financial resources of Russia. We will have to turn to the credit of the allied and neutral states, and it will, of course, not be provided for nothing ... And so, inevitably, even after the victorious end of the war, we will fall into such financial and economic bondage to our creditors, in comparison with which the present dependence on German capital will seem like an ideal. Surprisingly, even Soviet historians explained the growing anti-German

sentiments in "educated" metropolitan circles by the fact that German competition began to interfere with the growing Russian commercial and industrial capital. They say that industrialists especially wanted to break the Russian-German treaty of 1904, since this would eliminate the import of "German manufactured goods" into Russia.

But "manufactured product" is different for "manufactured product". From Germany, Russia received the vast majority of exports under the item "cars and colors of cars." It is one thing to supply a "competitor" with a bed welded from a rolling "corner", it is another matter to put in a "corner", and it is quite another to install a rolling mill on which this "corner" is rolled. So German deliveries threatened not so much the domestic sale of Russian goods as the plans for the technological enslavement of Russia by Anglo-Saxon and French capital. And what

about the "Slavic" dinners that the Ryabushinskys rolled up in the spring of 1913 in company with the "Slavophilizing" Cadet leaders under the approving glances of the Tsar's uncle, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich? Well, they shouted about the "straits" there, but they drank and walked, in fact, for the glory of France, England, Belgium ... That's why Durnovo warned ...

And for all the accuracy of analysis, which was deadly for the figures of New Berdichev and the Entente, Durnovo was not a special genius-prophet. He wrote about the obvious. But how many among the Russian elite were able to see this obvious and, moreover, be guided by it? Brusilov wondered about pro-German omnipotence ... But what kind of omnipotence

was it possible to speak if the situation was not broken even by documents and arguments similar to those presented by Durnovo?

Nikolai did not draw practical conclusions from Durnovo's warning, but he doubted ... And how could he not doubt if he had to finally decide on a lot ... A couple of years ago, when faced with the need to fill the position of our ambassador in Berlin, he offered him to the then Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Count V. Kokovtsov, saying: - You know that this post is very difficult, our policy has always been based on friendship with Germany, and now the circumstances are such that we need an experienced and seasoned person, like you, to protect our interests.

Kokovtsov listened attentively, not even trying to express with a gesture his reaction, and the king continued:

"Besides, Emperor Wilhelm, apparently, sincerely favors you and lavished upon me the greatest praises for you. - Sovereign, I am touched by your confidence, but can I give a completely frank answer, or is your decision final? asked Kokovtsov. - No, I do not want to embarrass you, Vladimir Nikolaevich, and I do

this proposal because I believe in its favor.

- Your Majesty, I have no right to refuse the post of ambassador in Berlin, but I am afraid of being in the wrong place in Berlin ... I am not used to diplomatic subtleties, and in Berlin every word is taken into account.

Nikolai listened without visible displeasure, and Kokovtsov decided: - And, to be honest, I am also

afraid that my conviction in preserving peace at all costs may meet with other tendencies among those of our circles that pursue the so-called "national" policy ... The word "national" Kokovtsov pronounced emphatically, clearly putting it in quotation marks, but Nikolai did not want to pay attention to this, did not

ask for clarifications, and languidly said: - I cannot rape you, and I will gladly keep your current position. Tell Sazonov that he can send me a report on the appointment of his candidate.



The choice fell, as we know, on S. Sverbeev, a man, according to Kokovtsov, "strikingly insignificant." And he turned out to be an ideal transmitter of the ideas of the "chief" Sazonov and the backstage chefs of the "chief".

In the presented fully documentary episode, as in a drop of dirty water, you can find a complete set of bacilli that poisoned the Russian state body: the tsar's lethargy and indecision, the inability even correctly, of the truly nationally minded part of his entourage to reverse this lethargy and the active fuss of supposedly national forces directed "Anglo-French Entente. Nevertheless, Nikolai, even on the eve of the collapse of 1914, had doubts. Kaiser, for

all his self-confidence, also hesitated. Having learned that Pasic almost agreed with Vienna's ultimatum, he writes to Secretary of State von Jagow that Austria-Hungary should limit itself to diplomatic success and not start a war. Milyukov later claimed that Wilhelm was "carried away by the idea of a war with Russia," but forgot that at that time he himself was publicly "carried away" by the idea of a war with Germany, while the Kaiser was thinking about it. It was much easier for him to mobilize than for Nikolai. Colonel General Helmuth von Moltke Jr. once mentioned that the German army was in a state of "permanent mobilization", but behind him was not a readiness for aggression, but thoughtfulness, organization, a well-developed road network and extremely high military qualities of the reserve, even more combat-ready than young conscripts. After the announcement of mobilization, it was difficult for us to start and stop it. The "technical impossibility" of demobilization in St. Petersburg was not easy, but ...

Of course, this eternal Russian "but" meant a lot: not so much it was difficult to stop our mobilization if we wanted to ...

Indeed, by noon on August 1, the mobilization announced on the morning of July 31 had not yet left the stage of mastering mobilization instructions by officials and receiving mobilization sums by them. It was possible to suspend the collections that had not yet begun, but (one more "but") not for high-ranking St. Petersburg.

After the war, there were many disputes about whether the war could have been avoided, whether Berlin was in a hurry with the last ultimatum. The socialist Germans Bernstein and Kautsky argued, our Tarle and the German Delbrück went over the options, but only the fact that the war was decided was important. And the Sarajevo shots were only fired by the Serbs, but it was not they who prepared the ground for them. The war was decided, and the Russian colossus was untwisted not at all for

to stop her at the last moment...

At seven in the evening, Count Pourtales again entered Sazonov's office. It was obvious that he was very worried. Right from the threshold, the ambassador asked the question: - - Is the

Russian government ready to give a favorable answer to Germany's ultimatum? - No, we cannot cancel the general

mobilization, but we are still disposed to negotiate to resolve the dispute peacefully. - Mr. Minister, I ask again, is the Russian government ready to give a favorable answer to

Germany's ultimatum? I would like to point out the grave consequences that your refusal to reckon with this German demand will entail ...

- No, Mr. Ambassador, the mobilization cannot be stopped. Pourtales took a folded piece of paper out of his pocket and said in a trembling voice:

- So, I ask for the third time, Mr. Minister, is the Russian government ready to give a favorable answer to the German ultimatum? "Alas, Count, I cannot give you any other answer than what you

have already heard... Now Pourtales' voice and hand with the paper were trembling, but he

finished:

- In that case, I am instructed by my government to convey the following note to you. The note contained a

declaration of war, and - due to the phenomenal lack of inspection of the embassy - even in two versions that Chancellor Bethmann-Hellweg sent from Berlin. However, then even Sazonov did not pay attention to this. The meaning was clear, and Sergei Dmitrievich did not read the note verbatim. And Pourtales went to the window.

He leaned back, looking at Petersburg from the office of the Russian minister for the last time, raised his hands with an exclamation: "Who could have foreseen that I would have to leave Petersburg under such conditions!" and... cried. Sazonov suddenly looked into the future, and ... also trembled. He approached Pourtales, and instead of a cold handshake, he unexpectedly embraced him. And then the ex-

ambassador, not with firm steps, left Sazonov's office ... This scene is very picturesque (but with a very large share of gag, seriously distorting the information of the same Sazonov) was described by Valentin Pikul in "Unclean Power". Well, the liveliness of the imagination of writers is not forbidden. Worse, Pikul simply distorted the dates, arguing that by the time of Pourtales' last conversation with Sazonov, "the Germans had already occupied defenseless Luxembourg." They occupied it, but only the next day, August 2. Alas, this is not the only intentional "delusion" of Valentin Savvich, which exposes the situation in a light favorable to his schemes, but not favorable to reviewing the facts of history.

And to put an end to it, I will inform you that Pikul simply copied all the "artistic details" missing from Sazonov, which allow accusing Germany of stubborn intention to fight, from ... the French ambassador Maurice Paleologus. And this peculiar diplomat was inferior to his great compatriot Dumas only in his talent for writing, but by no means in his talent for invention. On that day, Nikolai modestly

noted: "I took a walk with the children. At 6 1/2 we went to the vigil. Upon returning from there, we learned that Germany had declared war on us. .) with a telegram from Georgie (George V. - S.K.}. It took a long time to answer with him ... We drank tea at 12 1/4 ".

Very little time will pass, and the first Russian blood will flow profusely. The public of Moscow - through the son of the Moscow industrialist Vladimir von Meck - asks Leonid Osipovich Pasternak (the father of the poet) "to draw a poster for a charitable collection of donations in favor of the victims of the war."

Pasternak is a subtle and impressionable artist, he will catch the "nerve" of what is happening exactly, even prophetically, and in not many colors will execute an expressive lithographed poster: a wounded soldier

wearing a cap, pressing a white bandage to his forehead, leaned against the wall and was about to fall.

There were crowds in front of the poster pasted in Moscow on the day of the gathering. The women were crying. And then an aide-de-camp came from St. Petersburg and informed the author: "The sovereign is not pleased with your poster. He said that he," here the handsome secular man raised his voice to an impossible courage, "his soldier always keeps himself well done, and not like that" ... And really! Why,

one wonders, should the bleeding "lower rank" not soar like a falcon, if his sovereign began his entry in his diary about the first day of the war with the words: "Good day, especially in the sense of raising the spirit"? After that, the Russian troops were naturally supposed to look to the devil and under

the marches of the regimental bands cheerfully go towards the German machine-gun "showers" ... "Showers" that cut off the past from Russia and hide the future of Russia behind their dense lead veil. And without that it is unclear ... The pre-war week has expired. For Russia and Germany, the first military week began. And already fought Austria-Hungary

and Serbia. By this time, Germany, implementing the ideas of the late Schlieffen, had found a way to declare war on France on August 3 in the evening and entered Belgium on the morning of August 4. Paris began a general mobilization on July 31, having learned that Petersburg had announced it. However, the French attributed its beginning to August 1 - the day when Germany announced it. Poincaré and Joffre were concerned about "national considerations of moral order" and wanted the Germans to be held responsible afterwards. At the moment of the beginning of the tragedy of the peoples, these buffoons cared only about the cleanliness of their shirt-fronts and the general's gloves. But even before the outbreak of hostilities, they were involved in the death of a man who called on him not to start a war. On July 31, in Paris, during a speech against the outbreak of war, the famous socialist leader Jean Jaurès was assassinated. That was the true mood of mass bourgeois France, which placed the responsibility for the war on the Kaiser.

However, French politicians - lovers of poses and phrases - could not do without hypocrisy even in conversations with each other. On August 1, Minister of War A. Messimi called the mayor of Lyon E. Herriot:

"From now on, this is the struggle of civilization against barbarism. All French must be united in hatred for the enemy, who has only one goal: to destroy the nation (how enough! - S. K.), speaking in front of the whole world as a fighter for the right and freedom."

Colonial Indo-China, Algeria, Somalia, Tunisia and Congo, Madagascar, Martinique and Tahiti could only keep silent during these speeches. The Moroccans, however, were involved in the struggle "for freedom", and they were to bleed in the fields near

the Marne. In the light of lamentations about "civilization and barbarism," the description by the former French ambassador in Berlin, Jules Cambon, of his last meeting with Secretary of State von Jagov is interesting. After the declaration of war, Jagov came to Cambon himself - to say goodbye. In front of the French embassy, the German crowd roared and whistled, and Jagov looked

slyly at the Frenchman and remarked: - What would these fools say, my dear friend, how we talk while sitting on the same sofa ...

England soon joined the war. Moreover, "pacifist" and "neutral" England was the first to start the war with the Reich - on August 4th. Vienna declared war on Russia only on 6 (sixth, reader!) August. So, it turned out that Austria-Hungary, in anticipation of the war with which Russia began mobilization, was the last to enter the "Russian" main line of war. However, one way or

another, a big war (either - a big massacre or - making super-profits - who cares) began in its entirety. For a long time and seriously. Already after it, some

people claimed that there was supposedly a moment when the position of England could have turned Germany exclusively towards Russia. And Anglo-Saxon historians enthusiastically suck at the question: "What would happen if the Germans went to the East in 1914, confining themselves to defense in the West?" It

is not enough for them that in reality two great peoples, called to complement one another, were quarreled and divorced on opposite sides of the historical ring. At least in their assumptions, they want to see only our mutual destruction, only our mutual weakening.

Then fear of a German-Russian alliance and hatred for such a prospect will break through in the anti-Soviet policy of the West, in

cannibalistic wishes of the American Truman and the Englishman Churchill-son, in lies about Germany.

On August 4, Emperor Wilhelm II of Germany delivered a speech from the throne in the Reichstag: "The present situation is a consequence of the ill will that has been fed for many years to the power and prosperity of the German Empire. We were forced to defend ourselves, and we take up the sword with a clear conscience and clean hands."

The first sentence was completely true, the second - only partly. None of those who had power in the world due to birth, elections, money or their own dexterity, could even stutter about a clear conscience. But still, Germany was then, perhaps, indeed, a considerable share of the rightness. Not without reason, the Nobel laureate, Norwegian writer and politician Bjornstjerne Bjornson, who was called the "Norwegian Voltaire" and "Norwegian Hugo", wrote about the Germans several years before the war: "They are a great people, happy with their unshakable faith in the indisputability of their rights." An outstanding personality, Bjornson knew what patriotism and national law are. And he was thinking about "Germanic" Europe. Was it possible to assume servile motives in a man who fought all his life for the independence of Norway from Sweden and for the democratization of society, was the author of the words of the national Norwegian anthem? I will give one more opinion of the now unquoted, although two-faced,

but undoubtedly smart Karl Radek: "When Wilhelm II realized that it would not be possible to localize the war (limiting himself to the conflict between Austria and Serbia. - S.K.) he tried to give counterparts in Vienna but it was too late."

Radek believed that Wilhelm only wanted to scare the tsar and thereby deprive the Serbs of Russian support.

Even more valuable can be considered the recognition of the American Barbara Tuckman, who wrote about Wilhelm as follows: "When Russia began to mobilize, he (Kaiser. - S.K.) burst into a hot tirade with ominous predictions, attacking not the "traitor-Slavs", but his cunning uncle (i.e. King of England Edward VII. - S.K.)". On the margins of "hot" diplomatic telegrams,

Wilhelm scribbled angrily: "The world will be overwhelmed by the most terrible of wars, the result of which

will be the defeat of Germany. The encirclement of Germany has finally become a fait accompli. We stuck our heads in the noose... The dead Eduard is stronger than the living me"...

Monarch Wilhelm, who had long identified himself with the Reich, could not help attaching paramount importance to the personality of another monarch. Therefore, he exaggerated the role of Edward. But he managed to see the presence of a conspiracy against Germany. And it is significant that he blamed it primarily not on the Russians, but on the European Entente.

By the way, even E. Tarle noted that in July 1914, the extreme right-wing press of Germany was very incited to the Kaiser, accusing him of excessive peacefulness, compliance, and indecision.

And who knows to what extent such "ultrapatriotic" appeals were paid for in dollars and pounds? Wilhelm

clearly expressed his attitude to the ongoing war in the East in 1915 in response to a secret request-memorandum from the commander of the German troops, General Falkenhayn. Falkenhayn asked: "Are reconciliation talks with Russia desirable?" The Kaiser immediately responded with an unqualified "Yes!".

Germany was always deployed to the West, and England pushed her to the same place. But the Germans did not attack Russia at first. Petersburg-"Berdichev" itself gave the order to cross the border and hastily invade East Prussia solely in the interests of supporting the French.

Of course, Germany had been preparing for war for years, as well as the rest of its future participants. And yet only Germany can be said to be in many ways a victim of circumstances.

Serbia was undoubtedly the victim of a provocation.

And Russia fell victim to mediocre leadership and internal betrayal of her interests by the top, "cream of society".

The military theorist B. Shaposhnikov, whom we have mentioned more than once, assessed the beginning of the war in this way: "Mobilization on the threshold of a world war was its actual declaration and could be understood only in this sense ... If we consider the responsibility for the war from this point of view, then Of course, those who blame Russia for the global conflagration are right." Unpatriotic talk? No, just incomplete.

Because further Shaposhnikov says bluntly: "Of course, not a Russian

mobilization was the cause of the European war" and refers to Lenin, who spoke well about the beginning of the war even during the war. Shaposhnikov quoted Lenin not only because in the 1920s he was already the commander of the Red Army, but also because Lenin beat, as they say, "to the point", stating: "War is a continuation of politics. It is necessary to study the politics before the war, the politics that led and led to the war... The layman confines himself to saying that "the enemy is attacking", without understanding why the war is being waged, by what classes, for what political goal. It is important because of what this war is being waged. " Shaposhnikov gave both a figurative and, at the same time, professionally accurate description of the war: "The Germans

from the banks of the Spree have the honor of establishing the term "oncoming battle." So, in accordance with its nature, we would sum up the world war under the heading of a counter war. Maybe bourgeois diplomats, politicians and historians will reconcile for scrap in determining the nature of the war, and by the way, they will divide the responsibility for the war in half. "Excellent, but, nevertheless, maybe someone could have been given and " more than half"? After all, Shaposhnikov himself wrote that "the hand of the Serbian General Staff directed Princip's revolver, thereby

challenging Austria-Hungary to a bloody struggle" ... And who directed the Serbian General Staff? No, the role of Germany was particularly ambiguous, the role of Austria

from the very beginning was a subordinate.

The real instigators of the war turned out to be France and England, obedient to the Golden International. Therefore, it remains for us, the reader, to cast a last pre-war glance at England and Sir Edward Grey. It was he who completed what he thought. This "Eduardgreeda" looked like this. On the eve of the delivery

of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, Gray rejected Sazonov's proposal for the collective influence of Russia, England and France on Vienna. He needed an ultimatum to be presented. Its content was not a secret for the British: in addition to the advance information of the Austrian ambassador, the main provisions of the ultimatum were set out on July 22 in The Times



(controlled by Jewish circles since the days of Disraeli Beaconsfield). That is also the day before. On the "ultimatum

day," July 23, Gray received the Austrian ambassador Mensdorff and began to talk about the damage that the war would cause to the trade of the four great powers: Russia, Austria, France and Germany. He did not mention England, from which the Austrian drew a favorable conclusion: England would not fight. About Gray, Mensdorff reported: "He was cold-blooded and objective, as usual, friendly and not without sympathy for us." And before the entry of England into the war was less than a crescent. Throughout the following week, Gray, whom Sazonov even in the

twenties certified as a "convinced pacifist", tirelessly engaged in one thing: directing Europe to war. The day after the delivery of the ultimatum - July 24 - he spent in tireless work. Already, personally, he

informs the Russian Ambassador Benckendorff that he is ready, through the mediation of the

"disinterested" powers (England, France, Germany and Italy), to discuss the crisis with Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Grey's Russia remained outside the brackets, but Sazonov - either out of naivety, or obscuring the truth - later highly

appreciated this hypocritical step of Gray (they say, Gray "agreed", in the end, with his proposal). Gray, however, wrinkled at the same time such a barely perceptible - not sour, but only with a gentlemanly sourness, face that Benckendorff

reported to Petersburg the next day: "I did not observe a single symptom either from Gray or from the king, indicating that that England is seriously considering the possibility of remaining neutral. My observations lead to a certain impression of the reverse order." The Russian Germans Benkendorfs were not stupid in all their times! Then Gray again accepted Mensdorff. Yesterday he refused to discuss the Austrian note on the merits, saying that he supposedly needed to see the document with his own eyes. Now the Austrian

has brought the official

copy.

- Sir, here is the authentic text.

Gray began to "thoroughly" read the already well-known text without any emotion on his perfectly shaven face. Then he put down the paper and sighed: - You gave the

Serbs too little time and were too categorical. But the document is amazing, amazing... - What do you mean, sir? - Ah, Mr.

Ambassador, I mean that England, fortunately, is here only an impartial observer. And finally, on the 24th,

it is the turn of the German ambassador to London von Lichnowsky. Here Gray was simply categorical:

- While we are talking about localizing a collision between you and Serbs, this does not concern me ... - I understand you, sir, - Lichnowski agreed. "But if public opinion in Russia (!? - S.K.) forced (Ha! S.K.) the Russian government to oppose Austria, then the danger of a European war, in our opinion, would come close," Gray continued.

- European? Lichnowski shivered involuntarily. -

Yes ... And all the consequences of such a war of four, - Gray slightly but distinctly raised his quiet, measured voice, - the great powers cannot be foreseen at all.

Lichnowski almost asked: "And England?", but even so everything was clear. The four powers are Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany and France... "So, England, thank God, puts itself out of the conflict," Lichnowski thought to himself

with relief. A day later, on July 26, the English team of the Golden International went with the king's trump card. George V had an intimate conversation with his nephew, the Kaiser's brother, Prince Heinrich of Prussia. The king spoke as if he and his subject Sir Gray had read from the same page: the war should be localized between Austria and Serbia, and England would be neutral. Heinrich told his brother that these words were clearly "said in earnest." However,

something else was being said seriously. On July 27, at a cabinet meeting, Gray issued an ultimatum to England's participation in the war and, otherwise, threatened to resign. But this was already just coquetry - SERIOUSLY no one was going to object.